

Mādhyamika position. As a translator, I dare say that the reader need not do the same in order to appreciate Tsoṅ-kha-pa's text. That is to say, a reader need not calm his mind in the manner described in the "Calm-ing" section merely to ascertain how Tsoṅ-kha-pa establishes the Mādhyamika position. Readers interested in Mādhyamika Buddhism should find herein valuable suggestions for why the school is called "followers of the middle (*madhyama*)."

Use of Buddhist Logic

There are various reasons for the author's enthusiastic use of Buddhist logic, especially of Dharmakīrti's works. There was an intensive study of this topic in the several centuries before Tsoṅ-kha-pa and it was prevalent in his own day. For the Prāsaṅgika school of Mādhyamika which Tsoṅ-kha-pa accepts, Candrakīrti's own arguments with Bhāvaviveka and with the Buddhist logician Dignāga involve a conventional acceptance of the four "authorities" (*pramāṇa*) of the Nyāya school and assume a scholastic study of the "rules of debate" with the rather acute distinctions of the later Indian school of Buddhist logic. Previously, in the introduction to Tsoṅ-kha-pa's life, we noticed how assiduously and devotedly he studied Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*.

This truly remarkable application of Buddhist logic under the category of "Discerning" creates two forms of stark contrast: *a*) the contrast with the usual Western treatment of the Mādhyamika, limited to philology, metaphysical interpretations, and the like; *b*) the contrast with present-day expositions by Theravādins of "insight-meditation" ("insight" rather than "discerning" being the usual rendition from the Pāli *vipassanā*) taking its Buddhist doctrinal base in the Abhidharma.

It is not possible to deal here with all the ways in which Tsoṅ-kha-pa employs Buddhist logic, but since he devotes the first large topic in the "Discerning" section to determining the principle to be refuted by considering the "overpervasion" (*ativyāpti*, Tib. *khyab ches pa*) and "nonpervasion" (*avyāpti*, Tib. *khyab chuṅs pa*), I shall restrict myself here to a consideration of this matter.

According to Ingalls, *ativyāpti* (overpervasion), *avyāpti* (nonpervasion), and *asaṃbhava* (impossibility) are fallacies of the definition in Nyāya.⁸⁰

Indeed, they are about the same as fallacies of the reason (*hetu*) in earlier Indian logic, which includes the Buddhist logic that was transmitted to Tibet and earnestly studied there.

Tsoṅ-kha-pa uses the two terms to cover his various rejections of Buddhist sectarian differences on apprehension of the Mādhyamika refutable (*niṣedhya*). He first treats the overpervasion in lengthy fashion (40 folios), then the nonpervasion rather briefly (4 folios), where the first of these fallacious positions, the overpervasion, affirms *svabbāva* (self-existence); and the second, the nonpervasion, denies *svabbāva*. He follows in many folios thereafter with what he represents as the proper Mādhyamika apprehension of the refutable, which is either the refutable of the path (the hindrance of defilement and the hindrance of the knowable, in Sanskrit the *kleśa-* and *jñeya-avarāṇa*) or the refutable of the principle (the adherence to a delusive thing and to the presence of self-existence).

The opponents thus judged to be guilty of overpervasion are especially the realists, called the *vastu-satpadārtha-vādin*—a name extant in the Sanskrit fragments of Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's *Catuhṣataka*. Other opponents are the mind-only (*cittamātra*) persons of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism as well as the Mādhyamika-Svātantrika (of which Bhāvaviveka is the most famous exponent). Of the three opponents, Nāgārjuna may have been opposed by only the *vastu-satpadārtha-vādin*—whether or not he knew them by that name—since the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika-Svātantrika arose after him, although it is possible that arguments similar to those of the latter two schools may also have been advanced in Nāgārjuna's day.

Now the question arises why those opponents should be charged with overpervasion by way of their *svabbāva* affirmation. Or, is their overpervasion a fallacious inference according to the illustration, "It has smoke, as it has fire"? The discussions are complicated, but as I read Tsoṅ-kha-pa's section, the easiest position to pin down under "overpervasion" is that of the *Cittamātra*. In this case, the *svabbāva* is threefold, the "perfect" (*pariniṣpanna*), the "dependency" (*paratantra*), and the "imaginary" (*parikalpita*). This school takes the dependency character as the reason (*hetu*) for refuting *saṃvṛti* (the conventional world) as *parikalpita*; the reason is overpervasive, since the dependency character is both real (*sat*) and unreal (*asat*), while *parikalpita* is only unreal.

The realist is the opponent assumed in Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, to wit, the opponent who argues (MK, XXIV, 1), "If all this is void, then your position reduces to the absurdity that there is no arising or passing away and there are no four Noble Truths!" And the one who argues (*Vigrahavyāvartanī*, k. 1), "If there is nowhere a self-existence of any presences (*bhāva*) your words, being without self-existence, are unable to refute the self-existence!" Thus the realist says that things either exist or do not exist, and has no middle ground (according to Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist dependent origination). For this realist, a thing exists and works by way of its *svabhāva* (self-existence or own-being). It is held that these realists fall into the faults of eternalism and nihilism, saying (per Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, k. 43), "Oh, it is permanent, (or) it is impermanent!" Their fault is more clearly stated in *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (XXIV, 16), "If you look upon the occurrence of entities as being from self-existence, then you regard the entities as without causes or conditions." Otherwise stated: the realist has not distinguished the mean (i.e., the shoot without self-existence, that has arisen from causes and conditions) from an extreme (i.e., absence of the shoot, or presence of the shoot by own-nature). Therefore, the realist overpervades with a reason of "presence" (*bhāva*) or "absence" (*abhāva*). Indeed, when the realist charges the Mādhyamika with nihilism, Nāgārjuna mounts a counterattack, undermining the appeal to authority (*pramāṇa*), as when one says realistically, "The hill has fire, as it has smoke." But Nāgārjuna says (MK, III, 2): "Vision does not see itself as itself. Now, if it does not see what is itself, how will it see what is another?" Thus Nāgārjuna rejects the authority of direct sense perception, anticipating Candrakīrti's argument against the Buddhist logicians.

The argument between Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka involves the distinction of supreme truth (*paramārtha-satya*) and conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*). Tsoṅ-kha-pa points out that only Bhāvaviveka's school, the Mādhyamika-Svāntarika, applies *paramārtha* in particular to the refutable principle (the *niśedhya*), in commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, I, 1. The fallacy is suggested by Candrakīrti, in *Madhyamakāvātāra*, VI, 32d: "Even according to the world the birth is not from another." So I understand the inclusion of the Mādhyamika-Svāntarika under "overpervasion" to be involved in Bhāvaviveka's appeal to *para-*

mārtha-satya as a reason while he employs the theory of *paramārtha-satya* in overpervasion of *saṃvṛti-satya*.

So in the briefest reply to the question I posed, it appears feasible to interpret the overpervasion of all three opponents in analogy to the way fire overpervades smoke, namely, that the pair *sat* and *asat* overpervade *asat*, that *bhāva* and *abhāva* each overpervade their mean, and that *paramārthasatya*, in a certain theory, overpervades *saṃvṛtisatya*.

Under the nonpervasion, Tsoṅ-kha-pa places the insider of the Mādhyamika, Prāsaṅgika school who has quite properly denied *svabhāva* as a principle and then falsely denies *svabhāva* in the Buddhist path, i.e., takes it as the refutable of the path. Thus this insider misses the meaning of the scriptural passage, "Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise this true nature of *dharmas* abides," found both in a Pāli-language scripture and in the Mahāyāna scripture *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*. Nāgārjuna alludes to this *svabhāva* in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, chapter XV. Regarding this nonpervasion, Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra* has this verse (VI, 141)—extant in Sanskrit as cited in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha* (as I translate): "Seeing a snake coiled in a recess of his house, and thinking, 'There is no elephant here' his alarm is dispelled (as to an elephant), and he abandons fear even for the snake. Behold the rectitude of our opponent!" Here the snake can be explained as nescience (*avidyā*). This person does not fear the snake because he thinks, "There is no elephant here" (i.e., there is no *svabhāva*, self-existence). Thereby he loses fear for the snake of nescience and continues to have its threatening presence there in the recess. So "Behold the rectitude of our opponent!" In this case, nonpervasion (*avyāpti*) is construed as "not the *vyāpti*," meaning that non-self-existence (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) is not the *vyāpti* of the Buddhist path, even though it is a *vyāpti* in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and referred to as the "principle."

Upon reading some of the discussions of these two fallacies of *vyāpti* in a Navya-Nyāya work on *vyāpti*,⁸¹ it appears that Tsoṅ-kha-pa's discussion approximately fits the presumed fallacies of the *kevalānvayi vyāpti* (the universally present pervasion) and the *kevalavyatirekī vyāpti* (the universally absent pervasion). That is to say, the three outer opponents of the Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika would universalize their principle that is used for the refutable of *saṃvṛti*. In contrast, the insider opponent of the Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika would universalize the absence of *svabhāva*.

Thus, Tsoṅ-kha-pa's usage seems consistent with later Indian logic, where the two terms are nonoverlapping, that is to say, a fallacious inference which is *ativyāpti* cannot be *avyāpti* and vice versa.

The same work sets forth Gaṅgeśa's discussion and rejection of a number of definitions of *vyāpti* as found in previous schools, including the definition by the Buddhist logicians.⁸² Of course, to assail the definition of *vyāpti* made by a previous school implies a rejection of the soundness of the arguments in that school. Indeed, Gaṅgeśa thereby takes that definition as the refutable (*niśedhya*), a kind of *sādhya*; while we know that *vyāpti* is itself a part of the inference involved. This reminds us of Bhāvaviveka's position as cited in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (chap. I) and explained in Tsoṅ-kha-pa's "Discerning" section:⁸³

Now, if one holds such distinctions, there are no agreed-upon conventions for the inference or for the inferable. The reason is as follows: if we hold that sound is derived from the four great elements, that is not proved to the opponent (who is the Vaiśeṣika). On the other hand, when he (the Vaiśeṣika) holds sound to be a quality of space (*ākāśa*), that is not proved to the Buddhist on his side. Likewise, if the Vaiśeṣika sets forth the proposition "Sound is not eternal" and holds that the sound is constructed (*kārya*), that is not proved to those others (i.e., the Mīmāṃsā, who maintain that it is made perceptible, *vyāṅgya*, from its imperishable state). On the other hand, if sound be held as made perceptible (*vyāṅgya*), that is not proved to (the Vaiśeṣika) himself.

In short, one way of disagreeing with another school is to reject its definition of *vyāpti*; another way is to reject the *vyāpti* itself. But, for example, the Buddhists presumably agree that every created thing is impermanent—it is pervaded by impermanence. So when a Buddhist reads that the five personality aggregates are impermanent, he accepts this because he has already accepted the pervasion, oblivious of the definition of "pervasion." While in "inference for others" according to Bhāvaviveka, in the case of the well-known syllogism about the smoke and the fire, when one gives the example "like the stove," it is necessary for the two parties to agree that the example is viable, or it would be futile to go on. Perhaps this is a reason why, when I asked the late Hidenori Kitagawa of Nagoya, Japan, if he had ever noticed in the texts of Buddhist logic the simile of the mirror, he responded negatively. But Nāgārjuna is willing to use more similes than those used by the logicians. Thus, he writes in his *Pratītyasamutpādhādaya-vyākaraṇa*:⁸⁴

Just as in the case of a flame from a flame, the reflected image in a mirror from a face . . . a person is not taught . . . that one is different from the other, so also in the case of reconnection of the personality aggregates, the wise person will understand that there is no transfer.

The Middle View

The middle view of course avoids the extremes of existence and nonexistence, or, in the preceding terminology, avoids the alternatives of overpervasion or nonpervasion. But, as was mentioned, it is often held that the Mādhyamika, especially in the Prāsaṅgika form, rejects all views and therefore does not have a position of its own. According to Tsoṅ-kha-pa, there is a great misunderstanding here. Chakraborty mentions: "Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa Khāḍya of Śrī Harṣa is a case in point. Śrī Harṣa here with the help of a formidable dialectic disproves the case of the opponents but does not take pains for the positive establishment of any thesis."⁸⁵ In fact, Śrī Harṣa in the first chapter takes the Mādhyamika side against the Nyāya opponent and argues that even if he (Śrī Harṣa) does not have a thesis of his own, it is still possible to carry on a debate. Indeed, by disproving the opponents he gradually defines his own position in negative terms, somewhat analogous to when in ancient India the absolute was referred to as "not this, not this" and still the absolute was thereby referred to and was not denied. So Tsoṅ-kha-pa, early in his section "B. Option of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika as Refuting Agent" states, ". . . while insisting that the Svātantrika is not valid, he [Candrakīrti] clarified the (Prāsaṅgika) position." Besides, the fact of not putting forth a position of one's own while arguing with opponents is consistent with the middle view not being expressible in the ordinary realistic terms of existence and nonexistence. Hence, the middle view is expressed as nonself; and dependent origination is voidness (*śūnyatā*): the natures (*dharmā*) arise like a dream, like a face in a mirror, a flame from a flame, etc. Fire arises by a cause (=the original fire that does not go anywhere) and conditions (combustible materials; exciting agencies, such as friction). And the arising by cause and condition is not equivalent to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *asatkāryavāda*, holding that the clay pot arises from itself (clay) and from the potter, wheel, sticks, etc. This is because the "new" fire is not, according to Nāgārjuna, composed of the "old" fire,

since in the case of a flame from a flame, there is no transfer. In short, the "old" fire is the efficient, not the material cause, while in the realist position the clay is the material cause of the clay pot. But the "new" condition (the combustible material, etc.) is the instrumental cause, like the realist's old potter, wheel, sticks, etc.

Pursuant to the middle view, Tsoṅ-kha-pa cites Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and Candrakīrti's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā-vṛtti*.
Nāgārjuna:

What arises in dependence is not born;
That is proclaimed by the supreme knower of reality (= Buddha).

Candrakīrti:

(The realist opponent says): If (as you say) whatever thing arises in dependence is not even born, then why does (the Mādhyamika) say it is not born? But if (you Mādhyamika) have a reason for saying (this thing) is not born, then you should not say it "arises in dependence." Therefore, because of mutual inconsistency, (what you have said) is not valid.

(The Mādhyamika replies with compassionate interjection:)

Alas! Because you are without ears or heart you have thrown a challenge that is severe on us! When we say that anything arising in dependence, in the manner of a reflected image, does not arise by reason of self-existence—at that time where is the possibility of disputing (us)!

So when in this Mādhyamika literature one frequently finds such statements as "The natures (*dharmas*) arise void of self-existence (*svabhāva*)," the opponents declare this to be a nihilistic position (thus willing to attribute a "position" or "view" to the Mādhyamika), asserting that the Mādhyamika denies self-existence (*svabhāva*) or denies the natures (*dharmas*). An example should clarify Candrakīrti's response. If we were to say, "The children came to school without shoes," and another were to make a challenge, "So you deny that there are shoes," we would have to answer, "Alas, you are without ears; we did not deny shoes when we said that the children came to school without shoes." And if another were to make a challenge, "So you deny children," we would have to answer, "Alas, you are without heart; whoever would deny children is heartless, and we did not deny children when we said that the children

came to school without shoes." Thus, these Mādhyamikas do not deny *svabhāva* (= shoes) or *dharmas* (= children), when saying, "The natures (*dharmas*) arise void of self-existence (*svabhāva*)."

Svabhāva of the Path

Having again and again denied the self-existence (*svabhāva*) of entities, the Mādhyamika followers go on to qualify their denials. It turns out that the *svabhāva* that was denied is the one believed in by ordinary persons called *bāla* (the childish, spiritually immature person), who accept as real what they imagine to perceive, while their eye of knowledge is covered by nescience's caul. So Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* commentary on the *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (XV, 2):

By whatever (deluded) self one approaches the form of entities (form, etc.) perceptively reached by the power of nescience's coat; and by whatever method of nonseeing belonging to the nobles who are rid of nescience's coat one approaches the domain (of *samāpatti*): just that own-form (*svarūpa*) is established as the *svabhāva* of those (entities).

But, as he mentions there, the meditator who can ascend to equipoise (*samāpatti*) may witness the *svabhāva* that is inaccessible to the ordinary person. And as Tsoṅ-kha-pa further cites Candrakīrti (his *Madhyamakāvatāra*): "The reality (i.e., own-form) which no childish person can witness is the principle which (ultimately) is *svabhāva*," and "Consequently, it is for the purpose of witnessing that (ultimate *svabhāva*) that the pure life (and path cultivation) becomes meaningful."

To further explain the witnessing of *svabhāva*, one may refer to the tradition of the Buddha's night of enlightenment when he discovered the formula of dependent origination; and according to Āśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* (chap. XIV) discovered it in the third watch of night by working backward from "old age and death" (no. 12 in the twelve-membered formula) in the formula with ten members, up to "perception" (*viññāna*) (no. 3 in the twelve-membered formula). Āśvaghoṣa writes:⁸⁶

71. When perception arises, name-and-form is produced. When the development of the seed is completed, the sprout assumes a bodily form.

72. Next he considered, "From what does perception come into being?" Then he knew that it is produced by supporting itself on name-and-form.

The significance of this is exposed in Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi* in the *Vas-tusamgrahaṇī* section. Asaṅga explains what is meant by "seeing *dharmas*" as seeing a "place of truth" by seeing either constructed natures or unconstructed natures; and in both cases with either conventional or absolute truth. As to the "place of truth," he says:⁸⁷

Just as there is some place of truth, he rightly knows it as it is, and rightly knows as it is the truth (thereof). What is a place of truth? Name-and-form, called the "own-nature of a man" (*manuṣya-svarūpa* *).

Thus when the terminology "discerning the real" is employed, the "real" may be referred to as "name-and-form."⁸⁸

The foregoing also helps to clarify why Aśvaghōṣa used at that point the ten-membered formula, which omits the usual two first members of "nescience" (*avidyā*) and "motivations" (*saṃskāra*). This suggests the enlightenment situation when both "nescience" (defilement) and "motivations" (the *karma*) have ceased, and so Nāgārjuna writes in his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (k. 10-11AB):⁸⁹

Having seen with right knowledge (= clear vision, *vidyā*) what has arisen with the condition of "nescience," there is no apprehension at all of either arising or passing away. That very thing is Nirvāṇa as this life (= the *dharma* seen, *dr̥ṣṭa-dharma*), and the requirement is done (*kṛta-kṛtya*).

This situation is prepared for by the Bodhisattva's contemplation of dependent origination on the sixth stage according to the Mahāyāna scripture *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*. This is said to occur to that Bodhisattva: "Because of the clinging to a creator, activities are known; wherever there is no creator, there also activities are not perceptively reached in the absolute sense," and "These three realms are this mind-only." As I have discussed elsewhere using Tsoṅ-kha-pa's materials,⁹⁰ it is "nescience" which clings to a creator, so when "nescience" does not arise, "activities" (= 'motivations') are not perceptively reached, i.e., "percep-

tion" (*vijñāna*) does not perceive them. Then, "perception," in the light of the present discussion, is the conventional mind-only which is tantamount to the three realms. In Aśvaghōṣa's account, it is not the *vijñāna* itself that is to be got rid of. Rather, it is disengaged from dependence on "activities" and instead is promoted by "name-and-form." This may then be the intention of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (text 126.11-12): "According to my promulgation, Mahāmāti, the warding off of the *manovijñāna* that thinks discursively, is said to be Nirvāṇa." Thus *vijñāna* changes its meaning from "perception" to "understanding," and understands the "name-and-form," also with "insight" (*prajñā*) or with "clear vision" (*vidyā*).

Now it should be pointed out that the *svabhāva* which is here alluded to as "name-and-form," or the reality which is the object of discerning (*vipaśyanā*), is also referred to in this literature as the "true nature" (*dharmatā*). So the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* may be cited (218.8-13):

Whether the Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, there remains this true nature (*dharmatā*), the rule of *dharmas*, the continuance of *dharmas*. This abiding of *dharmas* is not in the sphere of any of the visualizations of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, or heads of sects; and immature ordinary persons are not awakened to it. It is contemplatively evoked (*prabhāvita*) by the insight-knowledge of the Tathāgatas.

The foregoing should show why the Mādhyamika has over the centuries afforded such difficulties of interpretation, so that it was not only the opponents—who so often do not take pains to ascertain what they are disagreeing with—who were found to be rejecting the Mādhyamika; but also those who counted themselves as the "insiders" were arguing as vociferously with each other on the matter. Small wonder that this Mādhyamika school should be misunderstood, when it vigorously rejects the *svabhāva* that is something to establish by mundane reasoning, and then upholds the *svabhāva* that is something to realize in Yoga attainment. Or when it sometimes denies having a position of its own, and then argues at length and in all sorts of ways to refute the "wrong" views—for why bother to reject views on the grounds that they are wrong, if not wrong in comparison with a "right" view!

* Theoretical reconstruction of the Sanskrit.

paramārtha are according to the Mādhyamikas the proof for *saṃvṛti*. Their theories (put forth) as *saṃvṛti* are judged by the Mādhyamikas as proving (instead) the (Mādhyamika) *paramārtha*. One should analyze those (differences) because there is no contradiction at all (in the Mādhyamika case).

Furthermore, their (i.e., realists') existence of *puḍgala* by designation and this *ācārya*'s (i.e., of the Mādhyamika school) existence of *puḍgala* by designation are alike (only) in terms, but (decidedly) different in meaning, because this *ācārya* maintains that those (realists) lack the view which comprehends selflessness of *puḍgala*, and because (this *ācārya*) maintains that if they do not comprehend selflessness of *puḍgala* they do not comprehend selflessness of *dharmas*. Hence, this *ācārya* maintains that as long as they do not abandon the school (*siddhānta*) going with the substantial existence of the personality aggregates they will hold that the *puḍgala* also has substantial existence, so they will not have the comprehension that the *puḍgala* does not exist from the absolute standpoint.

II. THE BASIC ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REALITY

There are three parts: A. Engaging the principle to be refuted; B. Option of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika as refuting agent; C. Relying on this agent, the method of generating the view in consciousness (*saṃjñāna*).

A. Engaging the Principle to be Refuted

This also has three parts: 1. The reason for the requirement to determine the refutable (principle); 2. Refuting the other school which denies without determining the refutable; 3. Our own school's method of determining the refutable.

1. THE REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT TO DETERMINE THE REFUTABLE

For example, to be certain about thinking that a (certain) person is not present, it is necessary to know this person with his cause for absence. In the same way, to be certain about the meaning of nonself and non-self-existence, it is also necessary to determine that "self" and "self-existence" with cause for their absence, because as long as the generality of the (principle) to be refuted does not arise (in the mind) there is not

certainty that the refutation is without error. This is stated in the *Caryāvatāra* (IX, 140a–b).³¹ "As long as one has not contacted an imagined entity, one cannot apprehend its absence."

Now, particular diversified principles to be refuted are innumerable, but when one summarizes the refutable principle and refutes it to the root, one can counter all refutable principles. Besides, if one does not counter all the points to be refuted—even subtle ones—one falls into the extreme of existence and with attachment to things has no capacity for liberation from phenomenal life. On the other hand, when one refutes the refutable principle out of all proportion by not observing the proper measure, he casts aspersion on the series of cause and fruit and of dependent origination, and falls into the extreme of nihilism, and this view leads him to a bad destiny. Therefore it is very important to well apprehend the refutable principle, because if one does not apprehend it, he will certainly generate either the view of eternalism or the view of nihilism.

2. REFUTING THE OTHER SCHOOL WHICH DENIES WITHOUT DETERMINING THE REFUTABLE

There are two parts to this: a. Refutation of overpervasion in determining the refutable; b. Refutation of nonpervasion in determining the refutable.

a. Refutation of Overpervasion in Determining the Refutable

This has two sections: (1) Setting forth the (opponent's) thesis; (2) Showing that (the thesis) is not valid.

(1) SETTING FORTH THE OPPONENT'S THESIS

The generality of modern-day (i.e., Tibetan) adherents of the Mādhyamika, while setting forth its meaning, say: By the principle which examines whether the reality of birth, etc. is proved or not proved one counters all the *dharmas* from form up to omniscience,³² because when one examines with a principle regarding whatever (*dharmas*) be upheld, there is not even an atom that can withstand examination; and because when one refutes all the four alternatives of "it exists," "it does not exist," etc., there is no unconstructed nature (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*) therein (i.e., in the four alternatives). Moreover, when with the noble knowledge that sees reality one sees that there is no (*dharmas*) whatever of

birth and decease, bondage and liberation, etc., then it must be the case as authorized by that (noble *samāpatti*), so there is no birth, etc. If one claims that there is birth, etc., then either it can withstand or not withstand the examination with a principle that examines the reality in that case. In the event it can withstand (that examination), there would be (proved) explicitly as true that there is an entity which withstands the examination by the principle. In the event it cannot withstand that examination, how could it be valid that there exists an entity countered by the principle?

Accordingly, if one claims an existence of birth, etc., it is either proved or not proved by an authority. In the first case (i.e., proved by an authority), since it is proved by that knowledge (= *ārya-samāpatti*) which sees reality (directly), it is not valid that it sees the nonexistence of birth. If it is claimed to be proved by cognition of the conventional eye, etc. (ear and so on), it is refuted that they constitute an authority, because the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* shows as invalid that they (eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.), as in this passage (IX, 23):

(The perception based on) eye is not an authority (*pramāṇa*), nor are (the perceptions based on) ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind authorities. If these (perceptions based on) sense organs were authorities, who would need to resort to the Noble Truth!

And also because the *Avatāra* (= *Mādhyamakāvatāra*, VI, 31a) states, "The world with its multitudinous aspects is not an authority." The claim that it exists although not proved by an authority is not held by us, and since it is not a principle it is (highly) invalid. If one claims there is birth, while denying it in an absolute sense, it is necessary that he claim it so in a conventional sense, but this is not proper, because this passage of the *Avatāra* (VI, 36) states that the principle by which birth is denied in the absolute sense, also denies it conventionally:

By whatever principle in the phase of reality there is no reason for birth from oneself or from another, by that principle there is no reason for it conventionally. Therefore, how can there be your birth!

And also because a thing does not arise from itself, from another, and so on—four in all—so if one claims that it arises, he counters by imagining

the four alternatives to be a refutation of birth in the absolute sense and so do not disallow (birth); but (the four alternatives means) there is no birth of them at all. Suppose there were birth from a particular one of four alternatives, and denying three of them, suppose it were necessary to be born from another thing—that is not proper, because the *Avatāra* states (VI, 32d): "Even according to the world the birth is not from another." Therefore, when refuting birth, one should not apply the special feature of *paramārtha*, because the *Prasannapadā* refutes the application in particular of *paramārtha*.

In this matter also, some assert that they do not admit birth, etc. even conventionally; and some claim that there is (birth, etc.) conventionally. But all agree with a principle in refuting for the *dharmas* a self-existence produced by own nature, because while this *ācārya*'s school does not affirm and then deny,³³ he simultaneously refutes the production by self-existence in the sense of both truths. If that is the way there is no self-existence, then what (else) is there? Therefore, the special application of *paramārtha* to the refutable principle is now explained with special clarity³⁴ to be only the school of Mādhyamika-Svāntarika.

(2) SHOWING THAT THE THESIS IS NOT VALID

This has two parts: (a) Showing that the special refutation of *dharmas* by that school is not common to the Mādhyamika; (b) Teaching how to avoid defeat by the assailant's discourses.

(a) Showing That the Special Refutation of *Dharma* by That School is Not Common to the Mādhyamika.

Here there are three parts: (i) Determining the special *dharmas* of the Mādhyamika; (ii) Manner in which a school opposes that (special *dharmas*); (iii) How the Mādhyamika answers this (challenge).

(i) Determining the Special *Dharma* of the Mādhyamika (Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (verse 60) says:

By means of this virtue all persons amass
their collection of merit and knowledge.
May the two sublimities that arise from
merit and knowledge, be achieved!

The point of this passage is that the candidates who proceed by the highest vehicle attain the sublimity of the Dharmakāya and the sub-

limity of the Rūpakāya in the phase of the fruit. In the phase of the path, as was previously explained,³⁵ they resort to amassing the uncountable collection of merits and knowledge while avoiding a one-sidedness of either means (*upāya*) or insight (*prajñā*).³⁶ That is to say, they concern themselves with two kinds of certainty: *a*) They associate the causes and fruits of *saṃvṛti* by thinking that from such-and-such a cause comes this benefit (of good destiny) or this trouble (of bad destiny) as fruit, and draw certainty from the bottom of their hearts and with sincerity, thus attaining the certainty of the phenomenon. *b*) And they reach certainty from the bottom of their hearts that there is not even a particle of self-existence (*svabhāva*) produced by own nature in all the *dharmas*, thus attaining the certainty of the noumenon. The reason is that if either one is lacking, the full complement of the path of both means and insight is not being learned from the bottom of their hearts and with sincerity.³⁷ Accordingly, *a*) the method of establishing the basic view that does not mistake the essential of the causal path for attaining both bodies in the phase of the fruit,³⁸ and *b*) the method of establishing the view that depends on that (basic view), achieve the (two) certainties in the two truths as just explained.

Except for this kind of Mādhyamika, what manner of other person who observes (only) the gathering of refutation and is ignorant of holding the irrefutable, would be called the Mādhyamika skilled in possession of broad examination and possessed of subtle learning! Thus, the one skilled in the means of comprehending the two truths, who is established without even the question of refutation, and resorts to achieving the ultimate purport of the Victor, engenders wondrous devotion to his teacher and the Teaching and gains understanding guided by the pure voice and words that tell him emphatically again and again the mysterious words: the meaning of the voidness which is void of self-existence is the meaning of dependent origination, but is not the meaning of absence void of efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*).

The learned realists with their own position may train ever so much in numerous fields of knowledge, but when they deny the Mādhyamika view and dispute the Mādhyamika—it being a fact that all *dharmas* are entirely void of any self-existence at all that is accomplished by self-nature—their theory fails in any establishment of bondage and liberation, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, etc. The *Mūla-prajñā* (XXIV, 1) states [presenting the realists' challenge]:

If all this is void, then your position reduces to the absurdity that there is no arising or passing away and there are no four Noble Truths!

That says that if these are void of self-existence, arising and passing away as well as the four Noble Truths are not valid. The *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (k. 1) puts (their challenge) this way:

If there is nowhere a self-existence of any presences, your words, being without self-existence, are unable to refute the self-existence!

This says that if words are without self-existence, they have no capacity to prove the rejection of self-existence or non-self-existence. Thus it disputes, claiming that in the absence of self-existence there is no validity of generator and thing generated, or of refutation and agent and act of proof. Thus they argue, sapient that this principle of opposing self-existence denies all agents and action. Therefore the schools (*siddhānta*) of the realist and the Mādhyamika are not in common; and when these two dispute, the argument merely revolves about whether or not (those holding) the void of self-existence have validity in any establishment of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. Anyway, while there is not even a speck of self-existence accomplished by own nature, the special *dharma* of the Mādhyamika suffices in its theory for all establishments of generator and thing generated, refutation and proof, etc. and *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. According to the *Mūla-prajñā* (XXIV, 13, 14):

Furthermore, when you, sir, object to this voidness, the faulty refutation does not apply to the void of our school. For the school which holds voidness as valid, everything becomes valid. For the school which holds voidness as invalid, everything becomes invalid.

This points out that the fault charged by the words, "If all this is void, . . ." does not accrue to the school of non-self-existence; even more, that arising, passing away, are valid in the position (holding) the void of self-existence; and that they are not valid in the position (holding) no void of self-existence. That is also stated in the *Prasannapadā*:³⁹

It is not just that the aforementioned faulty refutation does not apply to our school, but also so as to teach that all the establishment of truths, etc. is highly valid, he says: "For the school which holds voidness as valid. . . ."

Thus he (Candrakīrti) explains it in his text.

Chapter XXVI of the *Mūla-Madhyamaka-kārikā* teaches the arising sequence in direct order of dependent origination in twelve members and the cessation sequence in reverse order.⁴⁰ Chapter XXV especially teaches the denial of self-existence.⁴¹ Chapter XXIV, by examination of the Noble Truths, extensively lays down that if it is not void of self-existence, all establishments of arising and passing away, and so on of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, are invalid; and that if it is void of self-existence, all those (establishments) are valid.⁴² Consequently, these chapters are of great importance for understanding all the other chapters.

Hence, those who nowadays claim to speak the meaning of the Mādhyamika and say that such causes and effects as generator and thing generated, when (assumed) without self-existence, are pervaded with invalidity constitute the realist school (*vastuśatpādārthavādin*). So one should seek out the Mādhyamika path as it was maintained by nātha Nāgārjuna—that on the basis of this-and-that cause and condition, this-and-that fruit arises and ceases; that the establishment of cause and effect is the void of self-existence in dependence. Chapter XXIV (k. 18, 19) states:⁴³

The origination in dependence we call the "voidness." That is the designation when there is depending. Precisely that is the middle path.

Since no *dharmā* originates outside of dependence, it follows that there is no *dharmā* whatsoever that is not void.

This states that dependent origination is pervaded by the void of self-existence. So do not deny it and say that birth by reliance on causes and conditions is pervaded by accomplishment of self-existence! Along the same lines, the *Vigrahavāyāvartanī* (k. 71–72) proclaims:

For whatever (school) this voidness is feasible, all things are feasible. For whatever (school) voidness is not feasible, nothing is feasible. I bow to that incomparable Buddha who has expounded voidness, dependent origination, and the middle path with the same meaning.

Furthermore, the *Śūnyatāśāptati* (k. 68) says:

The incomparable Tathāgata has declared that all entities are void of self-existence, giving as the reason that the entities arise in dependence.

Besides, the *Yuktiśāstikā* (k. 43–45) states:

Those (i.e., outsiders) who insist on a self in a world without dependence, are carried away by views like, "Oh, it is permanent; it is impermanent!"

Those (i.e., the Buddhist realists) who claim that entities in dependence are accomplished in reality, do not recognize the faults of eternalism, etc. as they occur.

Those (i.e., the correct Mādhyamika) who hold that entities in dependence are like the moon in the waters, being not misled by unreality are not carried away by those distorted theories.

Moreover, it is said in the *Lokātinastava* (k. 19–20):⁴⁴

The logicians (*tārikika*) believe that suffering is constructed by oneself, by another, by both, or by chance; but you teach that it arises in dependence.

Whatever is originated in dependence, you regard as void. "There is no independent entity,"—that is your incomparable lion's roar.

This states that it is only void of self-existence because it has origination in dependence. This idea that the meaning of dependent origination is the meaning of voidness of what is non-self-existent is the unshared school of nātha Nāgārjuna. Hence, our school takes the side of Mādhyamika with voidness of what is non-self-existent and thus establishes the cause and effect of dependent origination. If one is loath to so take it, he is guided to other positions and does not have the meaning of dependent origination. Because the (above-cited) passage, "For the school which holds voidness as valid, everything becomes valid," refers to the school of non-self-existence and means that for it everything of dependent origination pertaining to *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* becomes valid.

However, suppose there is the question of how the position accepting voidness is the school validating all of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. (In answer:) The one saying that all entities have voidness of self-existence, speaks in

that case with the reason that they arise in dependence on causes and conditions; this is to be expounded (below).

That being the case, dependent origination is valid in that (void of self-existence). Since it is valid, suffering is also valid. So it is necessary to posit suffering in anything that arises in dependence on causes and conditions, because suffering is not valid if there is no arising in dependence. If there is the Truth of Suffering, then the Source from which it arises, the Cessation with ceasing of that Suffering, and the Path leading to that (Cessation) are valid, so the four Truths are established. If there are the four Truths, their respective experience, elimination, direct realization, and path cultivation are valid. If there are those, the three Jewels, and so on, are all valid. It is so according to the *Prasannapadā* (on XXIV, k. 14):⁴⁵

For the school in which this voidness of self-existence of all entities is valid, "everything," as was stated, becomes valid. How so? Since we call "voidness" the arising in dependence, it follows that for the school in which this voidness is valid, dependent origination is valid. For the school in which dependent origination is valid, the Noble Truths are valid. How so? For the reason that it is just when there is dependent origination that suffering arises; it does not arise in the absence of dependent origination. And that is void of self-existence. When there is suffering, then the source of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering are valid. Consequently, the thorough experience of suffering, the elimination of the source, the direct realization of the cessation, and cultivation of the path, are valid. When there are the thorough experience, etc. going respectively with suffering, etc., their fruits are valid. When there are the fruits, those who abide in the fruits are valid. When there are those abiding in the fruits, those who have resorts (to the fruits) are valid. When there are those abiding in the fruits and those who have resorted, the Saṃgha is valid. When there are the Noble Truths, the Illustrious Dharma is also valid. When there are the Illustrious Dharma and the Saṃgha, the Buddha is also valid. Therefore, the three Jewels are valid, and all the distinguished comprehensions (*viśeṣādbigama*)⁴⁶ going with mundane and supramundane entities, are valid. And also, virtue, nonvirtue, and their fruits, and all worldly conventions are valid. Hence, "For the school which holds voidness as valid, everything becomes valid." While for the school which holds voidness as invalid, in the absence of dependent origination, "everything becomes invalid."

One may understand from that passage when the valid and the invalid are present or absent.

Regarding the previously cited opponent's challenge in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (k. 1), the *ācārya* (= Nāgārjuna) clarifies his response with a reply that agent and act are valid when they have no self-existence. He states in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (k. 22):⁴⁷

Whatever one of entities occurs in dependence, we declare "voidness." And whatever one arises occurring in dependence, is his (= the Mādhyamika's) lack of self-existence.

And the self-commentary on this states:

And you sir (= the realist), not understanding the meaning of voidness of entities, try to argue this way: "Since your words lack self-existence, they are impotent to refute the self-existence of entities." But in this case (I reply:) Whatever one of entities occurs in dependence, is a voidness. For what reason? For reason of non-self-existence. Those entities which arise in dependence do not arise with self-existence, because they lack self-existence. For what reason? For reason of depending on cause and conditions. If (according to the realist) entities could exist by virtue of self-existence, they could even exist disallowing causes and conditions. They do not occur that way. Therefore, they are not self-existent. Because they lack self-existence, they are called "void." Thus, my words also have arisen in dependence and so are without self-existence; and since they are without self-existence, it is right to call them "void." Just as the pot, the cloth, etc., by reason of arising in dependence, are void of self-existence, and yet (in the case of the pot) has the capacity to hold honey, water, and milk, and to take (from others);⁴⁸ and (in the case of the cloth) has the capacity to protect from cold, wind, and sun—so also, my words, while without self-existence because arisen in dependence, still have the capacity to prove that entities lack self-existence. Therefore, in this case what you say, "Since your words lack self-existence, they are impotent to refute the self-existence of entities," is itself not valid.

Thus he states clearly that if (entities) are produced by their self-existence, they are pervaded by nondependence on causes and conditions; and that if they depend on causes and conditions, they are pervaded by non-self-existence—so present in similar cases and absent in dissimilar