

Some Comments on Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* and Professor Wayman's *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*¹

by Geshe Sopa

I

Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the great scholar-yogin and founder of the dGe lugs pa teaching, whose followers were to reunify Tibet at the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama, is one of the most important figures in the history of Tibetan Buddhism and one of the hardest to approach. He appeared several centuries after another great Tibetan religious teacher much better known to Western readers, the venerable Milarepa. Unlike the charismatic qualities of Milarepa's simple life and lyricism, which are not lost even in poor, awkward English translations, Tsong kha pa's thought is often hard to approach even in Tibetan. The difference is partially in their respective audiences. Milarepa's time saw a revival of Buddhist learning and activity in Tibet, which continued unabated right up to the time of Tsong kha pa. By then, however, these very efforts had produced such an accretion of guru-transmissions, learned exegeses and yoga practices—often at loggerheads with one another—that a simple understanding of the thought of the Buddha and of the great *ācāryas* of Buddhism was increasingly hard to arrive at. Thus, one writing at the time of Tsong kha pa had perforce to address his works to a Buddhist public that was at once complex and erudite. Such a writer, in composing any explanation of the teaching of the Buddhist *tripiṭaka*, needed also more or less to follow the traditional format of rejecting other explanations perceived as objectionable, establishing his own position, and dispelling anticipated criticism of his position.

Tsong kha pa traveled widely in Tibet and studied with many of the most famous teachers of his time, representatives of all the sects of

Tibetan Buddhism. Later, he composed his own works, covering all major phases of Buddhism, both *sūtra* and *tantra*. In composing these works, Tsong kha pa had churned the milk-ocean of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist learning and, like the gods of Indian legend, brought forth the most precious things, including the *amṛta*—such was the judgement of many people of his own time and subsequently.

Among Tsong kha pa's major works is the *Lam rim chen mo* (the longer "Steps of the Path"), his great manual of Buddhist yoga, a veritable *vade mecum* that for size and complexity finds little parallel in Western religious literature. It looks mainly to the *Bodhipathapradīpa* (Lamp to the Path to Enlightenment) of Aṭiṣa, in which Tsong kha pa perceived many special virtues, in particular its quality of "holding level all the teachings of Buddhism, without a slant." A long section (about 150 Tibetan folios) in the final portion of the *Lam rim chen mo* is devoted to "right view," and this section constitutes one of Tsong kha pa's four main commentaries on the Mādhyamika.² As a Mādhyamika himself, Tsong kha pa upheld the superiority of the Prāsaṅgika view of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, which he especially tried to delineate clearly for Tibetans, and while he was not the first Tibetan teacher to maintain the supremacy of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, he was the foremost in attempting to clarify it.

II

Professor Alex Wayman's *Claming the Mind and Discerning the Real*,³ taken from the *Lam rim chen mo*, represents the first translation of a major work of Tsong kha pa into English, and contains Tsong kha pa's entire section on "right view" together with his immediately preceding section on the development of one-pointedness of mind, the *lhag mthong* (*vipaśyanā*) and *zhi gnas* (*śamatha*) sections, respectively. The translation is of about two hundred folios of the original work's five hundred. In addition, the translation is provided with a substantial series of introductory essays and about fifty pages of notes, glossaries and bibliography. Professor Wayman brings to his work many years of devoted study and research into his subject-matter, along with a quite genuine appreciation and understanding of much important auxiliary material used by Tsong kha pa, and the translator's familiarity with this material serves to enrich both the translation and the introductory essays and notes.

On the other hand, while the book serves to show some of the main features of Tsong kha pa's presentation of the meaning of the Mādhyamika and the system of meditation based on the *sūtras*, a reader who cannot refer to the Tibetan original needs often to be extremely cautious in coping with the sense of this or that specific sentence or passage, for the translation is quite heavily spotted with misconstruals of the original, and the introductory essays display some unevenness as well.

The first essay, "The Lineage, and Atīśa's 'Light on the Path to Enlightenment,'" discusses the guru-transmission of the *Lam rim chen mo* and gives a translation of Atīśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa*, the *Lam rim chen mo*'s root text. The translation is especially helpful in placing the topics of "Calming" (*zhi-gnas*) and "Discerning" (*lhag mthong*) in their proper sequence as steps of the path. This is followed by "The Author of the *Lam rim chen mo*," a short biographical essay ably put together from the works of mKhas grub and bLo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan dpal bzang. The next, "Asāṅga on the Ancillaries of Calming and the Supernormal Faculties," is principally translation of passages from the *Śrāvakaśāstra* that supplement Tsong kha pa's treatment of "Calming." "Discursive Thought and the bSam-yas Debate" is a substantial and important essay on the debate at bSam yas. Professor Wayman champions Tsong kha pa's view that the debate at bSam yas between the Indian *ācārya* Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Ch'an master Hwa-shang Mahāyāna was not an argument between "sudden" and "gradualist" schools, but dealt with the nature of discursive thought and its role in meditation. Unfortunately, the final essay, "Tsong kha pa's Position on Discerning," while advancing the meaning of the Mādhyamika as middleism, contains two singularly misleading subsections, the "Use of Buddhist Logic" and "*Svabhāva* of the Path." These, instead of guiding the reader through a rather long and quite important stretch of the translation, can only serve to confuse him.

Here, the "Use of Buddhist Logic" is simply a misnomer. At the beginning, Professor Wayman notes that Tsong kha pa "devotes the first large topic in the 'Discerning' section to determining the principle to be refuted by considering the 'overpervasion' (*ativyāpti*, Tib. *khyab ches pa*) and 'nonpervasion' (*avyāpti*, Tib. *khyab chung pa*) of the principle to be refuted."⁴ He proceeds to identify these as "fallacies of the reason (*hetu*) in earlier Indian logic, which includes the Buddhist logic that was transmitted to Tibet. . . ."⁵ While these terms do have a technical meaning in Buddhist logic, specifically as fallacies involving a non-

concomitance between the two terms of a major premise, they also have other meanings, in common usage. These common meanings, like “to be too broad” or “to be too narrow,” are preferable here, as Tsong kha is not dealing with the *khyab pa* of the logicians in any way, neither talking about logical concomitance nor using the notion of logical concomitance to talk about other things. In his discussion of the determination of the object being denied by the negation entailed by emptiness, Tsong kha pa states simply that some scholars, by denying that things exist even conventionally, overextend the negation and make it cover too broad an object, i.e., overpervasionism (*khyab ches ba*), whereas others, in failing to deny that things exist by some kind of inherent nature, do not extend it far enough, i.e., underpervasionism (*khyab chung ba*).

Much more serious, therefore, is the writer’s complete inversion of Tsong kha pa’s actual use of the terms. He says, “the overpervasion, affirms *svabhāva* (self-existence); and the . . . nonpervasion, denies *svabhāva*.”⁶ In fact, in Tsong kha pa’s use of the terms, overpervasionism denies *svabhāva* and is nihilistic, while underpervasionism fails to deny *svabhāva* properly and is substantialist or eternalist.⁷ The difficulty does not end there, however, for the writer goes on to identify the overpervasionists as the realists, including the Yogācārins and Svātantrika Mādhyamikas, and the underpervasionists as “the insider of the Mādhyamika, Prāsaṅgika school who has quite properly denied *svabhāva* as a principle and then falsely denies *svabhāva* in the Buddhist path.”⁸ Again, something more like the opposite is what Tsong kha pa is saying. In discussing overpervasionism, i.e., nihilism, Tsong kha pa addresses himself mainly to those Tibetan adherents of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika whose *svabhāva*-denial is too all-encompassing; and in discussing underpervasionism he is addressing himself to those Mādhyamikas, again mainly Prāsaṅgikas, whose *svabhāva*-denial does not altogether relinquish the notion of existence by way of some kind of *svabhāva*.

The writer’s confusion here cannot altogether be explained away as an effort on his part to bring the overpervasionists and underpervasionists into accord with his inversion of their definitions, for as he notes on page 61, Tsong kha pa “first treats overpervasion in lengthy fashion (40 folios), then the nonpervasion rather briefly (4 folios).” Possibly, he has himself taken and overextended a discussion in Tsong kha pa’s treatment of overpervasionism, where Tsong kha pa compares those Mādhyamikas who see some contradiction between denial of *svabhāva* and acceptance of such *dharmas* as origination, cessa-

tion, *samsāra*, *nirvāṇa*, etc., as being *like the realists*, who also see such a contradiction—a point, incidentally, which is altogether lost in Professor Wayman’s translation. Beyond this, there is little help from the translation itself, which is rather to be explained by this essay instead of the essay’s being supported by the translation, for the translation here is generally so obscure as to who is talking about what that it may easily leave a reader with considerable uncertainty as to whether the positions being set forth so unclearly are those of realists, Yogācā-rins, or Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas.

III

In the *lhag mthong*, the “Discerning” section of the original, Tsong kha pa begins his actual discussion of overpervasionism (CMDR, pp. 189-191) by stating its basic positions, arguments and citations from authority. Tsong kha pa states fairly explicitly that he is setting forth a view of the meaning of the Mādhyamika that was current in his time and that he considered nihilistic. The basic view is that nothing exists, and its proofs are the classic Mādhyamika arguments of Nāgārjuna against *svabhāva*, i.e., that things are not produced from self, other, both or neither, etc. In appealing to authority, it cites Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Prasannapadā*. All this clearly identifies overpervasionism as a kind of Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika viewpoint current in Tibet in Tsong kha pa’s time.

The translation has Tsong kha pa begin his discussion of overpervasionism with the following:

The generality of modern-day (i.e., Tibetan) adherents of the Mādhyamika, while setting forth its meaning, say. . . .⁹

In spite of its misconstrual of *'dod pa* as “adherent,” and its misconstrual of the syntax of *smra bar* as “while setting forth,” the passage more or less translates the sense of the original, and such tiny falts should barely deserve comment, did not the accumulation of many such small misconstruals, along with some major ones, obscure the sense of much of the original discussion here. The passage should read something like the following:¹⁰

Nowadays, the majority who wish to explain the meaning of the Mādhyamika say. . . .¹¹

In what follows, most other such minor obscurantist mistranslations that do not seriously damage the sense of the passage will not be noted, as the reviewer wishes to comment on those that do, and to do so without becoming too long.

The discussion continues by stating that the overpervasionist position holds that nothing can withstand scrutiny by the reason that examines its reality, because not even an atom can withstand such scrutiny and, as the translation puts it,

...because when one refutes all the four alternatives of “it exists,” “it does not exist,” etc., there is no unconstructed nature (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*) therein (i.e., in the four alternatives).¹²

Here, apparently, *ma ’dus pa’i chos* has been misconstrued as *’dus ma byas chos* (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*), but the passage should read something like:

...because by rejection of all four alternatives, “it is,” “it is not,” etc., there is no *dharma* that is not included in those (four alternatives).¹³

The translation continues:

Moreover, when with the noble knowledge that sees reality one sees that there is no (*dharma*) whatever of birth and decease, bondage and liberation, etc., then it must be the case as authorized by that (noble *samāpatti*), so there is no birth, etc.¹⁴

Here, aside from the misconstrual of *gzhal* as “authorized,” the translation mainly fails to take into account the syntactical ambiguity in *med par gzigs pa*, which forms the basis for discussion later (p. 217), where *med par gzigs pa* vs. *ma gzigs pa* is a moot point, and consequently it might better be translated something like:

Moreover, since production, passing away, *saṃsāra*, *nirvāna*, etc., are perceived as not at all existent by the *ārya*’s gnosis that perceives reality, there is no production, because it (production, etc.) ought to be as understood by that (*ārya*’s gnosis).¹⁵

The translation continues:

If one claims that there is birth, etc., then either it can withstand

or not withstand the examination with a principle that examines the reality in that case. In the event it can withstand (that examination), there would be (proved) explicitly as true that there is an entity which withstands the examination by the principle. In the event it cannot withstand that examination, how could it be valid that there exists an entity countered by the principle?¹⁶

While it is not important that the first sentence is a question, syntactical misconstruals reduce the second sentence to bare redundancy, which loses the definition it is setting forth; of the third there is little criticism. The passage should read something like:

If one accepts production, etc., does it or does it not withstand scrutiny by the reason that examines its reality? If it withstands, then it becomes a real entity, by virtue of being an entity that withstands scrutiny by (such a) reason.¹⁷ If it does not withstand scrutiny, how can one admit the existence of an entity that is repudiated by the reason?¹⁸

The translation continues:

Accordingly, if one claims an existence of birth, etc., it is either proved or not proved by an authority. In the first case (i.e., proved by an authority), since it is proved by that knowledge (= *ārya-samāpatti*) which sees reality (directly), it is not valid that it sees the nonexistence of birth. If it is claimed to be proved by the cognition of the conventional eye, etc. (ear and so on), it is refuted that they constitute an authority, because the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* shows as invalid that they (eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.), as in this passage (IX, 23): “(The perception based on) eye is not an authority (*pramāṇa*), nor are (the perceptions based on) ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind authorities. If these (perceptions based on) sense organs were authorities, who would need to resort to the Noble Truth!”¹⁹

Again, the first sentence ought to be a question. However, the second sentence of the translation completely inverts the sense of the original, for according to the view Tsong kha pa is setting forth as *pūrvapakṣa* (i.e., a view to be criticized), the *ārya*'s gnosis validates, not invalidates, the nonexistence of production. Particularly objectionable in the final sentence before the quotation is the gloss, “(form, etc.)” in “they they (eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.). . . .” This gloss is quite gratuitous and misleading, and the same may be said about glossing the quotation

from the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* with “(the perception based on).” The passage is quite complete as it stands without these glosses, and the objects for which they do not constitute an avenue of validity are simply not stated. In fact, the whole question here, and later on, is just exactly for what objects they do not constitute an avenue of validity, i.e., their respective sense-objects or reality itself? The *Samādhirāja* quotation tends, even on the surface, clearly to favor the latter, and would do so in English, had not the translator misconstrued *phags pa'i lam* as “Noble Truth” rather than correctly translating it as “Noble Path,” for again the reference is to the *ārya*'s gnosis that directly perceives reality. We would translate the passage somewhat as follows:

Likewise, if one accepts that there is a production, etc., is it established by an avenue of validity, or is it not so established? If the former, then since no origination is seen by the gnosis that perceives reality, it cannot be admitted as established by that (gnosis); but if one accepts it as established by the conventional consciousness of the eyes, etc., these are inadmissible as an avenue of validity in the *Samādhirāja-sūtra*: “The eyes, the ears, the nose are not an avenue of validity; the tongue, the body, the mental-consciousness are not an avenue of validity, either. If these sense organs were an avenue of validity, what need has anyone for the Āryan Path?”²⁰

The translation continues:

And also because the *Avatāra* (= *Madhyamakāvātāra*, VI, 31a) states, “The world with its multitudinous aspects is not an authority.” The claim that it exists although not proved by an authority is not held by us, and since it is not a principle it is (highly) invalid. If one claims there is birth, while denying it in an absolute sense, it is necessary that he claim it so in a conventional sense, but this is not proper, because this passage of the *Avatāra* (VI, 36) states that the principle by which birth is denied in the absolute sense, also denies it conventionally: “By whatever principle in the phase of reality there is no reason for birth from oneself or from another, by that principle there is no reason for it conventionally. Therefore, how can there be your birth!”²¹

In the *Avatāra* quotation, “with its multitudinous aspects” is an indefensible translation of *mam kun*, “all its aspects.” Aside from the fact that *kun* can mean only “all” and never “many,” only something like “in all its aspects” can communicate the necessary ambiguity as to whether

mam kun signifies “in every aspect” or “in any aspect,” which is a moot point later on (p. 221). Confronting this problem on page 221, the translator changes his translation of the same passage to “by all means, the world is not an authority,” and if one has to choose between a correct translation of *kun* or *mam*, this is better. The next sentence has a slight syntactical problem in failing to assimilate the *'dod pa* to *'dod pas* on account of the *cing*. The next sentence again completely inverts the sense of the original by “but that is not proper,” which makes it say the opposite of the original’s meaning. Finally, the translation of the *Avatāra* quote does not distinguish between the noun *rigs pa*, meaning “reason,” or “a reason,” and the verb *rigs pa*, “to be true,” or “to be right,” and this creates a slight obscurity. We would translate the passage somewhat as follows:

Also, because the *Avatāra* says, “The world in all its aspects is not an avenue of validity.” To accept that it (production, etc.) exists, even though it is not established by an avenue of validity, is inadmissible, because even you will not accept that, and because it is illogical. If, in accepting production, one has to accept it conventionally because one cannot accept it as an ultimate, this is not right, because the *Avatāra* says that the reason that rejects production as an ultimate also rejects it as a phenomenon: “By what will your production become existent if it is false even conventionally by the reason that origination from a self or other is untrue by whatever line of reason one examines its reality?”²²

The translation continues:

And also because a thing does not arise from itself, from another, and so on—four in all—so if one claims that it arises, he counters by imagining the four alternatives to be a refutation of birth in the absolute sense and so do not disallow (birth); but (the four alternative means) there is no birth of them at all. Suppose there were birth from a particular one of the four alternatives, and denying three of them, suppose it were necessary to be born from another thing—that is not proper, because the *Avatāra* states (VI, 32d): “Even according to the world the birth is not from another.” Therefore, when refuting birth, one should not apply the special feature of *paramārtha*, because the *Prasannapadā* refutes the application in particular of *paramārtha*.²³

The first sentence contains numerous syntactical misconstruals, which are not commented on, because the main difficulty is that in lieu of a

careful construal of the original, the translator simply has superimposed upon it a completely wrong sense, and is making Tsong kha pa represent the overpervasionists as showing their own criticism of an essentially Svātantrika position, which they are not even remotely referring to. So far in this section, Tsong kha pa has been showing the arguments of the overpervasionists by way of dichotomy, and he continues to do so here. Just above, the overpervasionists have shown their criticism of accepting production by means of an avenue of validity (*pramāṇa*). Now, if someone is still accepting production, etc., just conventionally, he still confronts the problem of the tetralemma, i.e., it exists, it does not exist, it both exists and does not exist, it neither exists nor does not exist. So, again, dichotomizing: if one accepts even a conventional production, it either fits into the tetralemma or is outside it. If it is outside it, which is to say that there is a middle ground among the four alternatives, then production as an absolute or ultimate cannot be repudiated by the tetralemma, and this, of course, is unacceptable to Tsong kha pa's opponents' opponents, who are Mādhyamikas. On the other hand, if a conventional production is accepted as within the tetralemma, then the only alternative that will be admitted is a conventional production from another, for all schools of Buddhism but the Prāsaṅgika do admit some kind of production from another while rejecting the other three alternatives; but even a conventional production from another is rejected by the leading exponent of the Prāsaṅgika school, the *ācārya* Candrakīrti. So, without commenting further on the translation of this passage, we simply give our own translation as something like the following:

Moreover, if one accepts production even if it is not produced from any of the four alternatives, "from self," "from other," etc., the rejection of production as an ultimate becomes a non-rejection, by denying it within the four alternatives, because there is production that is none of these. If (you allow) production from one of the four alternatives, by not accepting the other three, production must be from other; and this is false, for the *Avatāra* says, "There is not even a conventional production from another." Therefore, one should not put the designation, "ultimate," on the denial of production, because the *Prasannapadā* repudiates putting this designation of "ultimate."²⁴

The translation of this section concludes:

In this matter also, some assert that they do not admit birth,

etc., even conventionally; and some claim that there is (birth, etc.) conventionally. But all agree with a principle in refuting for the *dharmas* a self-existence produced by own-nature, because while this *ācārya*'s school does not affirm and then deny, he simultaneously refutes the production by self-existence in the sense of both truths. If that is the way there is no self-existence, then what (else) is there? Therefore, the special application of *paramārtha* to the refutable principle is now explained with special clarity to be only the school of the Mādhyamika-Svātantrika.²⁵

We have no criticism of the translation of the first sentence, but the second, in addition to various syntactical misconstruals, mistranslates *bsnyon*, “to deny the apparent,” as “to affirm and then deny”; “simultaneously” is gloss, and should be bracketed as such. We have no criticism of the third sentence. In the fourth, “application in particular” mistranslates *khyad par sbyor*, as “refutable principle” does *dgag bya*, and “with special clarity” does *mgring pa bsal nas*; “now” is again gloss and ought to be bracketed. In particular, the loss of the picturesque quality of *mgring pa bsal nas*, along with the interpolation of “now,” may leave the reader with an ambiguous impression of this sentence that concludes the discussion of the positions of overpervasionism, for it may appear that Tsong kha pa is saying that in the next section he himself will “now” explain “with special clarity” that the qualification of a negation by “it does not exist ‘as an ultimate’” is just the school of the Svātantrika Mādhyamika; however, this is just the conclusion of the setting forth of the positions of the overpervasionists. We would translate the passage somewhat as follows:

Here also some state that origination, etc., is inadmissible as a phenomenon, and others that it is existent phenomenally, but all say that in the school of this *ācārya* (Candrakīrti) there is no denying the obvious that the (above) reason rejects that *dharmas* have an inherently existent nature, because in both truths he rejects an inherent nature. Thus, if there is no nature, what else is there? Therefore, clearing their throats, they expatiate that a qualification of the negated thing by (“it does not exist”) “as an ultimate” is the system of just the Svātantrika Mādhyamika.²⁶

This concludes Tsong kha pa's laying out of the positions of the overpervasionists, and even from this much it ought to be quite clear that he is dealing only with a school of interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika, and in no way with realism, etc.

IV

Tsong kha pa's discussion now shifts to his own criticism of the above positions, and the translation gives the new topic headings:

(2) SHOWING THAT THE THESIS IS NOT VALID

This has two parts: (a) Showing that the special refutation of *dharma* by that school is not common to the Mādhyamika. . . .²⁷

"Showing that the thesis is not valid" is partly gloss, and should be indicated as such by brackets. The original merely states, "Showing that this is inadmissible." Also, in supplying the gloss of "the thesis," why not "the theses," since many theses have been set forth and are treated later one by one? This is a minor point; more serious is the syntactical misconstrual, "Showing that the special refutation of *dharma* by that school is not common to the Mādhyamika." This should read something like, "Showing that this school repudiates a special feature unique to the Mādhyamika." This special feature of the Mādhyamika is the first main topic of the new discussions that these headings have served to introduce.

Introducing this topic of the special feature, or *dharma*, of the Mādhyamika, Tsong kha pa begins his discussion by quoting a dedication by Nāgārjuna extolling the two sublime bodies, or aggregates of illustrious qualities, of a Buddha, which are the final result of the double accumulation, of wisdom and merit. Tsong kha pa then comments in a brief passage that the attainment of these resultant two bodies, the *rūpakāya* and *dharmakāya*, is possible only through the path that joins wisdom (*prajñā*) and method (*upāya*); and the joining of wisdom and method, in turn, is possible only through a proper understanding of the two truths. The conclusion of this passage Professor Wayman translates:

Accordingly, a) the method of establishing the basic view that does not mistake the essential causal path for attaining both bodies in the phase of the fruit, and b) the method of establishing the view that depends on that (basic view) achieve the (two) certainties in the two truths as just explained.²⁸

Again, on account of some syntactical problems, the sense of the original has become slightly inverted, and we would translate it rather something like:

Thus, inasmuch as not mistaking the essentials of the path (that is) the cause of obtaining the Two Bodies at the time of its fruition is dependent on the method of establishing the view of the fundamentals (on which the path and its final result rest), and the method of establishing the view is getting ascertainment of the two truths as just explained.²⁹

There follows immediately a quite important passage, which Professor Wayman translates:

Except for this kind of Mādhyamika, what manner of other person who observes (only) the gathering of refutation and is ignorant of holding the irrefutable, would be called a Mādhyamika skilled in possession of broad examination and possessed of subtle learning! Thus, the one skilled in the means of comprehending the two truths, who is established without even a question of refutation, and resorts to achieving the ultimate purport of the Victor, engenders wondrous devotion to his teacher and the Teaching and gains understanding guided by the pure voice and words that tell him again and again the mysterious words: the meaning of the voidness which is void of self-existence is the meaning of dependent origination, but is not the meaning of absence void of efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*).³⁰

The translation of this passage is singularly garbled by numerous syntactical misconstruals and by misconstruals of a number of words, i.e., 'gal, "to be contradictory," as "to refute"; 'chad, "to say" or "to explain," as "to hold"; 'gal ba'i dri tsam, "the slightest smell of contradiction," as "even the question of refutation"; skad gsangs, "clear voice," as "mysterious words"; and sgrogs, "to make a big sound" or "to proclaim loudly," as "to tell." In particular, the mistranslation of 'gal, "to be contradictory," is most harmful to the sense of this passage, and of others later (e.g., p. 200),³¹ which set forth some of the key ideas of Tsong kha pa's position. The passage ought to be translated something like:

Here even anybody else, except a Mādhyamika, on seeing the contradictory brought together, will not know how to explain it as not contradicting, but a master possessing a subtle, keen and very far-reaching wisdom, (our) so-called "Mādhyamika," by his skill in the method of understanding the two truths, establishes (denial of self-existence and acceptance of origination, etc.) without the faintest scent of contradiction; he discovers the final purport of the Jina; and by having recourse to that (final

purport), he proclaims again and again with a high, clear voice, with pure words brought forth by the birth of a wondrous devotion to the Teacher and the Teaching, “You who have understanding! The meaning of emptiness which is void of self-existence is dependent origination, but its meaning is not a nonentityness devoid of the capacity to do work!”³²

This non-contradictoriness between denial of self-existence and acceptance of *dharmas* like production, passing away, etc., which is based on the equivalence of absence of self-existence and dependent origination (i.e., cause and effect), is one of the cardinal features of Tsong kha pa’s own views as a Mādhyamika, and with it he proceeds at length to counter one by one the positions of the overpervasionists, all of which are on the side of nihilism.

V

When, later, he finishes with overpervasionism, Tsong kha pa turns to a brief consideration of underpervasionism.

Like the overpervasionists, the underpervasionists are also exegetes of the meaning of the Mādhyamika. Tsong kha pa categorizes them as underpervasionists because instead of negating that things exist by virtue of a self-existence (*svabhāva*) that is established by an own-entityness (*svarūpa*), they merely deny a nature (*svabhāva*) that is uncaused, unchanging and non-relative. Tsong kha pa argues that since the lower schools of Buddhism already understand that originating things are not uncaused and unchanging, what need is there for the Mādhyamika to deny existence by way of self-existence (*svabhāva*) if it means only that?

The translation says here:

Accordingly, when insiders (i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, etc.) hold that constructed natures (*saṃskṛta*) are generated by causes and conditions, if it is not required for them (i.e., those insiders) to comprehend that entities lack self-existence, with that (your determination) where is the unshared refutable (pertaining to the view that comprehends voidness)!³³

This has many syntactical misconstruals, and should read something like:

Thus, inasmuch as our own schools already understand that conditioned things are produced by causes and conditions, there are these objections, that there would be no need to prove no self-existence to them, and that they also would understand that things are without self-existence, etc.; therefore, how can that (kind of nature) be the object of (the Mādhyamika's) unique denial?³⁴

However, Tsong kha pa's main criticism of this underpervasionist view is that it does not go nearly deep enough to uproot the innate nescience that is the basis for clinging to the two kinds of self, i.e., of persons and of *dharmas*, this clinging being the bond that ties all sentient beings to the round of suffering existences (*samsāra*). Toward the end of this section, Tsong kha pa has this same criticism of another kind of underpervasionist view, which is essentially that of the Jo nang pa, who adhered to a kind of extreme realism, in particular with regard to the ultimate truth.

Consequently, as the underpervasionists are Mādhyamikas clearly not on the side of nihilism, it is difficult to understand the translator's placing them there in his essay on the "Use of Buddhist Logic." According to Tsong kha pa's view of the extremes, the extreme of nihilism is to hold that things do not exist at all, whereas the extreme of eternalism is to hold that things exist by an own-entityness. On page 258 of the translation, Tsong kha pa comments on a quotation from Candrakīrti:

In this context, the existence and non-existence of the entity was explained previously when speaking of the two possibilities, to wit, it exists with its own-form or it doesn't exist at all.

Since "possibilities" is an unbracketed and misleading gloss, and *gnyis su smra ba* has been misconstrued, we would prefer to see this translation something more like the following:

Here, as explained above in the section on the adherents of the two (extremes), entity and nonentity are (respectively) "existing by an own-entityness" and "not existing at all."³⁵

Elsewhere, Tsong kha pa defines the side of nihilism as holding that things do not exist even nominally, and the side of eternalism as holding that they exist as ultimates.

Still more difficult and misleading is the statement in the “Use of Buddhist Logic,” “Under the nonpervasion [i.e., our ‘underpervasionism’], Tsong kha pa places the insider of the Mādhyamika, Prāsaṅgika school who has quite properly denied *svabhāva* as a principle and then falsely denies *svabhāva* in the Buddhist path, i.e., takes it as the refutable of the path.”³⁶ As indicated above, in Tsong kha pa’s view the underpervasionist has not *properly* denied *svabhāva*, and it is Tsong kha pa himself who takes the proper refutation of *svabhāva* as the main object of understanding in the Buddhist path, as follows.

Having indicated his view that the underpervasionist does not go far enough in his denial of *svabhāva*, Tsong kha pa proceeds to show that the mere denial that phenomenal things have any uncaused and unchanging nature encounters also a problem with *dharmatā* (emptiness, or the ultimate truth), which is the final nature (*svabhāva*) of any and all *dharma*s, which is itself uncaused and unchanging, and which is the principal object of meditation on the Buddhist path. In the “*Svabhāva* of the Path,” Professor Wayman notes, “Small wonder that the Mādhyamika school should be misunderstood, when it vigorously rejects the *svabhāva* that is something to establish by the mundane reasoning, and then upholds the *svabhāva* that is something to realize in Yoga attainment.”³⁷ In Tsong kha pa’s treatment of this subject, there is no inconsistency here, for it is not that something called *svabhāva* is first being denied on all phenomenal things and then the same thing called *svabhāva* is later being affirmed on the ultimate truth, or *dharmatā*, for the denial that things exist by way of an own-nature (*svabhāvatāsiddha*) is not to deny that they lack all logical definition or nature (*svabhāva*) as well.

Consequently, when *svabhāva* is denied, what is being denied is *rang gi ngo bos grub pa*, “existence by an own-entityness,” or *rang bzhin gyis grub pa*, “existence by an own-nature” (i.e., by *svabhāva*). These are identified by Tsong kha pa as the essential object of negation for the Mādhyamika in many passages, including that immediately following the one cited above: “. . .this (preceding) is not the (Mādhyamika’s) unique object of negation. (But), if one establishes a nature which exists by an own-entityness. . . .” Other synonyms are also used, mainly, *don dam par grub pa*, “existence as an ultimate,” *yang dag par grub pa*, “existence as a true thing,” and *bden par grub pa*, “existence as a real.” The existence of a nature establishable by an own-entityness Tsong kha pa denies for all *dharma*s, and for *dharmatā* as well, as will be shown later on. On the other hand, the *svabhāva* that is affirmed on *dharmatā* is its

nature of uncausedness, its nature of unchangingness, its nature of being the final nature of all *dharmas*, etc. In precisely the same sense, all *dharmas* have their respective natures (*svabhāva*), like fire its nature of hotness, water its nature of wetness, all *dharmas* their final nature of *dharmatā*, etc.

In discussing this affirmation of *svabhāva*, Tsong kha pa cites and comments on a passage from Candrakīrti, translated by Professor Wayman as follows:

“By *svabhāva* one understands this innate nature, uncreate, which has not deviated in the fire in the past, present, and future; which did not arise earlier and will not arise later; which is not dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat of water, (one or another) of this side and the other side, long and short. Well then, does this own-nature of fire that is of such a manner (i.e., uncreate, nor dependent) exist? (In reply:) This (*svabhāva* of such sort) neither exists nor does not exist by reason of own-nature. While this is the case, still in order to avoid frightening the hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such as ‘*svabhāva*’ and ‘*dharmatā*’) and say it exists.” Thus that *svabhāva* is said conventionally to exist, after its accomplishment by own-nature was denied. Now, while that represents to teach with designations so as to avoid frightening the hearers, does that not contradict the *ācārya* himself? (In reply:) That is not right, because it is necessary (to avoid frightening the hearers); in fact all other *dharmas* as well are expressed by designations, because they are (all) nonexistent!³⁸

Of the many misconstruals involved in the translation of the above, by far the most unfortunate is the total inversion of Tsong kha pa’s meaning on such a crucial point, and the passage should read somewhat as follows:

“That (heat) of fire, which is the uncreate, inherent and nondelusive nature of fire even in the three times, which is not something that arises later not having arise before, (and) which does not have a dependence on causes and conditions like the heat of water, this side and that side, and the long and the short, that is said to be *svabhāva*. If it is asked, ‘What? Does something exist that is like the nature of fire?’ it is neither so that it exists by an own-entityness nor is it so that it does not exist. So it is, but notwithstanding, in order to dispel the alarm of a hearer, we say it exists conventionally by imputation.” Thus it is stated that this nature (*svabhāva*), having been denied as existing by an own-entityness, exists nominally. If, on account of the statement that is shown by imputation in order to dispel the alarm of a hearer, one thinks it is

not being accepted as existent, this would be incorrect, because other *dharmas* would become nonexistent as well, since they are also stated as imputations for this purpose.³⁹

Finally, in concluding this discussion, Tsong kha pa brings these two together, for that *svabhāva* which is both the ultimate truth and the final nature of all *dharmas* is just the non-existence of all things by an own-entityness (and this includes the ultimate truth, *paramārtha satya*, itself), for the meaning of the ultimate truth does not go beyond just this absence of existence by way of *svabhāva*. He first discusses briefly this kind of ultimate truth as understood conceptually, whereby phenomenal things are known as empty, i.e. *dharmas* are the loci of emptiness as an attribute—this way of understanding emptiness is called “the imputed ultimate truth”; then he shows the same emptiness as understood by yogic direct-perception, in which the dharmic locus (i.e., the phenomenal thing) does not appear:

Now (in considering emptiness), *dharmas* have an emptiness that is the emptiness of self-existence (and) that is established as the nonexistence of even an atom establishable as a nature existing by an own-entityness, and because (this emptiness) is an attribute that takes (the *dharmas* of) form, etc., as a locus, both of these as the object of a single discernment is not contradictory; and, since there is no turning away of this appearance as two (i.e., attribute and locus of attribute), this emptiness is the imputed ultimate truth.

Whenever by acclimitization to this view that understands the absence of self-existence—in the face of perceiving directly this object (i.e., emptiness)—there is no seeing of these loci of form, etc., by the knowledge that directly perceives this reality, because every illusory appearance wherein the absence of a self appears as a nature is turned away. Inasmuch as, in the fact of this discernment, there is not both a reality of this kind and a locus, this positing of both, a reality and its locus, has to be established from the point of view of another conventional way of discerning. Thus ultimate truth is set forth as just the turning away of any illusion of false appearances whereby things, while being without a self-existence, appear so (i.e., as self-existent), (this) in addition to its being free of any illusion of an own-entityness, and therefore, when one accepts that, what need is there for accepting a self-existence that is established as an entity?⁴⁰

Here, to avoid a complete loss of continuity in our own discussion, we have included only our own suggested translation. We find it

preferable to Professor Wayman's translation, on page 258, where he has glossed Tsong kha pa's own view as the position of opponents. Professor Wayman's version is included in the notes.⁴¹

From the above, it should be clear that *svabhāva*, in the sense of a nature existent by its own-entityness, is the very object that Tsong kha pa accepts as the primary object of negation on the Buddhist path, and a writer composing an essay on "Tsong kha pa's Position on Discerning" need not look much farther than that. Consequently, the search by the sub-essay, on "*Svabhāva* of the Path," for a positive meaning for Tsong kha pa's view of the ultimate truth, called a *svabhāva*, is misled and misleading. In particular, the writer's effort at identification of this *svabhāva* as "name-and-form" brings together two incompatible passages from Aśvaghosa and Asaṅga, in only the former of which "name-and-form" functions as one of the members of the chain of dependent origination, whereas in the latter passage it is something quite different. Likewise, the assertion that "the *svabhāva* which is here alluded to as 'name-and-form,' or the reality which is the object of discerning (*vipaśyana*), is also referred to in this literature as the 'true nature' (*dharmatā*),"⁴² also brings together certain similar things without noting their important differences, for the various schools of Buddhism have a variety of views on such subjects as "name-and-form," *vipaśyanā*, *dharmatā*, etc. Tsong kha pa's own position on "Discerning" is that of a Mādhyamika, which all these eclectic speculations do not help clarify.

"The Middle View," the remaining sub-essay in "Tsong kha pa's Position on Discerning," states that it is often held that the Prāsaṅgika rejects all views and has none of its own, and that according to Tsong kha pa there is a great misunderstanding here. This seems very correct, as Tsong kha pa has devoted many pages to this subject, and comments at length on many of the key passages in Candrakīrti from which the notion that the Mādhyamika has no view has arisen. Professor Wayman goes on and develops the idea that while the Mādhyamika definitely has a position of its own, it delineates this position negatively by rejecting other positions, and refutes an opponent without putting forth its own position. Here, it is a bit unclear whether this means to say that the Mādhyamika never advances a thesis and always defines its own positions negatively; or whether it means that the Mādhyamika, even when it refutes another position without setting forth a position of its own, has a position even at that time, and might on another occasion set forth its position. At any rate, the former will find little support in the "Discerning" section, whereas the latter will find many passages

supporting it. We refrain from looking at any more passages, as we already have become rather long, and should conclude.

VI

As a writer, Tsong kha pa contributed valuable innovations to the style of Tibetan philosophical writing. He looked past his contemporaries to the older Tibetan writers and translators, whose style he made more congenial to contemporary scholars and, in a sense, updated. Both his thought and his style are clear and lucid, although given an often quite difficult subject matter, are hard to approach at first. His sentences are often turgid, as well as long and periodic, and his Tibetan requires that great attention be given to his constructions. Too great a looseness in dealing with Tsong kha pa's sentence construction is the single greatest problem in Professor Wayman's translation. Not only has it often led to obscure and misleading translations, but other qualities and nuances of the original, like a greater sharpness in presentation, or a greater profundity, or deference, or humor, or rhetorical exaggeration, etc., have generally disappeared into a monotone. Sometimes, the most explicit of these have been recolored, e.g., the following, from Candrakīrti: "(The Mādhyamika replies with compassionate interjection.) Alas! Because you are without ears or heart you have thrown a challenge that is severe on us!" The actual reading should be something more like, "Ouch! The hardship of an argument by one without ears or wits (i.e., a blockhead) has landed on me!" Also, isn't "nescience's caul" a little too strong for "nescience's defective vision" (*rab rib*)?

Many Tibetan words have a common meaning as well as a special meaning in Buddhist philosophy. There is a tendency on the part of the translator to give too little attention to context and consequently to overlook the common meanings of these contingently technical words, and this had led to many mistranslations. The problem of taking overpervasion and underpervasion as technical logical terms has already been mentioned. In another passage (p. 285), on account of *yul thams cad du*, a passage that ought to read, "However, the direct perception of (smoke and fire in the kitchen) does not establish a concomitance (between smoke and fire) *everywhere*," becomes, "so when there is (smoke, directly perceived) *in all the sensory domain (viṣaya)*, there is no (demonstration of pervasion of smoke by fire). A little further down, Professor

Wayman translates, "Also, there is no (demonstration of that pervasion connection) by inference, because it (the authority of inference) *firmly decides* the object (*viṣaya*), as is now shown. The object of inference (as an authority) is the *qualified negation of all*." Here, *nges pa can* and *thams cad ma yin* respectively are at fault, and the passage should read something like, "Likewise, inference does not establish a concomitance either, because, again, its object is *particularized*. Thus, the object of an inference is *not all* (comparable instances)."⁴³

Sometimes, because of 'gog and other such words that mean, among other things, "to refute," and sometimes because of glosses, much of the "Discerning" section has too many "refutations," "refutables," "opponents," "antagonists," etc., and reads like a very long debate on obscure points whose purport the general reader will most of the time be at a loss to discover. On the other hand, the most patient and determined reader, who is willing to put up with the inevitable idiosyncracies of any translator's translationese in dealing with a work of this kind, will leave the book much less well-rewarded for his pains than he ought to be, because the sense of the original simply isn't there much of the time.

Notwithstanding these numerous faults, such translations, especially those dealing with the Mādhyamika, have had a long and honorable history in the development of Western Buddhist scholarship, especially in pioneer works, and Professor Wayman's translation is indeed a pioneer work. As both the rhetoric and dialectic of the West and of India-Tibet have developed so differently, each presents its own distinctive difficulties in the translation of any Tibetan philosophical work into English. When a translator essays a translation of the "Discerning" section of the *Lam rim chen mo*, all the problems of translating every kind of text converge on him at once, for not only is the subject-matter often quite difficult, but so too can be the styles of the innumerable quotations from authorities, ranging in types and periods of literary composition over a period of more than fifteen hundred years. In addition, Western Buddhist scholarship has produced to date little reliable translation of the historical classics of the Mādhyamika, and Tibetan-English and other lexicons frequently fail to show the meanings of Tibetan words as used in many classes of religio-philosophical texts, the terminology of the Mādhyamika, Prajñāpāramitā and logic being particularly poorly represented in such dictionaries. However, the greatest difficulty of all is perhaps the mainstream Western interpretive tendency to explain the sense of the Prajñāpāra-

mitā and the Mādhyamika as a total rejection of conventional reality in favor of some kind of bare non-dual knowledge, with Nāgārjuna's criticism of the *svabhāva* of *dharmas* taken to mean a wholesale repudiation of *dharmas* and *abhidharma* altogether.

Professor Wayman's translation has avoided this in providing another important hermeneutical option by making available for the first time a major philosophical work by one of the foremost Tibetan exponents of the Mādhyamika. Professor Wayman is to be congratulated for his long labor in translating and publishing a work which—notwithstanding its numerous faults in translation—may still give many readers a first real glimpse of an important system of Tibetan Buddhist meditation and a persistent dialectic that makes relativity itself the most unassailable basis for the development of certainty in matters of faith and morals.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Elvin W. Jones for assistance in the preparation of this article.
2. His others are his commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* of Nāgārjuna together with Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (the so-called *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*), his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti (the *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*), and his *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*.
3. Alex Wayman, tr., *Calmng the Mind and Discerning the Real*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Hereafter referred to as CMDR.
4. CMDR, p. 60.
5. CMDR, p. 61.
6. *ibid.*
7. Strictly speaking, both overpervasionism and underpervasionism, being exegeses of the meaning of the Mādhyamika, and Tsong kha pa's own view of the exact meaning of Middleism (or Mādhyamika), all deny *svabhāva*. However, in the context of Tsong kha pa's discussion here on the ascertainment of precisely what is being negated by the reasons that deny *svabhāva*, overpervasionism falls to one side of what Tsong kha pa views as the middle, and underpervasionism falls to the other. With this qualification, therefore, we see no fault with Professor Wayman's saying that one side "affirms" *svabhāva*, at least in the sense that it has failed to deny it adequately, and our chief concern here is with Professor Wayman's reversal of the meanings of the two sides.
8. CMDR, p. 63.
9. CMDR, p. 189.
10. In following our own preferences in translation-words for our suggested translations of the various passages, we do not mean to imply any criticism of Professor Wayman's own choice of translation-words.

11. *da lta dbu ma'i don smra bar 'dod pa phal mo che na re/ Lam rim chen mo, Kalimpong, 1964, 375.b.1. Relevant overpervasionism material at Peking Tibetan Tripitaka, vol. 152, pp. 132-3-3 to 133-1-6.*

12. CMDR, p. 189.

13. *yod med la sogs pa'i mu bzhi po thams cad bkag pas na der ma 'dus pa'i chos med pa'i phyir ro/ 375.b.2.*

14. CMDR, pp. 189-90.

15. *gzhan yang de kho na nyid gzigs pa'i 'phags pa'i ye shes kyi skye 'gag dang bcings grol sogs ci yang med par gzigs pas na des gzhal ba ltar yin dgos pas skye ba sogs med do/ 375.b.2-3.*

16. CMDR, p. 190.

17. Here, and through to the end of this section laying out the positions of the overpervasionists, the word "reason" refers only to "the reason that scrutinizes the reality of the object under consideration."

18. *gal te skye ba sogs 'dod na de la de nyid dpyod pa'i rigs pas dpyad bzod dam mi bzod/ bzod na ni rigs pas dpyad bzod kyi dngos po yod pas bden dngos su 'gyur ro/ dpyad mi bzod na ni rigs pas khegs pa'i don yod pa ji ltar 'thad/ 375.b.3-4.*

19. CMDR, p. 190.

20. *de bzhin du skye ba la sogs pa yod par 'dod na tshad mas grub bam ma grub/ dang po ltar na de kho na nyid gzigs pa'i ye shes kyi ni skye ba med par gzigs pas des grub par mi 'thad la/ tha snyad pa'i mig gi shes pa la sogs pas grub par 'dod na ni de do/ tshad ma yin pa bkag pa'i phyir de dag sgrub byed kyi tshad mar mi 'thad de ting nge 'dzin gyi rgyal po las/ mig dang rna ba sna yang tshad ma min/ lce dang lus dang yid kyand tshad ma min/ gal te dbang po 'di dag tshad yin na/ 'phags pa'i lam gyis su la ci zhig bya/ 375.b.4–376.a.1.*

21. CMDR, p. 190.

22. *'jug par yang/ rnam kun 'jig rten tshad min zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro/ tshad mas ma grub kyang yod par 'dod pa ni rang yang mi 'dod cing rigs pa'ang min pas mi 'thad do/ gal te skye ba khas len na don dam par mi 'dod pas kun rdzob tu 'dod dgos na de ni mi rigs te/ 'jug pa las/ de nyid skabs su rigs pa gang zhig gis/ bdag dang gzhan las skye ba rigs min pa'i rigs des tha snyad du yang rigs min na/ khyod kyi skye ba gang gis yin par 'gyur/ zhes don dam par skye ba 'gog pa'i rigs pas tha snyad du'ang 'gog par gsungs pa'i phyir ro/ 376.a.1-3.*

23. CMDR, pp. 190-91.

24. *gzhan yang bdag gzhan la sogs pa bzhi po gang rung las mi skye yang skye bar 'dod na ni don dam par skye ba 'gog pa la mu bzhir brtags nas bkag pas mi khegs bar 'gyur te/ de dag gang yang min pa'i skye ba yod pa'i phyir ro/ mu bzhi gang rung las skye na gzhan gsum mi 'dod pas gzhan las skye dgos na don mi rigs te/ 'jug pa las/ gzhan las skye ba 'jig rten las kyang med/ ces gsungs pas so/ de'i phyir skye ba 'gog pa la don dam pa'i khyad par yang sbyar bar mi bya ste tshig gsal las don dam pa'i khyad par sbyor ba bkag pa'i phyir ro/ 376.a.3-6.*

25. CMDR, p. 191.

26. *'di la'ang kha cig ni skye ba la sogs pa tha snyad du'ang mi 'dod zer la/ kha cig ni tha snyad du yod par 'dod cing/ thams cad kyang 'di skad du rigs pas chos rnams la rang gi ngo bos grub pas rang bzhin 'gog pa ni slob dpon 'di yi lugs la bsnyon du med de/ bden pa gnyis char du rang bzhin gyis grub pa bkag pa'i phyir ro/ de ltar rang bzhin med na de nas ci zhig yod/ de'i phyir dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyor ni dbu ma rang rgyud pa kho na'i lugs yin no zhes mgrin pa bsal nas 'chad par byed do/ 376.a.6–376.b.2.*

27. CMDR, p. 191. *gnyis pa de mi 'thad par bstan pa la gnyis/ lugs des dbu ma'i thun mong ma yin pa'i khyad chos bkag par bstan pa dang/ 376.b.2-3.*

28. CMDR, p. 192.

29. *de ltar 'bras bu'i skabs su sku gnyis 'thob pa'i rgyu lam gyi gnad mi 'phyug pa gzhi'i lta ba gtan la 'bebs tshul la rag las pa'i lta ba gtan la 'bebs tshul ni de ma thag tu bshad pa'i bden gnyis la nges pa rnyed pa 'di yin no/ 377.a.2-3.*

30. CMDR, p. 192.

31. Professor Wayman translates: "In short, if they wish to refute the non-self-existence, bondage and liberation, arising and passing away, etc., then the two truths which validate all establishments of *samsāra* and *nirvāna* and the void which is void of self-existence are not proper anywhere, so they have opposed only the special *dharma* of the *Mādhyamika*." We would translate this somewhat as follows: "If you accept an absence of self-existence as contradictory to bondage, liberation, production and passing away, etc., then with regard to the emptiness that is the emptiness of self-existence, you are contradicting just the special feature of the *Mādhyamika*, because you cannot admit the categories of *nirvāna* and *samsāra* into either of the two truths."

Professor Wayman further translates: "If they claim they do not oppose those (establishment of bondage and liberation, etc.) then there is certainly no need to add the special thing (of *paramārtha*, etc.) to the thing opposed (i.e., arising, passing away, etc.) by (their) principle of cessation of self-existence, so there is no genuine reason at all for their belief about arising and passing away, and passing away of bondage and liberation." Our translation would run something like: "If you do not accept them (i.e., absence of self-existence on the one hand and bondage, liberation, production, passing away, etc., on the other) as contradictory, there is no right reason at all for accepting that bondage, liberation, production, passing away, etc., are unqualifiedly denied by the reason that rejects a self-existence."

32. *'di na dbu ma pa ma gtogs pa gang zag gzhan su'i ngor yang 'gal ba 'du par mthong nas mi 'gal bar 'chad mi shes pa la phra zhing mdzangs la shin tu rgya che ba'i rnam dpyod dang ldan pa'i mkhas pa dbu ma pa zhes pa des/ bden pa gnyis rtogs pa'i thabs la mkhas pas 'gal ba'i dri tsam yang med par gtan la phab nas rgyal ba'i dgongs pa'i mthar thug pa rnyed de/ de la brten nas rang gi ston pa dang bstan pa la shin tu gus pa rmad du byung ba skyes pas drangs pa'i ngag tshig rnam par dag pas/ shes ldan dag rang bzhin gyis stong pa'i stong pa nyid kyi don ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i don yin gyi/ don byed pa'i nus pas stong pa'i dngos po med pa'i don ni ma yin no zhes skad gsangs mthon pos yang dang yang du sgrogs par mdzad do/ 377.a.3-6.*

33. CMDR, p. 253.

34. *de ltar na 'dus byas rnam rgyu rkyen gyis bskyed pa dang gzhan du 'gyur ba ni rang gi sde pa rnam kyis grub zin pas de dag la rang bzhin med pa bsgrub mi dgos par 'gyur ba dang/ de dag gis kyang dngos po rnam rang bzhin med par rtogs par 'gyur ba sogs kyi skyon yod pas de thun mong ma yin pa'i dgag bya ga la yin/ 415.a.2-4.* In *P.T.T.*, vol. 152, the discussion of underpervasion runs from p. 145-4-7 to 147-2-6.

35. *'dir dngos po yod med ni sngar gnyis su smra ba'i skabs su bshad pa ltar rang gi ngo bos yod pa dang ye med yin no/ 418.a.4.*

36. CMDR, p. 63.

37. CMDR, p. 69.

38. CMDR, p. 256.

39. *dus gsum du 'ang me la me 'khrul ba gnyug ma'i ngo bo ma bcas pa gang zhis sngar ma byung ba las phyis 'byung ba ma yin pa gang zhi/ chu'i tsha ba'am tshu rol dang pha rol la ma ring po dang thung du ltar rgyu dang rkyen la ltos pa dang bcas par ma gyur pa gang yin pa de rang bzhin yin par brjod do/ ci me'i rang gi ngo bo de lta bur gyur pa de yod dam zhe na de ni rang gi ngo bos yod pa'ang ma yin la med pa'ang ma yin no/ de lta yin mod kyi 'on kyang nyan pa po rnam kyis skrag*

pa spag bar bya ba'i phyir sgro btags nas kun rdzob tu de yod do zhes brjod par bya'o/ zhes rang bzhin de yang rang gi ngo bos grub pa bkag nas tha snyad du yod par gsungs so/ gal te nyan pa po skrag pa spang ba'i phyir du sgro btags nas bstan bar gsungs pas yod par mi bzhed do snyam na de ni rigs pa ma yin to/ dgos pa de'i phyir 'di btags nas gsungs pa ni chos gzhan rnams kyang yin pas de dag kyang med par 'gyur ro/ 416.b.6–417.a.3.

40. *da lta chos rnams la rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bzhin du grub pa rdul tsam yang med par gtan la phab pa'i rang bzhin gyis stong ba'i stong nyid ni/ gzugs sogs kyi chos 'di dag khyad gzhir byas pa'i steng du khyad chos su yod pas blo gcig gi yul na de gnyis ka yod pa mi 'gal zhing gnyis snang de ma log pas stong nyid de don dam bden pa btags pa bar 'gyur ro/ gang gi tshe rang bzhin med par rtogs pa'i lta ba de nyid goms pas don de mngon sum du rtogs pa'i ngor ni rang bzhin med bzhin du rang bzhin du snang ba'i khrul snang thams cad ldog pas na chos nyid de mngon sum du byas pa'i shes pas chos can gzugs sogs de mi dmigs pas/ de lta bu'i chos nyid dang chos can gnyis blo de'i ngo na med pas de gnyis chos nyid dang chos can du 'jog pa ni tha snyad pa'i blo gzhan zhig gi ngos nas bzhag dgos so/ de ltar na don dam pa'i bden pa ni rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i spros pa thams cad zhi ba'i steng du rang bzhin med bzhin du der snang ba'i 'khrul snang gi spros pa thams cad kyang rnam par log pa tsam la 'jog pas de khas blangs kyang rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bzhin khas blang ga na dgos/ 418.a.4–418.b.3.*

41. “Nowadays, they establish the *dharma*s that are without even an atom accomplished as self-existent, accomplished by own-nature, as the voidness of what is void of self-existence. Now these *dharma*s of form, etc., amount to the ‘special basis’ (*khyad gzhi*) (i.e., void of self-existence); and thereupon there is a presence in the sense of the ‘special *dharma*’ (*khyad chos*) (i.e., voidness), thus in the scope of a single discrimination (*eka-buddhi*). (They say that) there is no contradiction in there being both of these (i.e., the special basis—form, etc.; and the special *dharma*—voidness), and that the second appearance is not wayward. But this voidness is the factitious (*kālpanika*) *paramārtha-satya*.

“At whatever time, by habituation in that view which comprehends the absence of self-existence, one comprehends this entity in immediacy—on this face (of comprehension) one wards off all delusive appearance that takes what is without self-existence to be self-existent. The awareness which realizes directly that true nature (*dharmatā*) does not have in view the factual bases (*darmin*) form, etc. Thus, the two, the true nature of that sort (=voidness) and factual bases (form, etc.) are the absence on the face of *buddhi*. So the positing of these two, the true nature and the factual base, requires a positing by the face of a different *buddhi* that is conventional. That being the case, *paramārtha-satya* is the quiescence of all elaboration (*prapañca*) accomplished by own-form, and on it is the absence of self-existence; but whatever appears there, namely all the elaboration of delusive appearance, is what one posits just in waywardness. So, while accepting that (*paramārtha*), where is the necessity to accept a self-existence accomplished by own-form!”

42. CMDR, p. 69.

43. 424.a.4-5. Emphasis in Wayman passages ours.