

ACIP 37B 2

, 'O NA THEG PA CHE CHUNG GI SDE SNOD DU CHOS KYI BDAG MED RDZOGS PAR STON MI STON DANG, DE GNYIS KYI LAM DU'ANG CHOS KYI BDAG MED RDZOGS PAR SGOM MI SGOM SLOB DPON 'DIS BSHAD PA'I DON GANG YIN SNYAM NA, DE NI THEG CHEN PA LA SHES BYA THAMS CAD RANG BZHIN GYIS GRUB PA MED PAR RTOGS PA YOD LA, NYAN RANG LA DE MED PAR SHES BYA PHYOGS GCIG PA 'GA' RANG BZHIN GYIS GRUB PA MED PAR RTOGS PA YOD CES PA NI, GTAN MIN TE GZHI GRUB PA CIG GI STENG DU, CHOS KYI BDAG MED TSAD MAS GRUB PA CIG BYUNG NA, DE NAS GZHI GZHAN LA BDEN PAR YOD MED KYI DPYOD PA ZHUGS NA, RIGS PA SNGA MA LA BR TEN NAS BDEN MED DU RTOGS PAR NUS PA'I PHYIR RO, DBU MA PAR 'DOD PA KHA CIG GIS DNGOS PO BDEN GRUB KHEGS PA'I LUGS SU BYAS NAS, @38A BDEN STONG BDEN GRUB TU 'DOD PA DANG, KHA CIG GIS CHOS NYID SGRUB PA RANG DBANG BA BDEN GRUB TU 'DOD PA'I SNGA MA NI, BDEN TSAD LEGS POR MA ZIN PAR RAGS PA CIG LAS MA KHEGS PAR 'DUG PA'I SKYON DU SNANG LA, PHYI MA NI DNGOS PO BDEN PA BKAG PAR RLOM YANG, TSAD MAS KHEGS PAR MI SNANG GI DNGOS PO LA SKUR 'DEBS KYI LTA BAR 'DUG PAS, DE DAG GIS MA NGES PA MED DO,

Hopkins Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, pp 174-176

QUESTION : What is the meaning of the master Nagarjuna's explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is taught fully in the Mahayana but not in the Hinayana scriptures? Also, what is the meaning of his explanation that the selflessness of phenomena is fully cultivated on the Mahayana but not on the Hinayana path?

ANSWER : In no way does Nagarjuna teach that Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not, like the Mahayanists, cognize that all objects of knowledge are without inherent existence, but rather cognize that just a portion of objects of knowledge are without inherent existence. If a selflessness of phenomena is established by valid cognition in terms of one phenomenon, then when you analyze whether or not another phenomenon inherently exists, you can realize its non-inherent existence on the basis of your previous reasoning.

Some who wish to be Madhyamikas assert a system refuting the true existence of phenomena but maintain that the emptiness of true existence truly exists, [i.e. Chapa Chokyi Senge - *phyapa chos kyisengge*] while others assert that a positive independent nature of phenomena truly exists. [i.e. Dolpo pa - who maintained an "other emptiness" *zhan tong* (*ghan stong*), so-called because it maintained that the ultimate (*don dam*), while empty of all things different from itself (*rang ma yin pas stong pa = gzhan stong*), is not empty of itself (*rang stong ma yin*).]

The former appears to have the fault of not delimiting well the measure of true existence and thereby of refuting only a coarse form of it.

The latter claims to refute the true existence of phenomena but appears not to have done so through valid cognition and instead abides in a view that is a denial of phenomena.

Therefore, these [two wrong interpretations (*de dag gis*)] cannot challenge [(*ma nges pa med do*) our position that if the emptiness of one phenomenon is realized, the emptiness of any phenomenon can be realized based on the previous reasoning].

Jinpa Chapter 6, p 176

"Failing to draw this distinction, many appeared who considered "that which is capable of withstanding reasoned analysis" or "an entity capable of withstanding such analysis" to be the measure of the object of negation. Numerous errors have apparently been made because of this. For instance, some assert that ultimate truth is not a knowable phenomenon; others view it as truly existent."³²⁴

Note 324 in Jinpa's translation of chapter 6:

"Although Tsongkhapa does not identify who he sees to be the proponents of these errors, his student Khedrup Jé attributes the first error to the great translator Ngok Loden Sherab (1059–1109) and the second to the logician Chapa Chökyi Sengé (1109–69). See Cabezón, *Dose of Emptiness*, 143. Khedrup offers a crucial middle step — namely, that such proponents fail to differentiate between "something that can withstand reasoned analysis" and "something that is established by reasoning." Since even the ultimate truth cannot withstand analysis, Ngok felt compelled to admit, according to Khedrup Jé, that ultimate truth is unestablished (*gzhi ma grub*)."

Cabezon Dose of Emptiness, p 143

Without making these kinds of distinctions, some have fallen into such errors as believing that the measure of that which is to be refuted (dgag bya'i tshad) [is determined by whether something] "can withstand analysis by reasoning" (rigs pas dpyad bzod). They do not distinguish between something "withstanding the analysis by reasoning that examines reality" and something "being established by reasoning." Hence, the sages of old, like the translator rNgog (1059-1109 C.E.), believe that the ultimate truth is not a knowable phenomena (shes bya). Whereas others, like Cha pa (1109-1169 C.E.) assert that the absence of true existence truly exists. Yes, errors as huge as these have arisen. ⁴⁸⁶

Note 486 - The basic error, says mKhas grub rje, is in confusing the two connotations of the word ultimate in the expression ultimately existing as explained. rNgog, he claims, confuses the analytical reasoning that examined reality with reasoning in general. mKhas grub rje visualizes him reasoning as follows: even reality cannot withstand an ultimate analysis . . . hence, it cannot withstand reasoning in general . . . hence, it cannot be established by a valid cognition and hence reality, that is, the ultimate truth, does not exist. Phya pa, on the other hand, he perceives to reason as follows: reality, the absence of true existence, exists within the purview of the gnosis that understands reality . . . hence, it truly exists, and hence, the absence of true existence truly exists. Only further scrutiny of the views of these authors, to the extent that they are available, will bear out mKhas grub rje's claims, however.]

Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, pp 406-411

Among six positions on the topic of what is divided into the two truths which are refuted by Jam-yang-shay-ba is that of the translator Ngok, (Ngog-lo-tstsha-ba bLo-Idan-shes-rab) and his followers, who do not accept that an emptiness is an object of knowledge because the mere non-finding of an object under analysis is just called an emptiness, and, thus, there is no phenomenon 'emptiness' existent there. Ngok's idea is that if an analytical consciousness cognized an emptiness, then that emptiness would necessarily inherently exist. For, an analytical consciousness is searching to find whether an object inherently exists or not, and if it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of inherent existence of that object, then it would seem that the emptiness must inherently exist since, according to him, it would be able to bear ultimate analysis. Therefore, according to him mere appearances are the basis of the division into the two truths and not objects of knowledge because an ultimate truth, that is, an emptiness, is not an object of knowledge.

Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p 535

The great Ga-dam-ba Ngok-lo-dza-wa Lo-den-shay-rap (Ngog-lo-tstsha-ba bLo-Idan-shes-rab), a student of Afisha, quotes Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti as sources but, along with his students, appears to agree mainly with Shantirakshita's Yogachara-Svatantrika. Also, there were some Chittamatrin followers of the teacher Suvarnavipa (gSer-gling-pa), who, though a Chittamatrin, was Afisha's principal guru for the generation of the altruistic aspiration to enlightenment.

The view of the Jo-nang-ba or Jo-mo-nang-ba school, a division of the Sa-gya order, is said by some to be a fabrication that is beyond the pale of the Indian schools of tenets. Their interpretation of the Madhyamika emptiness is that the permanent, unchanging realm or constituent (dhatu, khams) of the Tathagata which exists in all sentient beings is empty of all impermanent phenomena. Emptiness here is an emptiness of the other: the Tathagata realm, or Buddha nature, is empty of being impermanent phenomena and impermanent phenomena are empty of being the Tathagata realm. The other orders say that though emptiness is not impermanent phenomena and vice versa, this does not constitute emptiness; emptiness is a negation of self in the sense that phenomena are empty of, or lack, their own inherent existence. The Jo-nang-bas were refuted by many.....