

reference to a "self" constructed by another perception¹¹, and through this determination of perception-only, there is entry into the selflessness of all events, and not by a denial of their existence.¹² Otherwise, there would be an object for this other perception because of a perception itself (i.e. either "perception-only" or "the perception of self" would be a real object), there would be at least one perception which has an object consisting of another perception, and the state of perception-only wouldn't be demonstrated, because of the perception's state of having objects.¹³

But how is it to be understood that the existence of the sense-fields of visibles, etc. was spoken of by the Exalted One not because those things which singly become sense-objects of the perceptions of visibles, etc. really exist, but rather with a hidden intention? Because

A sense-object is neither a single thing,
nor several things,
from the atomic point of view,
nor can it be an aggregate (of atoms),
so atoms can't be demonstrated. 11

What is being said? The sense-field of visibles, etc. which consists (in a moment) of a single sense-object of a perception of visibles, etc. is either a unity, like the composite whole constructed by the Vaiśeṣikas*, or it is several things, from the atomic point of view, or it is an aggregation of atoms. Now, the sense-object can't be a single thing, because one can nowhere apprehend a composite whole which is different from its component parts. Nor can it be plural, because of atoms, since they can't be apprehended singly.¹⁴ Nor does an aggregation of atoms become a sense-object, because an atom as one entity can't be demonstrated, either.

How is it that it can't be demonstrated? Because

Through the simultaneous conjunction of six elements,
the atom has six parts. 12a

*cf. *Discussion for the Demonstration of Action*, note 11, and the entire discussion in that treatise in section 3.

If there is a simultaneous conjunction of six elements in six directions, the atom comes to have six parts.¹⁵ For that which is the locus of one can't be the locus of another.

~~If there were a common locus for the six,
the agglomeration would only be one atom.~~ 12b

It might be maintained that the locus for each single atom is the locus of all six elements. But then, because of the common locus for all of them, the agglomeration would be only one atom, because of the mutual exclusion of occupants of a locus. And then, no agglomeration would become visible.¹⁶ Nor, for that matter, can atoms join together at all, because of their state of having no parts. The Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir say, "We aren't arguing such an absurdity. It's just when they're in aggregation, that they can join together." But the question must be asked: Is then an aggregation of atoms not an object different from the atoms themselves?

~~When there is no conjunction of atoms,
how can there be one for their aggregations?
Their conjunction is not demonstrated,
for they also have no parts.~~ 13

So the aggregations themselves can't mutually join together, either. For there is no conjunction of atoms, because of their state of having no parts. That is to say, such a thing can't be demonstrated. So even in the case of an aggregation, which does have parts, its conjunction becomes inadmissible (because there can be no aggregation of atoms unless individual atoms conjoin. And so the atoms as one entity can't be demonstrated. And whether the conjunction of atoms is accepted, or isn't

~~(To assume) the singleness of that which has divisions
as to directional dimensions, is illogical.~~ 14a

For one atom, there may be the directional dimension of being "in front", for another, of being "on the bottom", and if there are such divisions as to directional dimensions, how can the

singleness of an atom, which partakes of such divisions, be logical ?

Or else, how could there be shade and blockage ? 14b

If there were no divisions as to directional dimensions in an atom, how could there be shade in one place, light in another, when the sun is rising ? For there could be no other location for the atom where there would be no light.¹⁷ And how could there be an obstruction of one atom by another, if divisions as to directional dimensions are not accepted ? For there would be no other part for an atom, where, through the arrival of another atom, there would be a collision with this other atom. And if there is no collision, then the whole aggregation of all the atoms would have the dimensions of only one atom, because of their common locus, as has been stated previously.

It may be argued : Why can't it be accepted that shade and blockage refer to an agglomeration, and not to a single atom ?

Reply : But in that case, is it being admitted that an agglomeration is something other than the atoms themselves ? Objector : No, that can't be admitted.

If the agglomeration isn't something other,
then they can't refer to it. 14c

If it is not accepted that the agglomeration is something other than the atoms, then shade and blockage can't be demonstrated as occurring in reference to the agglomeration only. This is simply an attachment to mental construction. "Atoms" or "aggregations" : what's the point of worrying with those, if "their basic characteristics of being visibles, etc." are not refuted ?

What then is their characteristic ? That they are in a state of being sense-objects of the eye etc., in a state of being blue, etc. It is just this which should be investigated. If a sense-object for the eye, and so on, is accepted in the form of blue, yellow, etc. then are these one entity, or several ? Now what follows from this ? The flaw inherent in assuming their severalness has already been discussed (in relation to the arguments on atomic aggregation).

If their unity existed, one couldn't arrive at anything gradually, there couldn't be apprehension and non-apprehension simultaneously,