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Sāṃkhya
A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy

EDITED BY
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AND
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PREFACE

Many years ago when I met the great Gopinath Kaviraj for the first time in Varanasi, he inquired about my work. I commented that I was working on one of the ancient systems of Indian philosophy, namely, the Sāṃkhya. He impatiently waved his hand to interrupt me. "Sāṃkhya," he said, "is not *one* of the systems of Indian philosophy. Sāṃkhya *is* the philosophy of India!" He was referring, of course, to the ancient period, but he also went on to stress the remarkable influence that Sāṃkhya has had on almost every phase of Indian culture and learning. Philosophy, mythology, theology, law, medicine, art, and the various traditions of Yoga and Tantra have all been touched by the categories and basic notions of the Sāṃkhya. This is not at all to claim that these various areas of learning and cultural practice have accepted the dualist metaphysics of Sāṃkhya or its overall classical systematic formulation. To the contrary, there have been intense polemics over the centuries against the Sāṃkhya position. What is striking, however, is the ubiquitous presence of the Sāṃkhya network of notions, functioning almost as a kind of cultural "code" (to use a semiotics idiom) to which intellectuals in every phase of cultural life in India have felt a need to respond.

The present volume of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* attempts to trace the history and to interpret the meaning of Sāṃkhya philosophy from its beginnings in the ancient period to the present time, a period of some twenty-five hundred years. As might well be imagined, it has not been an easy task to accomplish this in one volume. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya and I have had to make some difficult editorial decisions by way of limiting the boundaries of our undertaking. One such decision concerned the manner in which we would treat ancient and/or "popular" (nontechnical) Sāṃkhya passages. For a time we considered the possibility of including summaries of Sāṃkhya passages in the Upaniṣads, the *Mahābhārata* (including the *Bhagavadgītā*), the Purāṇas, the medical literature, and so forth. As we proceeded in our work, however, it became clear that these passages could be best treated in the Introduction to the present volume. More than that, it became clear that these passages represent what could be called "Proto-Sāṃkhya" and should be clearly distinguished from what we are calling in the present volume "Pre-Kārikā-Sāṃkhya," "Kārikā-Sāṃkhya," "Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya," "Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya," "Samāsa-Sāṃkhya," and "Sūtra-Sāṃkhya" (and see Introduction).

A second editorial decision concerned the manner in which we would deal with the extensive number of passages in Indian philoso-

phical literature that criticize Sāṃkhya from the perspective of other traditions, passages, for example, from Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist, Jaina, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta works. Again, for a time we considered the possibility of including at least some of these passages, but we ultimately determined that such passages appropriately belong in their own respective volumes in the *Encyclopedia* series and not in the Sāṃkhya volume itself.

A third editorial decision concerned the manner in which we would deal with the issue of the literature of Yoga. Our own view is that "Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya" is an important type of Sāṃkhya philosophy and deserves to be treated as such, but we encountered the practical difficulty of some seventy Sanskrit texts on Yoga that should be considered. The only sensible solution appeared to be, therefore, to prepare a separate volume of the *Encyclopedia* series for the Yoga materials with appropriate cross-references in both the Sāṃkhya and Yoga volumes. Eventually, then, when both volumes are published, they can be used in tandem.

Apart from such external editorial decisions, that is to say, what to exclude from the volume, we also had to make a number of decisions regarding the internal boundaries of the volume. It was obvious from the beginning, for example, that three of our texts required special treatment, namely, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, the *Tattvasamāsasūtra*, and the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*. These are the three fundamental and primary texts of the tradition upon which most other texts are based, and each presented a unique problem. Because the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is the oldest systematic text available, we thought it appropriate to present an extensive treatment of it. Indeed, the so-called "summary" of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* in the volume is considerably longer than the original text itself! In our view, however, since our task was not that of translation but, rather, that of presenting an overview of the systematic philosophical arguments in the text, we felt justified in taking some liberties in unpacking those arguments. Regarding the *Tattvasamāsasūtra*, the problem was the reverse. The *Tattvasamāsa* is not really a text in any sense. It is a checklist of topics upon which several commentaries have been written. We have, therefore, presented it in its entirety as a checklist. The *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, as is well known, is a late compilation, and there is no authoritative tradition either for the sequence of *sūtras* or their intepretation apart from the reading and interpretation offered, first, by Aniruddha, and then later by Vijñānabhikṣu (who generally follows Aniruddha throughout). We have, therefore, presented the *sūtras* themselves in a bare, outline form. We have, then, presented a full summary of Aniruddha's reading and interpretation followed by a shorter summary of Vijñānabhikṣu's reading and interpretation (stressing only those views of Vijñānabhikṣu that clearly differ from Aniruddha).

In three instances in the volume we have presented unusually detailed summaries, namely, those for the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, the *Sāṃkhya-saptativṛtti*, and the *Yuktidipikā*. The former two texts are those recently edited by Esther A. Solomon, and because they have been unknown in Sāṃkhya studies until now, we invited Professor Solomon to prepare full treatments of both. The latter text, the *Yuktidipikā*, is undoubtedly the most important text for understanding the details of the Sāṃkhya system, but until now no translation has been available. We thought it appropriate, therefore, to include as full a treatment of it as possible. The summary of the *Yuktidipikā* in this volume is not by any means exhaustive, but it does provide a wealth of information that has until now been unavailable.

Dr. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya and I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of those who helped to bring this volume to completion. First, of course, our thanks to the many contributors (see List of Contributors) who prepared the published summaries. Second, a special word of thanks and acknowledgment to those who prepared summaries of passages that could not be included in the final published version of the volume—passages, for example, from Jaina, Buddhist, or epic literature that, based on our final editorial decisions, finally fell outside of the boundaries of the volume, or summaries in which it became apparent that a particular text was simply repeating what had been said earlier in terms of philosophical interpretation. In this regard, we would like to thank and acknowledge the help of Dr. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Calcutta Sanskrit College), Dr. Sabhajit Misra (University of Gorakhpur), Dr. A. N. Pandey (Kashi Vidyapith), Dr. R. R. Pande (Banaras Hindu University), Dr. R. K. Tripathi (Banaras Hindu University), and Dr. S. P. Verma (Kuruksetra University).

Several research assistants have helped us in our work along the way, and we would like to thank and acknowledge them as well : Dr. Jayandra Soni, formerly of Banaras Hindu University and currently at McMaster University in Ontario, Canada; Dr. Paul Muller-Ortega, Dr. Wade Dazey, Dr. Michiko Yusa, and Dr. James McNamara, former doctoral students in religious studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Also, a special word of thanks for the research assistance of Dr. Edeltraud Harzer, of the University of Washington, Seattle. Our thanks, furthermore, to the American Institute of Indian Studies and the Indo-U.S. Subcommission for Education and Culture for financial assistance to our various contributors and to the coeditors, and, finally, our thanks and appreciation to Karl H. Potter for his continuing patience, encouragement, and help in his capacity as general editor of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*.

For the nonspecialist reader of the volume, it should be noted that

the Index provides brief definitions of many technical Sāṃkhya terms before listing page numbers and may be used, therefore, as a glossary for those unfamiliar with the Sanskrit terminology of the Sāṃkhya system. An additional glossary for classical Sāṃkhya terminology may also be found in Gerald J. Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya* (2nd edition, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), pp. 237-247.

Full diacritical marks are given only for all primary entries of texts and authors in the volume. In the case of modern Indian scholars, namely, authors of secondary works, summarizers, and other contributors, names are cited without diacritical marks, in accordance with current convention in modern India, Likewise, the names of modern Indian cities are given without diacritical marks.

GERALD JAMES LARSON
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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SĀṂKHYA

THE HISTORY AND LITERATURE OF SĀṂKHYA

I. Proto-Sāṃkhya and Pre-Kārikā-Sāṃkhya

The term "*sāṃkhya*" means "relating to number, enumeration, or calculation." As an adjective, the term refers to any enumerated set or grouping and can presumably be used in any inquiry in which enumeration or calculation is a prominent feature (for example, mathematics, grammar, prosody, psychology, medicine, and so forth). As a masculine noun, the term refers to someone who calculates, enumerates, or discriminates properly or correctly. As a neuter noun, the term comes to refer to a specific system of dualist philosophizing that proceeds by a method of enumerating the contents of experience and the world for the purpose of attaining radical liberation (*mokṣa, kaivalya*) from frustration and rebirth.

These three dimensions of meaning in the word "*sāṃkhya*" are not simply synchronic distinctions but indicate as well the diachronic or historical development of the word in the ancient period. That is to say, in the ancient history of South Asian culture there appear to be three identifiable phases of development of the term "*sāṃkhya*" that roughly correspond to these three basic meaning dimensions.[1] These can be briefly characterized as follows:

(1) Intellectual inquiry in the oldest learned traditions of ancient India (from the Vedic period, ca. 1500 before the Common Era [B.C.E.], through the Mauryan period in the fourth and third centuries B.C.E.) was frequently cast in the format of elaborate enumerations of the contents of a particular subject matter — for example, the principles of statecraft as preserved in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, the principles of medicine as preserved in the *Carakasaṃhitā* and *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, and so forth. The Vedic corpus itself exhibits this tendency as do traditions of law (*nītiśāstra*) and politics (*rājadharma*), and it is in such environments that one finds some of the early references to *sāṃkhya*. Kauṭilya, for example, refers to

sāṃkhya as one of three traditions of *ānvīkṣiki*.[2] The notion of *ānvīkṣiki* in these ancient contexts means something like the enumeration of the contents of a particular subject matter by means of systematic reasoning.[3] The practice of *ānvīkṣiki* is not really "philosophy" in our usual senses of the term; it is, rather, a kind of general "scientific" inquiry by means of the systematic enumeration of basic principles.[4] Such enumerations appeared in a variety of intellectual subject areas, including phonology, grammar, statecraft, medicine, law, cosmology, and iconography, and the compilations of these subject-area enumerations sometimes came to be called "*tantras*" (meaning a scientific work, and synonymous with such terms as "*śāstra*," "*vidyā*", and so forth). Moreover, certain stylistic rules or "methodological devices" (*yuktis*) came to be accepted in composing scientific works — for example, a brief statement of a position (*uddeśa*), a lengthy exposition of a position (*nirdeśa*), an etymological explanation (*nirvacana*), the proper order or sequence in enumerating a subject (*vidhāna*), and so forth.[5] Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* provides a list of such methodological devices, and the author illustrates how his work uses the various methodological devices, thereby establishing that his treatise is a scientific work. The medical texts (*Caraka* and *Suśruta*) are also scientific works in this sense and likewise provide lists of methodological devices. This may well explain why the later technical Sāṃkhya philosophy is frequently referred to as a *tantra*, and it helps in understanding the reasons why the long introduction to the *Yuktidīpikā* (the most important commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*), contains a detailed discussion of the methodological devices essential for any systematic inquiry. In this oldest period, however, it is undoubtedly an anachronism to interpret references to *sāṃkhya*, *ānvīkṣiki*, or *tantra* as themselves completed or distinct systems of thought, as some older scholars have suggested (Garbe, for example).[6] It is more plausible to interpret these references in a much more general sense as the first and groping attempts at systematic thinking, which proceeded by determining and enumerating the components of anything (whether it be the components of the human body, the components of the sacrificial ritual, the components of the heavens, or the components of grammar).

(2) A second phase in the development of the term "*sāṃkhya*" begins from the period of the oldest, pre-Buddhistic Upaniṣads, ca. eighth or seventh centuries B.C.E., and can be traced through traditions of the early ascetic spirituality in South Asia, namely, the various monastic (*śramaṇa* and *yati*) groups, the early Jain and Buddhist movements, and so forth, reaching a culmination in the sorts of speculative thinking one finds in the *Mokṣadharma* portion of the *Mahābhārata*, in the *Bhagavadgītā*, and in the cosmological descriptions of the oldest Purāṇas (or, in other words, reaching into the first centuries of the Common Era). If in the oldest period the term "*sāṃkhya*" could refer generally to any

enumerated set of principles (in an environment of *ānvikṣikī* for the sake of constructing a scientific work), in this second period the notion becomes linked to a methodology of reasoning that results in spiritual knowledge (*vidyā, jñāna, viveka*) that leads to liberation from the cycle of frustration and rebirth. It is possible, of course, perhaps even likely, that in the oldest period the term "*sāṃkhya*" in its general sense of intellectual enumeration was applied on occasion in contexts of meditation and religious cosmology — the enumerations in *Ṛg Veda* I.164, X.90, or X.129, or the enumerations of the parts of the body or the breaths in the *Atharva Veda* or in the Brāhmaṇa literature would suggest as much — but there is little doubt that it is primarily in this second period that "*sāṃkhya*" becomes a prominent notion in those environments in which meditation, spirititual exercises, and religious cosmology represent the crucial subject matters.

The archaic ontology of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.2-5, for example, with its emphasis on primordial Being (*sat*) in its tripartite manifestations as fire (red), water (white), and food (black), correlated with speech, breath, and mind, probably foreshadows the later Sāṃkhya ontological notions of *prakṛti*, the three *guṇas*, and the preexistence of the effect. On one level, of course, this kind of reflection echoes older Vedic notions (for example, some of the number sequences and symbolism of RV.X.164), but, on another level, it represents a transition to later formulations such as those in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* — for example, "The One unborn, red, white, and black... ." (*Śvet. Up.* IV.5), and "Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self-same tree..." (*Śvet. Up.* IV.6-7) — a text in which the older Vedic symbolism is clearly present and yet a text in which the terms "*sāṃkhya*" and "*yoga*" are actually used. Cosmological speculations such as these are combined with elaborate descriptions of yogic experience in such texts as *Kaṭha Upaniṣad, Mokṣadharma, Bhagavadgītā*, and *Buddhacarita*. The same sorts of speculation are used in the medical literature (*Carakasaṃhitā* and *Suśrutasaṃhitā*), and the hierarchical ordering of basic principles (*tattva*) is given a cosmological turn with respect to the periodic creation and dissolution of the manifest world in *Manusmṛti* and in most of the oldest Purāṇas. Certain characteristic notions become associated with Sāṃkhya, but throughout the period *Sāṃkhya* is primarily a methodology for attaining liberation and appears to allow for a great variety of philosophical formulations. Edgerton has expressed the matter well: "Any formula of metaphysical truth, provided that knowledge thereof was conceived to tend towards salvation, might be called Sāṃkhya.[7] ... It appears, then, that Sāṃkhya means in the Upaniṣads and the Epic simply the way of salvation by knowledge, and does not imply any system of metaphysical truth whatever."[8]

On one level, Sāṃkhya as a methodology for attaining salvation by knowing carries further many of the older cosmological notions of the

oldest Upaniṣads as set forth in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI, and so forth. On another level, Sāṃkhya as a methodology for attaining salvation by knowing carries further the various psychological analyses of experience that first appear in the oldest Upaniṣads and then become dominant motifs in Jain and Buddhist meditation contexts and in such later Upaniṣads as *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāśvatara*. The enumeration of basic principles in a hierarchical order is a fundamental aspect of the methodology, but the precise number of enumerated items varies widely. In some passages seventeen basic principles are enumerated;[9] in other passages twenty;[10] or twenty-four;[11] or the later, standard listing of twenty-five[12] are enumerated. On occasion the highest principle is the old Upaniṣadic *brahman* or *ātman*, or, again, the highest principle is God (*iśvara*). In some contexts the Sāṃkhya methodology implies a monistic perspective, in others a theistic or dualist perspective. Throughout the period, however, a characteristic terminology and a recurrent set of intellectual issues begin to develop around the methodology: reflections about a primordial materiality (*pradhāna*); enumerations of psychic states or conditions (*bhāvas, guṇas*) that can be construed psychologically and/or cosmologically; analyses of the various aspects of intellectual experience in terms of intellect/will (hereafter translated simply as "intellect") (*buddhi*), egoity (*ahaṃkāra*), and mind (*manas*); speculations about the nature of the inner self (*puruṣa*) in terms of a cosmic Self (*ātman*) or the self in the body or in the manifest world (*jīva, bhūtātman*); elaborations of the five sense capacities (*indriya*) correlated with the five gross elements (*bhūta*), the five action capacities (*karmendriya*), and the five contents or "objects" (*viṣaya*) of the senses; and a general polarity between subjectivity and objectivity in terms of "the knower of the field" (*kṣetrajña*) and "the field" (*kṣetra*). Clearly there is a system (or systems) in the process of developing, but the focus in this second period is rather on the process or methodology itself and not on the contents that result from the process.

In contrast to methods of spiritual discipline (*yoga*) that emphasize posture, breathing, recitation, and ascetic practices (*tapas*), *sāṃkhya* is the intellectual or reasoning method. The follower of *sāṃkhya* is one who reasons or discriminates properly, one whose spiritual discipline is meditative reasoning. This is probably the sense of the term "*sāṃkhya*" in the compound *sāṃkhya-yoga-adhigamya* ("to be understood by proper reasoning and spiritual discipline") in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* VI.13. It is probably also the sense meant in the twelfth chapter of Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*, in which reference is made to older spiritual methodologies studied by Gotama the Buddha prior to the discovery of his own unique method of meditation. Regarding the specific contents of this reasoning methodology, J.A.B. van Buitenen has offered the following comment:

> There must have existed scores of more or less isolated little centres where parallel doctrines were being evolved out of a common source. Occasional meetings at pilgrimages and festivals, reports from other and remote *āśramas* brought by wandering ascetics, polemic encounters with other preachers must have resulted in a laborious process of partial renovation and conservation, more precise definitions of doctrines and eclecticisms, readjustments of terminology, etc. At this stage to credit these little centres with the name "schools" is to do them too much or too little honor. . . . Most of the process must elude us necessarily, but we stand a better chance of recovering the little that is left by allowing for the greatest diversity, rather than the greatest uniformity of doctrine.[13]

In the *Mokṣadharma* portion of the *Mahābhārata* various names of ancient teachers are associated with these developing traditions, including Kapila, Āsuri, Bhṛgu, Yājñavalkya, Sanatkumāra, Vasiṣṭha, Śuka, Asita Devala (or Asita and Devala), Vyāsa, Janaka, and Pañcaśikha. Some of these names can be traced back to the older Upaniṣads, and many of them also appear in the later Purāṇic literature. Three of them are frequently referred to in the later technical philosophical literature as important precursors of Sāṃkhya philosophy, namely, Kapila, Āsuri, and Pañcaśikha. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and its commentaries refer to Kapila and Āsuri as the founders of the philosophical system and to Pañcaśikha as a teacher who greatly expanded or revised the original teachings. Unfortunately, all three teachers are lost to antiquity. References to Kapila and Āsuri are brief and largely eulogistic, and the situation is not much better with Pañcaśikha. Fragments here and there are attributed to a certain "Pañcaśikha," and Pañcaśikha on occasion is referred to as the author of a massive treatise in verse on Sāṃkhya philosophy called *Ṣaṣṭitantra.* The views attributed to Pañcaśikha in the *Mokṣadharma,* however, appear to be clearly different from the views that can be pieced together from the fragments, suggesting that there was more than one Pañcaśikha or that the name Pañcaśikha was a revered name in the tradition to which a variety of views were ascribed.[14] Moreover, the claim that Pañcaśikha is the author of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is contradicted by other references that attribute authorship of *Ṣaṣṭitantra* to Kapila or to a certain Vārṣagaṇya. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that Pañcaśikha was a revered teacher of *sāṃkhya* in the sense that has been indicated in this second period, that is, *sāṃkhya* not yet as a fixed philosophical system, but as a general methodology of salvation by knowing or reasoning. It is also reasonable to suppose that practitioners of *sāṃkhya* in this sense represent various kinds of ancient lines of teachers (*guruparamparā*) that traced their lineages to archaic figures such as Kapila and Āsuri

(in much the same fashion as Jains and Buddhists claimed archaic precursors for their traditions).

What is missing in all of these environments, however, is a critical appreciation for the need to argue for or establish an intellectual basis for these speculative intuitions. Reasoning, to be sure, is being used, but it is a reasoning not yet distinguished from the immediacy of personal experience and the accumulated heritage of ritual performance and priestly wisdom. There is, of course, some groping for independence and a growing recognition that thinking itself may be a unique human activity that can exert its own identity against the established and received ordering of things. The very fact that much Upaniṣadic speculation appears to have been developed in princely (*rājanya*) or warrior (*kṣatriya*) circles (as opposed to priestly groups) and that the early independent ascetic movements (Jains, Buddhists, and so forth) were especially successful among the newly emerging commercial classes in towns where commerce and a monied economy were developing, certainly suggest that thoughtful persons were in need of new and independent ways of thinking and behaving. Moreover, that the political consolidation achieved under the Mauryans appears to have been legitimized by a notion of *dharma* and a theory of the state that owed more to Jain and Buddhist paradigms than to older Vedic models is also symptomatic of changes that were occurring in other areas of intellectual life. Similarly, the rise of devotional and theistic movements (the Kṛṣṇa cult, and so forth) in the last centuries before the beginning of the Common Era is an additional symptom of a broadly based cultural need to develop new and different patterns of intellectual formulation. Many of these tensions and changes come together intellectually in the *Bhagavadgītā*, and it is surely no accident that the so-called "philosophy" of the *Gītā* is little more than a potpourri of Upaniṣadic speculation, cosmological and psychological *sāṃkhya* reasoning, Jain and Buddhist ascetic motifs, *varṇāśramadharma* as *karmayoga*, tied together with an apologia for early Vaiṣṇava *bhaktiyoga* — a potpourri that confuses a modern reader almost as much as it confused Arjuna.

In older German scholarship there was an interesting debate as to whether the kind of "philosophy" one finds in the epics (including the *Gītā*) and the Purāṇas is pure syncretism (*Mischphilosophie*, as in Garbe) or transitional philosophy (*Übergangsphilosophie*, as in Oldenberg).[15] The resolution of the debate is surely the correctness of both, or possibly neither, for the crucial point is that there is no evidence of serious independent philosophizing of any kind in these texts. Whether one wishes to call these traditions syncretistic religion (or what we usually mean when we use the terms "Hinduism" and "Buddhism") or prephilosophical speculation on the way to becoming philosophy (or what we usually mean when we use the expressions "the philosophy

of the Vedas and Upaniṣads" in regard to the Vedic corpus or "early Buddhist philosophy" in regard to the Buddhist canonical texts of the *Tripiṭaka*) makes little difference. They all have in common a predilection for speculative intuition in an environment of received authority. Returning, however, to Sāṃkhya, the point to be stressed is that in this ancient period there is only a Proto-Sāṃkhya. There was, of course, an incipient philosophical Sāṃkhya gradually distilling itself out of this diffuse and varied intellectual heritage, but the evidence suggests that it was not at first taken very seriously. Whenever it is referred to (in the *Mokṣadharma* or the *Gītā*, for example), it is simply discounted and characterized as not really being different from Yoga.[16] Taken overall, then, it is heuristically permissible to refer to this second period of development of Sāṃkhya as Kapila-Pañcaśikha-Sāṃkhya, or to carry through the association of the term "*sāṃkhya*" with the term "*tantra*" from the oldest period, to refer to this second period as Kapila-Pañcaśikha-Tantra, or simply as Kapila-Tantra.

(3) The third phase in the development of the term "*sāṃkhya*" marks the beginning of the technical philosophical tradition and coincides with the end of the second period, namely, from about the last century B.C.E. through the first several centuries C.E. Until recently this third phase was as shrouded in obscurity as the second phase, and Edgerton, for example, in 1924 claimed that Sāṃkhya as a technical philosophical system was not really in existence prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.[17] Since then, however, three sources have become available that clearly indicate that Sāṃkhya as a technical system existed prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's own formulation comes at the end of the normative period of formulation rather than at the beginning. These three sources are (A) the publication of a previously unknown commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* called *Yuktidīpikā* (edited by P. Chakravarti in 1938, and edited a second time by R. C. Pandeya in 1967);[18] (B) the reconstruction of a pre-*Kārikā* interpretation of Sāṃkhya epistemology based on quotations from older Sāṃkhya texts cited in Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi, Mallavādin, and Siṃhasūri by E. Frauwallner;[19] and (C) the reconstruction of a Sāṃkhya "emanation text" or a "short instructional tract" from the earliest Purāṇas and the *Mokṣadharma*, which Purāṇic editors then brought into conformity with the normative view of an established Sāṃkhya philosophical system, by P. Hacker.[20]

(A) From the *Yuktidīpikā* it becomes clear that there was a tradition of philosophical Sāṃkhya in the early centuries of the Common Era that was more than a methodology of liberation by knowing (that is to say, more than the rather diffuse Sāṃkhya-Yoga traditions characteristic of the second period described above), and, specifically, that this tradition (1) attempted to establish certain instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) and to offer careful definitions of these instruments;

(2) developed a special interest in inference (*anumāna*) and constructed a sequence for making inferences made up of ten members (*avayavas*); (3) attempted, after much debate, to fix the number of basic principles, together with the precise order of their enumeration, including the technical term "subtle element" (*tanmātra*); (4) fully developed the related notions of *prakṛti*, the three *guṇas*, the transformation of the *guṇas* (*guṇapariṇāma*), and the effect's preexistence in the cause (*satkārya*); (5) finally accepted after much controversy one primordial *prakṛti* but a plurality of *puruṣas*; (6) maintained a rich fabric of internal debate involving such teachers as Paurika, Pañcādhikaraṇa, Patañjali, Vārṣagaṇya, and various schools such as the "followers of Vārṣagaṇya," including Vindhyavāsin and Īśvarakṛṣṇa,[21] and (7) maintained as well a vigorous polemic of external debate with certain Buddhist philosophers and with the followers of early Vaiśeṣika. (8) It also identified itself with a tradition known as *ṣaṣṭitantra*, which apparently referred to a scheme of sixty topics made up of ten principal topics (*mūlikārtha*) and fifty subsidiary categories (*padārtha*) and which also apparently referred to a text (or possibly texts, that is to say, more than one version) by the same name (*Ṣaṣṭitantra*); and (9) it received its final normative formulation in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, which, though a brief text, nevertheless encompassed all of the important issues of the system in a concise and cogent fashion.

(B) From Frauwallner's reconstruction it becomes clear that Pre-*Kārikā* philosophical Sāṃkhya operated with a definition of perception ("the functioning of the ear, etc.", *śrotrādi-vṛttiḥ*) and a definition of inference ("because of the perception of one aspect of an established relation, one is able to infer the other aspect of a relation," *sambandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāt śeṣasiddhir anumānam*, based on a scheme of seven established relations, or *saptasambandha*) that Īśvarakṛṣṇa clearly built upon and improved. Frauwallner speculates that this older Sāṃkhya epistemology derives from a revised version of *Ṣaṣṭitantra* composed by Vārṣagaṇya at the beginning of the fourth century of the Common Era. Such may or may not be the case, but the reconstructed passages do point to a pre-*kārikā* philosophical Sāṃkhya epistemology.[22]

(C) Finally, from Hacker's reconstruction it becomes clear that there was an older Sāṃkhya ontology-cosmology that, again, formed the bases for Īśvarakṛṣṇa's normative conceptualization in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.[23]

Apparently, this philosophical tradition of Sāṃkhya developed some time between the sorts of speculation one finds in the *Mokṣadharma* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, on the one hand, and the sort of normative conceptualization one finds in the *Śāṃkhyakārikā*, on the other. Moreover, it appears to coincide with the development of comparable conceptualizations within traditions of early Buddhist thought and early Vaiśeṣika. It is tempting to suggest with Frauwallner that this

Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition is the oldest of the technical schools of Indian philosophy (Hindu, Buddhist, or Jain) and that Buddhist ontology, Vaiśeṣika atomism, and Nyāya epistemology may all have arisen out of an earlier Sāṃkhya philosophical environment, but this is perhaps to claim too much. To be sure, all of the later technical systems undoubtedly derive from the sorts of fluid speculation one finds in the "middle"-verse Upaniṣads (*Kaṭha*, and so forth), the *Mokṣadharma*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*, in which Sāṃkhya is primarily a methodology for liberation by knowing. When the term "sāṃkhya" becomes linked with a technical philosophical system, however, one has the impression that there has been a definite turn away from the older diffuse speculations and that philosophical Sāṃkhya has become a parallel or sibling intellectual movement alongside Vaiśeṣika and the early Buddhist schools, rather than a parental tradition to these schools.

Unfortunately, although the *Yuktidīpikā* refers to a number of older Sāṃkhya philosophical teachers, it is difficult to ascertain even rough approximations of their dates. Paurika, who evidently accepted a plurality of *prakṛtis* along with a plurality of *puruṣas*, was probably an older teacher whose views were finally rejected during the final stages of normative consolidation. Similarly, Pañcādhikaraṇa, who accepted only ten organs instead of the normative thirteen, was also probably an older teacher. Moreover, Pañcādhikaraṇa appears to have had a somewhat eccentric view concerning the subtle body, which later teachers rejected. Also, Patañjali (not to be confused with the compiler of the *Yogasūtra* and/or the grammarian) is apparently an older figure, for his views that there was a new subtle body for each rebirth and that egoity has no separate existence as a basic principle apart from the intellect were discounted in the final formulation of the *Sāṃkhya* system.

Vārṣagaṇya, however, and the followers of Vārṣagaṇya, including Vindhyavāsin, appear to have been closer to the time of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Indeed, it could well be the case that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was himself in the lineage of Vārṣagaṇya. Frauwallner has suggested, basing his opinion primarily on citations of Vārṣagaṇya's views in the works of Vācaspati Miśra, that Vārṣagaṇya was the author of a revised version of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, older versions of which had been attributed to Kapila or Pañcaśikha. Vindhyavāsin is said to have been a pupil of Vārṣagaṇya, to have revised the developing system further, and, according to Paramārtha's "Life of Vasubandhu," to have defeated Vasubandhu's teacher (Buddhamitra, according to Paramārtha, or Manoratha, according to Hsüan Tsang's pupil, Kuei-chi) in a debate during the reign of Candragupta II (ca. fourth century).[24] Vasubandhu, according to Chinese sources, then composed a rejoinder to Vindhyavāsin. Also, Hsüan-tsang (seventh century) refers to a later debate between Guṇamati and a certain Sāṃkhya teacher, Mādhava, by

name.[25] It is interesting to observe, however, that the views of Vindhyavāsin (as set forth in the *Yuktidīpikā*) and Mādhava (as set forth in Dignāga) diverge considerably from the views of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Vindhyavāsin clearly preceded Īśvarakṛṣṇa, for the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* indicates that Īśvarakṛṣṇa refrained from discussing the tenfold inference, since it had already been discussed by Vindhyavāsin. Moreover, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* claims that Vindhyavāsin rejected the notion of a subtle body (because the sense capacities are ubiquitous and do not, therefore, require a subtle vehicle for transmigration); and that he accepted neither the contention that the subtle elements emerge out of egoity (since they emerge, rather, along with egoity from the intellect) nor the notion of a thirteenfold instrument (*trayodaśakaraṇa*) (since he argued instead that experience occurs in the mind, thus reducing intellect, egoity, and mind to one organ of internal experience, which, along with the ten sense capacities make a total of eleven organs instead of thirteen). These variant views of Vindhyavāsin are suspiciously similar to the views of Vyāsa in his *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, a similarity that has inclined both Chakravarti and Frauwallner to suggest that the Vārṣagaṇya-Vindhyavāsin line of Sāṃkhya is preserved in the Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya of classical Yoga philosophy.[26]

Mādhava, on the other hand, appears to have been later than Īśvarakṛṣṇa, for the reported debate with Guṇamati occurred around the time of Dignāga (ca. 480-540) a period in which the normative view of Sāṃkhya was already established. Moreoever, Dignāga refers to Mādhava as a Sāṃkhya heretic or "destroyer of Sāṃkhya" (*sāṃkhya-vaināśika, sāṃkhya-nāśaka*) because he interprets the notion of *prakṛti* and the three *guṇas* as a plurality of primordial materialities (thus taking *prakṛti* in the direction of Vaiśeṣika atomism). Then, too, Mādhava appears to have believed that action (*karman*) resides in this plurality of kinds of stuff and that the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*) is beginningless (thereby implicitly denying the Sāṃkhya notion of emanation).

In all of this, it is quite clear that Sāṃkhya was a vigorous and polemical philosophical system, and one is tempted to believe the old Chinese claim that there were as many as eighteen schools of philosophical Sāṃkhya (though the parallel with the eighteen Buddhist schools is probably no accident). This must have been intellectually a remarkable stage in the development of Sāṃkhya, and of Indian philosophy generally, for it was evidently in this creative and formative period in the first several centuries of the Common Era that the main issues of Indian philosophy were first formulated and polemically discussed: the number and definition of the instruments of knowledge, theories of ontology and causation, the role and function of knowing and ignorance, the theory of error, the problem of selfhood, the problem of

action and rebirth, and the problem of freedom and bondage. All of these issues had been discussed earlier, but the crucial task in this first philosophical period was that of systematic formulation, overall intellectual coherence, and persuasive presentation. Earlier diffuse traditions were brought together and codified in collections of *sūtras* and *kārikās* — one thinks, for example, not only of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* but of Nāgārjuna's, and, later, Gauḍapāda's *kārikās*, and, of course, the early *sūtra* collections of Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; patterns of training students were being established; commentaries were being composed explaining the emerging technical terminology; and rules for discussion and debate were being formulated. These developments in Indian philosophy mirrored similar developments in literature, art, law, medicine, and social reality generally. The older Mauryan political hegemony had collapsed centuries earlier and the resulting decentralized regionalism had generated a resurgence of local traditions that now found themselves in creative tension with one another as the Gupta political unification (beginning in the fourth century under Candra Gupta [ca. 320]) reopened once again a broader cultural environment that transcended the older provincialism.

Taking all of these disparate (and admittedly problematic) historical observations together, one might suggest a tentative chronology for early philosophical Sāṃkhya:

(1) *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, a tradition of "sixty topics" that was either a format for the treatment of philosophical Sāṃkhya or the actual name of a text, an old form of which was attributed either to Kapila or Pañcaśikha—ca. 100 B.C.E.–200 C.E.[27]

(2) Paurika, Pañcādhikaraṇa, Patañjali, and other early philosophical *ācāryas*—100-300 C.E.

(3) Vārṣagaṇya, who composes a revision of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*—ca. 100-300 C.E.

(4) Followers of Vārṣagaṇya, including
   (a) Vindhyavāsin, ca. 300-400, who further revises the Sāṃkhya system and who carries on a vigorous polemic with the Buddhists, and
   (b) Īśvarakṛṣṇa, ca. 350-450, who composes a definitive summary of the Sāṃkhya position, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, based on Vārṣagaṇya's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* but corrected as a result of the Buddhist debates and the work of Vindhyavāsin.

(5) Mādhava, the "destroyer of Sāṃkhya," who goes even further in adjusting the views of Sāṃkhya to Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist thought—ca. 450-500.

(6) Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* and Vyāsa's *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, which possibly preserve the older Vārsagaṇya-Vindhyavāsin interpretation of Sāṃkhya in the format of Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya—ca. 500-700.

This, then, brings us to the threshold of the beginning of technical philosophical Sāṃkhya as set forth in the normative account of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Up to this point there has been no available Sāṃkhya textual tradition, and the historical account has been based on reconstructions and occasional references in the ancient literature. Nevertheless, we have been able to identify (at least heuristically) three phases in the development of Sāṃkhya that roughly parallel the three basic meanings of the term, namely, *sāṃkhya* as any enumerated set or grouping (Tantra); *sāṃkhya* as a method properly employed by a discriminating person (Kapila-Tantra); and *sāṃkhya* as an early tradition of dualist philosophizing (Ṣaṣṭi-Tantra), which attained a normative formulation in the work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

From this point on there is an identifiable textual tradition, and the task of writing a history of Sāṃkhya thought is on somewhat firmer ground.[28]

II. The Sāṃkhya Textual Tradition

Because we have now reached the beginning of the Sāṃkhya textual tradition, summaries of the contents of which make up the main part of the volume, it may be useful, first of all, to present a Checklist of Texts and Authors of the Sāṃkhya tradition as a whole and then to comment in some detail about the historical development of the textual tradition in its various parts. We are dealing, of course, with a sweep of intellectual history that covers nearly two thousand years (indeed, more than two thousand years if one includes the Proto-Sāṃkhya and Pre-Kārikā traditions already briefly discussed), so it will only be possible to discuss the high points of Sāṃkhya's intellectual history. It is important, however, to provide at least a rough outline of the history of the tradition so that the philosophical discussions in the sequel have an appropriate historical framework.

CHECKLIST OF TEXTS AND AUTHORS

TEXT	*AUTHOR*	*DATE*
(PROTO-SĀṂKHYA):		
Chāndogya Upaniṣad	?	ca. 800-600 B.C.E.
Kaṭha Upaniṣad	?	400-200
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad	?	400-200
Arthaśāstra	Kauṭilya	300 (core text)
Mokṣadharma (*Mahābhārata*)	?	ca. 200 B.C.E.-200 C.E.
Bhagavadgītā (*Mahābhārata*)	?	200 B.C.E.-200 C.E.
Manusmṛti (and other lawbooks)	?	200 B.C.E.-200 C.E.
Buddhacarita	Aśvaghoṣa	ca. 100 C.E.

TEXT	*AUTHOR*	*DATE*
Carakasaṃhitā (Āyurveda)	Caraka	100-200 C.E.
Suśrutasaṃhitā (Āyurveda)	Suśruta	200-300 C.E.
Purāṇas (*Mārkaṇḍeya, Vāyu,* etc.)	?	300 C.E. and after
?	(Kapila, Āsuri, and Pañcaśikha are names frequently linked with the old Sāṃkhya traditions mentioned in the above *texts*)	?
(PRE-KĀRIKĀ-SĀṂKHYA):		
Ṣaṣṭitantra (either a text or systematic format for discussing Sāṃkhya)	Pañcaśikha (but also attributed to Kapila and Vārṣagaṇya)	ca. 100 B.C.E.-200 C.E.
?	Paurika	?
?	Pañcādhikaraṇa	?
?	Patañjali (other than the Patañjali of the Yoga tradition)	?
Ṣaṣṭitantra (possibly a revised version or format of an older tradition)	Vārṣagaṇya (but also attributed, as noted above, to Kapila and Pañcaśikha)	ca. 100-300 C.E.
?	Vindhyavāsin	ca. 300-400 C.E.
?	Mādhava (referred to as a Sāṃkhya heretic by Dignāga)	? (but probably later than Īśvarakṛṣṇa)
(KĀRIKĀ-SĀṂKHYA and PĀTAÑJALA-SĀṂKHYA):		
Sāṃkhyakārikā (SK)	Īśvarakṛṣṇa	ca. 350-450 C.E.
*(*Yogasūtra*)	(Patañjali)	(ca. 400-500 C.E.)
Suvarṇasaptati (SS)	? (translated by Paramārtha into Chinese)	translated into Chinese, 557-569C.E. composed ca. 500C.E.
Sāṃkhyavṛtti (SV)	?	ca. 500-600

*A few important Yoga texts are included in the résumé for comparative purposes. They are not dealt with in detail, however, since another volume in this series will be given over to the history of Yoga philosophy.

TEXT	*AUTHOR*	*DATE*
Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (SSV)	?	ca. 500-600
Bhāṣya (GB)	Gauḍapāda	ca. 500-600
* (*Sāṃkhyapravacana-bhāṣya*) (on *Yoga-sūtra*)	(Vyāsa)	(ca. 500-700) (?)
Yuktidīpikā (YD)	?	ca. 600-700
Jayamaṅgalā (J)	? (Śaṃkara or Śaṃkarārya)	ca. 700 or later
* (*Yogasūtrabhāṣya-vivaraṇa*)	(Śaṃkarabhagavat)	(ca. 700 or later)
Māṭharavṛtti (M)	Māṭhara	ca. 800 or later

(KĀRIKĀ-KAUMUDĪ-SĀṂKHYA; SAMĀSA-SĀṂKHYA; and SŪTRA-SĀṂKHYA):

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī (STK)	Vācaspati Miśra	ca. 850 or 975 C.E.
* (*Tattvavaiśāradī*)	(Vācaspati Miśra)	(ca. 850 or 975 C.E.)
* (*Rājamārtaṇḍa*)	(Bhojarāja)	(ca. 1150)
Tattvasamāsasūtra	?	ca. 1300-1400
Kramadīpikā (on *Tattvasamāsa*)	?	ca. 1300-1400
Sāṃkhyasūtra	?	ca. 1400-1500
Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti	Aniruddha	ca. 1400-1500
Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya (on *Sāṃkhyasūtra*)	Vijñānabhikṣu	ca. 1550-1600
* (*Yogavārttika*)	(Vijñānabhikṣu)	(ca. 1550-1600)
Sāṃkhyasāra	Vijñānabhikṣu	ca. 1550-1600
* (*Yogasārasaṃgraha*)	(Vijñānabhikṣu)	(ca. 1550-1600)
Tattvayāthārthyadīpana (on *Tattvasamāsa*)	Bhāvagaṇeśa	ca. 1550-1600
Vṛttisāra (on *Sāṃkhyasūtra*)	Mahādeva Vedāntin	ca. 1650-1700
Guṇatrayaviveka	Svayaṃprakāśayati	ca. 1650-1700
Sāṃkhyacandrikā (on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* as read by Gauḍapāda)	Nārāyaṇatīrtha	ca. 1680-1720
Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti (on *Sāṃkhyasūtra*)	Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, or Nāgeśa	ca. 1700-1750
Sāṃkhyatattvavibhākara (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Vaṃśidhara	ca. 1750

(KĀRIKĀ-KAUMUDĪ-SĀṂKHYA; SAMĀSA-SĀṂKHYA; and SŪTRA-SĀṂKHYA continued)

Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana (on *Tattvasamāsa*)	Ṣimānanda (or Kṣemendra)	ca. 1700-1900
Sarvopakāriṇīṭīkā (on *Tattvasamāsa*)	?	ca. 1700-1900
Sāṃkhyasūtravivaraṇa (on *Tattvasamāsa*)	?	ca. 1700-1900
Sāṃkhyatattvapradīpa	Kavirāja Yati	ca. 1700-1900
Sāṃkhyataruvasanta	Mudumba Nara-siṃhasvāmin	ca. 1700-1900

TEXT	*AUTHOR*	*DATE*
(KĀRIKĀ-SĀṂKHYA; SAMĀSA-SĀṂKHYA; and SŪTRA-SĀṂKHYA continued):		
Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsa (on *Tattvasamāsa*)	Raghunātha Tarkavāgiśa	ca. 1800-1900
Sāṃkhyataraṅga	Devatīrtha Svāmin	ca. 1850
Upodghāta (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati	ca. 1865
Tattvasamāsabhāṣya	Narendranātha Tattvanidhi	ca. 1871
Tattvakaumudīvyākhyā	Bhāratī Yati	ca. 1889
Amalā (on *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*)	Pramathanātha Tarkabhūṣaṇa	*ca. 20th century (published edition, 1900)
Āvaraṇavāriṇī (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana	ca. 20th century (1902)
Vṛtti (on *Sāṃkhyasūtra*)	Hariprasāda	ca. 20th century (1905)
Vidvattoṣiṇī (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Bālarāma Udāsīna	ca. 20th century (1907)
Pūrṇimā (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Pañcānana Tarkaratna	ca. 20th century (1919)
Tattvabodhinī (on *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti*)	Kuñjavihāri Tarkasiddhānta	ca. 20th century (1919)
Kiraṇāvalī (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya	ca. 20th century (1924)
Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya	Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya	ca. 20th century (1933)
Tattvakaumudīṭīkā	Rājeśvara Śāstrī Drāviḍa	ca. 20th century (1932)
Guṇamayī	Rameścandra Tarkatīrtha	ca. 20th century (1935)
Vivekapradīpa (on *Sāṃkhyasāra*)	Rameścandra Tarkatīrtha	ca. 20th century
Śāraprabhā (on *Sāṃkhyasāra*)	Kālīpada Tarkācārya	ca. 20th century
Sāṃkhyatattvāloka	Hariharānanda Āraṇya	ca. 20th century (1936)
Suṣamā (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Harirāma Śukla	ca. 20th century (1937)
Śārabodhinī (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Śivanārāyaṇa Śāstrin	ca. 20th century (1940)
Sāṃkhyavasanta	Naraharinātha	ca. 20th century (1946)
Abhinavarājalakṣmī (on *Tattvakaumudī*)	Sītarāma Śāstrī	ca. 20th century (1953)
Sāṃkhyasūtrabhāṣya	Brahmamuni	ca. 20th century (1955)
Sāṃkhyatattvapradīpikā	Keśava	ca. 20th century (1969)

*Here and following are works of the twentieth century. Specific dates indicate available published editions in libraries and bookstores.

TEXT	*AUTHOR*	*DATE*
Tattvamīmāṃsā	Kṛṣṇa Miśra	ca. 20th century (1969)
Sāṃkhyaparibhāṣā	?	ca. 20th century (1969)
Sāṃkhyasiddhāntaparāmarśa	M.V. Upādhyāya	ca. 20th century (1972)
Sāṃkhyarahasya	Śrī Rāma Pāṇḍeya	ca. 20th century

The Checklist begins with a sequence of texts that clearly are not Sāṃkhya philosophical texts but represent, rather, the probable intellectual environments from which the later Sāṃkhya philosophy arose. These may be conveniently designated as Proto-Sāṃkhya environments. Sāṃkhya philosophy proper begins with what the Checklist calls Pre-Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, including the tradition known as *ṣaṣṭitantra*, older teachers such as Paurika, Pañcādhikaraṇa, Vārṣagaṇya, Vindhyavāsin, and so forth. As already suggested, this was undoubtedly an exciting and crucial period in the development of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Unfortunately, however, the important details of this formative period escape us, for no texts remain and the interpreter is forced to reconstruct what might have occurred from stray references and occasional quotations in the later literature.

A. Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya

What is available and what perforce must represent the beginning of the Sāṃkhya textual tradition are two summary compilations, namely, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, truly remarkable works by any measure, but nevertheless reflecting the end products of a process of intellectual formulation rather than the process itself. These are two victors, as it were, in an intellectual war whose memories of specific battles have become hazy, reflecting, on one level, the arrogance of victory that attracts fellow travellers who in many cases were not part of the original conflict (namely, copyists and commentators) and, on another level, the security of peace that inevitably allows for endless scholastic recapitulation and a mindless defensiveness that can only finally be dislodged by yet another major conflict. Both of these summary compilations have many commentaries attached to them, but with the exception of the *Yuktidīpikā* and the *Tattvakaumudī* on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya*, Śaṃkara's *Vivaraṇa*, and Vācaspati's *Tattvavaiśāradī* on the *Yogasūtra*, all of the commentaries are less than satisfactory. To be sure, here and there each commentary offers valuable explanations of basic terms or helpful illustrations on a particular issue, but the reader gains an unmistakable sense that somehow the commentator neglects to come to grips with the deeper

issues or fundamental rationality of the Sāṃkhya system. One possible explanation is that the commentators are simply assuming a knowledge of the basic system itself and construing their task as one of providing notations on this or that point. Another possible explanation, perhaps more likely, is that there was a definite break in the tradition at an early point and that the commentators are themselves at a loss in understanding the deeper issues of the system. In any case, what comes through is that there is a basic and normative Sāṃkhya philosophy, concisely yet completely set forth in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and appropriated with a somewhat different inflection in Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* for the sake of yogic praxis. The former can be called simply the tradition of Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and the latter, Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya.

From a historical point of view we know very little about this early textual period extending from the fourth to the eighth century. The precise date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is unknown, but the text together with a commentary was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha during the last phase of his literary activity, 557-569. Little is known about Īśvarakṛṣṇa beyond the passing reference in the Chinese commentary to his being a Brahmin of the Kauśika family and the reference in the *Jayamaṅgalā* that he was a *parivrājaka*. If we assume with Frauwallner and others that a normative Sāṃkhya philosophical system was known in the time of Dignāga (ca. 480-540) and that the views of a certain Sāṃkhya teacher, Mādhava, were judged to be heretical from the perspective of the normative system, this would suggest that a philosophical school of Sāṃkhya must have been in existence well before the middle of the fifth century. Moreover, if we accept the evidence of the *Yuktidīpikā* that Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin preceded Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and if we accept Frauwallner's view that Vārṣagaṇya worked probably at the beginning of the fourth century (ca. 300) or earlier, this would indicate that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* may be reasonably placed in the middle of the fourth century (ca. 350). It must be admitted, however, that the date for a so-called "normative" Sāṃkhya — the term "normative" referring to the Sāṃkhya system as reflected in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* — may be older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by its own admission is only a summary account of an older tradition or text called *ṣaṣṭitantra*, and it could well be the case that Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his *Sāṃkhyakārikā* is summarizing an old normative Sāṃkhya system that predates both Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin. In other words, simply because Īśvarakṛṣṇa postdates Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin (as suggested in the *Yuktidīpikā*), it does not at all follow that his account of the Sāṃkhya is later than theirs conceptually. To the contrary, according to the *Yuktidīpikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa appears to have disagreed with some of the views of Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin and may have cast his summary account of the Sāṃkhya system using an older model. In any case, it appears

likely that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was familiar with the views of Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin and, more than that, was familiar with the various debates that were taking place in the first centuries of the Common Era with the Buddhist and early Vaiśeṣika thinkers, and it is reasonable to assume that he was attempting a final definitive statement of the Sāṃkhya position in his *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Whether other Sāṃkhya teachers of the time accepted Īśvarakṛṣṇa's account or even considered it a faithful summary of the whole system is an open question, although there can be no doubt that in subsequent centuries the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* became the definitive and normative statement of the Sāṃkhya position. To place the *Kārikā* account of Sāṃkhya in the middle of the fourth century, therefore, or to link the normative views of Sāṃkhya with the *Kārikā* is only to offer a reasonable interpretation of the extant evidence. The normative system may, in fact, be much older, and there must have surely been fuller accounts of the normative system than that found in the *Kārikā*. Current evidence, however, relegates such suggestions to the realm of scholarly speculation.

There are eight available commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* from this early commentarial period, namely, (1) *Suvarṇasaptati* (Paramārtha's Chinese translation), (2) *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, (3) *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, (4) Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya*, (5) *Yuktidīpikā*, (6) *Jayamaṅgalā*, (7) *Māṭharavṛtti*, and (8) Vācaspati Miśra's *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*. Reliable dates are only available for the first and last texts on the list. As already mentioned, Paramārtha's Chinese translation of the *Suvarṇasoptati* was completed by the middle of the sixth century (557-569). It is also known that the famous Vācaspati Miśra did his work in the ninth or tenth century (either 841 or 976).[29] Apart from these two approximations, unfortunately, there is little reliable evidence for dating the other commentaries, although there are suggestive hints here and there. The *Yuktidīpikā* for example, probably precedes Vācaspati Miśra, for the latter quotes some verses regarding the makeup of the *ṣaṣṭitantra*, verses that are also quoted in the opening section of the *Yuktidīpikā*. Moreover, the *Yuktidīpikā* quotes both Dignāga (ca., 480-540) and Bhartṛhari (ca., fifth to early sixth century) but does not seem to quote directly Dharmakīrti (ca., 650), thus making it plausible to suggest that it is a work of the beginning of the seventh century (ca., 600). Regarding Gauḍapāda, if one accepts that the Gauḍapāda of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Kārikā* is the same as the early Vedāntin Gauḍapāda of the *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā*, a sixth-century date for the *Bhāṣya* is not implausible. The problem, however, is that the views in the two texts attributed to Gauḍapāda diverge widely, although it must be conceded that Gauḍapāda may well have avoided expressing his own philosophical views when composing his elementary commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. There is insufficient evidence, unfortunately, to make a clear judgment either way.

Regarding the *Māṭharavṛtti*, it was suggested long ago by Belvalkar that it is the original commentary on the *Kārikā* and the one on which the Chinese commentary (*Suvarṇasaptati*) was based.[30] Moreover, Belvalkar suggested that the *Bhāṣya* is simply a plagiarized version of the *Māṭharavṛtti*. This would make the *Māṭharavṛtti* the oldest commentary on the *Kārikā*. Unfortunately, however, Belvalkar's claims have been challenged for a variety of reasons including (a) the *Māṭharavṛtti* quotes the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, both of which are later texts; (b) the *Māṭharavṛtti's* discussion of Sāṃkhya epistemology in verses 4 through 6 of the *Kārikā* presupposes a number of distinctions regarding the nature of inference that appear to come from later Nyāya technical discussions; and (c) perhaps most telling, in almost every instance in which the *Māṭharavṛtti* has common content with other *Kārikā* commentaries, the discussion in the *Māṭharavṛtti* is fuller and more systematic.[31] These are not by any means conclusive arguments, but it is difficult to avoid the judgment that the *Māṭharavṛtti* is a very late commentary (possibly ninth century or later) and represents an explicit attempt to expand and systematize the older commentarial tradition. With the question whether there were one or two Gauḍapādas, so also here the evidence is insufficient to warrant an unambiguous conclusion.

The existence of the commentaries *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* and *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, recently edited by E. A. Solomon (Ahmedabad, Gujarat University, 1973), only exacerbates the problem of dating the various *Kārikā* commentaries.[32] Solomon argues that the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* is the original commentary upon which the *Suvarṇasaptati*, the *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, the *Bhāṣya*, and the *Māṭharavṛtti* are based, and she has based her conclusion on a painstaking and valuable comparative analysis of all the commentaries on the *Kārikā*.[33] What Solomon has demonstrated, however, is a remarkable common core of content that appears in all five works. On the basis of this evidence one can plausibly argue for (a) the priority of the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, (b) the priority of the *Suvarṇasaptati*, or (c) some sort of original *Ur*-commentary upon which all five commentaries are based. Given the present state of the evidence, it is impossible to choose any one of these alternatives as being better than the other two, or, to put the matter somewhat differently, problems relating to the common content in the various *Kārikā* commentaries have not yet been satisfactorily solved.

Finally, regarding the *Jayamaṅgalā*, it has been argued that it precedes the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, for Vācaspati Miśra refers to an alternative explanation of the *siddhis* in verse 51 of the *Kārikā* that is remarkably similar to the explanation of the *Jayamaṅgalā*. Moreover, the *Jayamaṅgalā* is possibly somewhat later than the *Yuktidīpikā*, for the *Jayamaṅgalā* refers to an interpretation of the expression "*kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt*" in *Kārikā* 15 that mirrors a similar view in the *Yuktidīpikā*.[34]

It may be noted, furthermore, that the *Jayamaṅgalā* (in verse 5) appears to preserve the old Sāṃkhya view of the "sevenfold inference" (*saptadhā sambandha*) (which is also found, by the way, in the *Sāṃkhya-vṛtti*). This is hardly evidence for suggesting an early date, however, because the *Jayamaṅgalā* may well be a late text that preserves some older views. Kaviraj has suggested, interestingly, that the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā*, a certain Śaṃkara, or Śaṃkarārya, may be the same as a Hindu author of commentaries (one of which is called *Jayamaṅgalā*) on the *Kāmandakanītisāra* and *Kāmasūtra* from the fourteenth century.[35] This suggestion is undercut, however, by the benedictory verse of the *Jayamaṅgalā* (" . . . *lokottaravādinaṃ praṇamya munim*"), which suggests that the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā* was a Buddhist. Clearly, then, the date and authorship of the *Jayamaṅgalā* remains something of a mystery in Sāṃkhya studies, although its anteriority to the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* and its posteriority to the *Yuktidīpikā* is perhaps not an unreasonable suggestion.

Pulling together these various hints and suggestions, then, it can be reasonably asserted that the commentarial tradition on the *Kārikā* extends from about the beginning of the sixth century, assuming that the *Suvarṇasaptati* that Paramārtha translated had been known in the tradition for some time prior to his work, through the ninth or tenth century (the time of Vācaspati Miśra's *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*). The *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, and *Bhāṣya* are probably contemporary or slightly later than the *Suvarṇasaptati*. The *Yuktidīpikā* and *Jayamaṅgalā* are most likely products of the seventh century with the *Jayamaṅgalā* being slightly later than the *Yuktidīpikā*. Finally the *Māṭharavṛtti* appears to be a late expansion of the *Suvarṇasaptati*, *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, and *Bhāṣya* and may have been composed in the ninth century (or later).

The situation regarding date and authorship for the early textual tradition of Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya is even murkier than that for the *Kārikā* tradition. The *Yogasūtra* is obviously a compilation of older *sūtra* collections, and it is highly unlikely that the extant ordering of the *sūtras* is reliable. We know nothing about Patañjali, and attempts to link the Patañjali of the *Yogasūtras* with the grammarian Patañjali of the *Mahābhāṣya* are generally unconvincing. Keith may well have been correct in suggesting that the appearance of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* may have been the occasion for an attempt by the followers of Yoga to systematize their own older traditions. The so-called *Bhāṣya* of Vyāsa is also a mystery. The name "Vyāsa" is obviously incorrect, and the highly condensed and aphoristic *Bhāṣya* is hardly an exhaustive commentary in the traditional sense.

The *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, attributed to the great Vedāntin Śaṃkara, is, if authentic, a most important text on Yoga. Unfortunately, its authenticity is not yet established.[36] It is only with Vācaspati

Miśra's *Tattvavaiśāradī* in the ninth or tenth century that one reaches a historically identifiable text. As already mentioned, the views of Pātañjala Sāṃkhya appear to be similar to the views of Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin, and it may well be the case that the early textual tradition of Yoga philosophy represents their particular school of Sāṃkhya philosophizing.[37]

These early centuries of Sāṃkhya textual tradition saw a series of external invasions (the Hūṇas) and internal rivalries in India that had, by the middle of the sixth century, resulted in the disappearance of the Gupta political consolidation and ushered in centuries of feudal regionalism. This decentralization of political power was accompanied by the progressive decline of Buddhist traditions (as described, for example, by Hsüan Tsang in the seventh century) and the progressive strengthening of Hindu orthodoxy and rigid social stratification (the caste system). This trend toward a narrow orthodoxy was, however, tempered by popular syncretistic religion (the Tantra, Śāktism, and so forth) and exuberant *bhakti* spirituality (beginning in the south by the seventh century) that provided some personal relief from the ponderous presence that the established order was becoming. We know that other systems of Indian philosophy (Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, early Vedānta, the philosophy of language of Bhartṛhari, and so forth) were undergoing vigorous development, and one part of that development in each case involved polemical encounter with Sāṃkhya philosophy, but little remains of the Sāṃkhya response, if indeed there was a Sāṃkhya response.

Although Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya are available only through the summary compilations of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Patañjali (together with the commentaries already mentioned), there is sufficient evidence to indicate that both were systematic philosophical systems. They may be summarized as follows:

KĀRIKĀ-SĀṂKHYA:

1. *Ontology*: A dualism of two all-pervasive ultimate principles, namely, pure consciousness (*puruṣa*), construed pluralistically, and one primordial materiality (*mūlaprakṛti*).
   (A) Primordial materiality is made up of three constituent processes (*guṇa*), that is, intelligibility (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*), and inertia (*tamas*).
   (B) Because of the all-pervasive copresence of the two ultimate principles, the three constituent processes of primordial materiality undergo a continuing transformation (*pariṇāma*) and combination (*saṃghāta*) for the sake of consciousness (*puruṣārtha*). Viewed analytically, the various transformations and combinations of primordial materiality are simply parts of a totally functioning

whole. Viewed synthetically, primordial materiality (with its constituents) is construed as a basic unmanifest material cause (*kāraṇa*, *avyakta*) from which twenty-three preexistent effects become manifest (*vyakta*); they are (1) intellect; (2) egoity; (3-7) a group of five subtle elements, all of which are described as being both creative (*prakṛti*) and created (*vikṛti*); (8-23) a group of sixteen additional emergents, including mind, the five sense capacities, the five action capacities, and the five gross elements described as being only created (*vikṛti*). The five subtle elements, the five sense-capacities, the five action capacities and mind emerge from and make up the structure of egoity. Egoity emerges from intellect. Gross elements emerge from the five subtle elements and together constitute the natural body and the phenomenal world.

2. *Epistemology*: A critical realism based upon three distinct instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), that is, perception (*dṛṣṭa*), inference (*anumāna*), and reliable verbal testimony (*āptavacana*).
   (A) Awareness (*jñāna*) is a fundamental predisposition (*bhāva*) characteristic of intellect whereby the intellect assumes the form of that which is to be known (termed *buddhivṛtti*, or intellectual operations) assisted by the self-awareness (*abhimāna*) of egoity, the intentionality (in the sense of purposive intellectual activity [*saṃkalpa*]) of the mind, and the various mere sensings (*ālocanamātra*) by the sense capacities in immediate perception. These mere sensings arise from present or immediate intellectual operations, but the intentionality of mind, the self-awareness of egoity and the basic determinations of intellect encompass the operations of past, present, and future (including, for example, memory, imagination, fantasy, dreaming, and so forth).
   (B) Awareness by means of the three instruments of knowledge issues in reflective discerning (*adhyavasāya*) by the intellect, which is possible because of the presence of consciousness, which, though distinct from the intellect, is nevertheless an essential catalyst in the process of the occurrence of awareness.
   (C) Although inferences are in some sense always related to perception, it is nevertheless possible to make valid inferences regarding matters that are imperceptible in principle. Such inferences are called *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* and make possible the inference of the two ultimate unmanifest principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The inference of

primordial materiality is based upon (1) the presence of the three constituents in both the unmanifest and manifest transformations of primordial materiality; and (2) a corollary observation that the transformations and combinations of the constituents, whether construed analytically or synthetically, must be in a relation of preexistent identity with an original "material cause." The inference of *puruṣa* is based upon the need for a catalytic consciousness, itself distinct from intellect and primordial materiality, but the presence of which is essential for the occurrence of the awareness function of intellect and the transformations of primordial materiality. The former inference (namely, the inference to primordial materiality) provides the realism in Sāṃkhya epistemology. The latter inference (namely, the inference to *puruṣa*) provides a critical basis for Sāṃkhya epistemology in the absence of which Sāṃkhya would be a reductive materialism unable to account for its own rationality.

3. *Psychology/Physiology*: An organic psycho-physiology in which the polarity of mind-body or thought-extension is interpreted as a polarity between, on the one hand, a detachable "subtle body" capable of transmigration and rebirth, and on the other hand, a one-time-only "gross body" born of father and mother.
   (A) There is a subtle, material "internal organ" (*antaḥkaraṇa*) made up of intellect, egoity, and mind.
   (B) The internal organ is within a larger framework of a thirteenfold instrument made up of the threefold internal organ together with the five sense capacities and the five action capacities.
   (C) The thirteenfold instrument together with the five subtle elements make up the eighteenfold subtle body (*liṅgaśarira*), which transmigrates and undergoes a sequence of rebirths impelled by the effects of varying predispositions that reside in the intellect and that represent the karmic heritage of the organism.
   (D) The eighteenfold subtle body is reborn sequentially in one-time-only "gross bodies" (*sthūlaśarira*) produced genetically by father and mother.
   (E) Common to the organism as a whole is a sequence of five vital breaths (*pañcavāyu*), namely, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*, and *vyāna*, which regulate such varied functions as respiration, swallowing, speaking, digestion, excretion, sexual activity, circulation of bodily fluids, and the general homeostasis of the organism.

4. *Phenomenology* (meant here only in the sense of the apparent everyday world of ordinary experience): A dynamic, projective phenomenalism based upon a network of fundamental predispositions that generate the everyday, phenomenal world of ordinary experience (*upabhoga*) made up of fifty categories (*padārthas*) and referred to as the "intellectual creation" (*pratyaya-sarga*).
   (A) There are eight fundamental predispositions (*bhāvas*), four of which are *sāttvika*: meritorious behavior (*dharma*), knowledge (*jñāna*), nonattachment (*vairāgya*), and power (*aiśvarya*); and four of which are *tāmasa*, the opposites of the above four: *adharma*, *ajñāna*, *avairāgya*, and *anaiśvarya*. All these eight predispositions reside in intellect. The projective force of these fundamental predispositions is determined by the activities of the organism in past lives and determines in turn the trajectory of the organism in present and future lives.
   (B) In any given rebirth the projective force of the fundamental predispositions results in a particular constellation of categories that provides a sort of grid through which an organism experiences its world. The particular constellation of categories for a given organism is made up of five kinds of misconception (*viparyaya*), twenty-eight kinds of dysfunction (*aśakti*), nine kinds of contentment (*tuṣṭi*), and eight kinds of perfection (*siddhi*).
   (C) The projective force of the fundamental predispositions, together with the subtle body, generates not only the human realm but also an eightfold divine or cosmic realm and a fivefold animal and plant realm. Taken together, the projected realms are referred to as the external world (*bhautikasarga*), with *sattva* predominating in the divine realm, *rajas* in the human realm, and *tamas* in the animal and plant realm.
5. *Ethics*: A rational renunciation of ordinary experience based upon a psychological hedonism that generates an awareness that the entire pleasure-pain continuum must finally be overcome.
   (A) The experience of frustration (*duḥkha*) is threefold: internal or personal (whether mental or physical) (*ādhyātmika*), external (whether from other persons, animals, objects in the world, and so forth) (*ādhibhautika*), and celestial (whether from supernatural beings, astrological phenomena, cosmic forces, and so forth) (*ādhidaivika*).
   (B) Such frustration is inescapable in ordinary experience and generates the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) the means for overcoming it.

(C) Frustration is an experience of discomfort and may be contrasted with two other typical feelings that occur in ordinary experience, that is, satisfaction (*sukha*) and confusion (*moha*). Satisfaction is an experience of restful tranquillity (*śānta*), and confusion is an experience of bewilderment or alienation (*mūḍha*). All three experiences occur in the specific (*viśeṣa*) contexts of ordinary life, but it is the experience of frustration that arouses the faculty of awareness (the intellect) to discriminate the reasons for frustration and to pursue the means for overcoming it.

(D) Reflection reveals that the satisfaction-frustration-confusion continuum refers to three constituent dimensions that permeate the manifest world, namely, reflective intelligibility (*prakhyā, prakāśa*), externalizing activity (*pravṛtti, cala*), and reifying inertia (*sthiti, āvaraṇa*), or, in other words, *sattva, rajas*, and *tamas*.

(E) Further reflection (by means of perception, inference, and reliable authority) reveals that the three constituents together make up primordial materiality in its manifest and unmanifest aspects.

(F) To overcome frustration, therefore, it is necessary to transcend the transformations and combinations of primordial materiality altogether (including even reflective intelligibility or *sattva*).

(G) The ethical goal of Sāṃkhya, then, is to discriminate the presence of a transcendent consciousness, distinct from primordial materiality and its three constituents, and thereby to attain a radical isolation (*kaivalya*) or liberation from ordinary human experience.

PĀTAÑJALA-SAṂKHYA

1. *Ontology*: Basically the same as Kārikā-Sāṃkhya with three important exceptions, namely:

(A) Intellect, egoity, and mind are brought together into a single all-pervasive cognitive faculty called awareness (*citta*).

(B) The notions of transformation and combination are interpreted in terms of momentary manifestations or aspects of primordial materiality that exhibit changes in external property (*dharma*), present functioning (*lakṣaṇa*), and state of development (*avasthā*).[38]

(C) The existence of God is admitted, although the Lord is not considered to be an additional principle of the system. Rather, He is a particular kind of *puruṣa*.

2. *Epistemology*: Basically the same as Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, although the process of awareness is called *cittavṛtti* instead of *buddhivṛtti* or *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*.
3. *Psychology/Physiology*: Basically the same as Kārikā-Sāṃkhya with the important exception that there is no subtle, transmigrating body. Because the *citta* is all-pervasive, a subtle body is unnecessary.
4. *Phenomenology*: Similar in intent to Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, but the explanatory mode is dramatically different. Whereas Kārikā-Sāṃkhya develops its phenomenology using the notion of the eight predispositions and the fifty categories (misconceptions, incapacities, contentments, and perfections), Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya develops its phenomenology around the notion of the five cognitive conditions (*vṛtti*) of awareness, namely, knowledge (*pramāṇa*) error (*viparyaya*), conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*), and memory (*smṛti*). These conditions may be afflicted (*kliṣṭa*) or unafflicted (*akliṣṭa*). The former conditions generate latent dispositions (*vāsanā*, *saṃskāra*) and karmic residues (*karmāśaya*) that exacerbate "ignorance" (*avidyā*) and progressively lead to further frustration, rebirth, and transmigration. The latter conditions generate latent dispositions that counteract the afflicted dispositions, gradually destroy the residues that exacerbate ignorance, and progressively lead to the discriminative realization (*vivekakhyāti*) of the distinction between *sattva* and *puruṣa*. Finally, all cognitive conditions (both afflicted and unafflicted) must be stopped, for Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya defines the term "*yoga*" as "the cessation of the cognitive conditions of awareness" (*cittavṛttinirodha*).
5. *Ethics*: Basically the same ethical goal as Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, although the methodology for attaining the goal is different. Whereas Kārikā-Sāṃkhya appears to recommend a progressive sequence of reflective discriminations that naturally or spontaneously leads to the desired goal of liberation, Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya stresses a systematic and rigorous meditative *praxis* that is a prerequisite for reflective discrimination. To some extent the difference is only one of perspective, with Kārikā-Sāṃkhya focusing on the final stages of reflective discrimination and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya focusing on the requisite preparatory discipline. On another level, however, the difference appears to relate to divergent interpretations with respect to the role and function of the intellect and the cognitive faculty. Whereas Kārikā-Sāṃkhya focuses primarily on the "intellect" dimension of *buddhi* Pātañjala Sāṃkhya focuses primarily on the "will" dimension of *citta*. In Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya the yogin practices personal austerities (*tapas*), recitation and study (*svādhyāya*), and devotion to God (*iśvarapraṇi-*

dhāna) in order to discipline body and mind (*kriyāyoga*). The yogin also pursues a systematic eightfold program of discipline (*yogāṅgas*) made up of external and internal cleansing (*yama* and *niyama*), controlled posture (*āsana*), controlled breathing (*prāṇāyāma*), the restraint of capacities (*pratyāhāra*), focused concentration (*dhāraṇā*), continuous meditation (*dhyāna*), and the cultivation of altered states of awareness (*samādhi*). Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya provides detailed accounts of the various levels of altered states of awareness (including *savitarka, savicāra, sānanda,* and *sāsmita*), referred to as "altered states of awareness that have content or support" (*saṃprajñātasamādhi*), and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya also provides an account of a final *samādhi* that transcends all content or support (*asaṃprajñātasamādhi*). According to Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, the attainment of the advanced levels of awareness requires continuous and rigorous effort (*abhyāsa*) and the total nonattachment (*vairāgya*) to ordinary experience. Also, devotion to God is strongly recommended, since the object of devotion (namely, the transcendent consciousness of the Lord) is the perfect model or exemplar of what the yogin is seeking to achieve in his own discipline.

B. *Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya*

By the eighth and ninth centuries a crucial development had occurred that paradoxically both salvaged and destroyed the old Sāṃkhya philosophy, namely, the emergence of Advaita Vedānta in the work of Śaṃkara and his successors.[39] Vedānta salvaged and destroyed Sāṃkhya philosophy in much the same manner as Christian theology in the medieval period both salvaged and destroyed Plato and Aristotle. That is to say, while polemically regretting the errors of the older tradition, the newly emerging tradition unashamedly stole many of the essential features of the conceptual structure of the heretics. Vedānta, stripped of its scripture-based monistic *brahman-ātman*, is in many ways a warmed-over Sāṃkhya ontology and epistemology spooned up with the philosophical methodology of the old negative dialectic of the Mādhyamika Buddhists. What Śaṃkara could not intellectually tolerate, however, was the Sāṃkhya notion of an independent material (*pradhāna* or *prakṛti*) apart from consciousness (*puruṣa*), and even more difficult to accept was the crucial role for inference apart from scriptural authority that the Sāṃkhya notion of materiality permitted. Sāṃkhya had never denied reliable verbal testimony (*āptavacana* or *śruti*) as a legitimate and important means of knowing, but Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning, even in the area of *samyagdarśana* and *adhyātmavidyā* (that is to say, in the area of ultimate truth and the science of liberation).

One has the impression in reading Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* that the author is not especially vexed by the naive realism and the neat, logical distinctions of Nyāya, or by the quaint atomism of Vaiśeṣika, or by the action-orientation of Mīmāṃsā, or by the harmless devotion of the theological *bhakti* enthusiasts. The genuine enemy is the *pradhāna-kāraṇavāda* (namely, the Sāṃkhya), because Sāṃkhya offers an alternative account of the role and function of philosophy on precisely the same ground and for precisely the same purpose (liberation) as does Vedānta.[40] To allow Sāṃkhya to stand is to threaten the entire edifice of the received tradition. Moreover, as Śaṃkara himself points out, to demolish Sāṃkhya is to demolish by implication the other systems of Indian thought that harbor the pretence of the adequacy of independent reasoning.

> . . . we have taken special trouble to refute the *pradhāna* doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. . . . Hence the Sūtrakāra formally extends, in the above Sūtra, the refutation already accomplished of the *pradhāna* doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their protagonist, the *pradhāna* doctrine, has been so completely disposed of.[41]

Apart from this crucial disagreement, however, Vedānta adopts many of the Sāṃkhya conceptualizations (with, of course, numerous variations in nuance): the theory of causation (which becomes *vivartavāda* with the collapse of the Sāṃkhya dualism), the notion of the three *guṇas*, the importance of the science of liberation and nondiscrimination (*aviveka*), the notion of a subtle body, technical terms such as "*buddhi*," "*ahaṃkāra*," "*manas*," and so forth.

This tendency of Vedānta to absorb the conceptual structure of Sāṃkhya had the double effect of, on one level, decisively destroying the old Sāṃkhya dualism (through the refutation of the Sāṃkhya notion of primordial materiality on the basis of independent reasoning), but, on another level, of reviving and refurbishing many of the old Sāṃkhya notions. This latter effect helps to explain why an important thinker such as Vācaspati Miśra, composed a major commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudi*) in the ninth or tenth century. Vācaspati, of course, composed a variety of commentaries on many of the older schools of Indian philosophy (including Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Yoga, and Vedānta), but his work on Sāṃkhya is especially significant in the sense that it triggered a subsequent commentarial Sāṃkhya tradition that reaches down to the present day and that probably would otherwise not have existed. In other words, whereas his work on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta represents an important contribution to each of these systems, his work on Sāṃkhya actually inau-

gurated an independent tradition. As the Checklist clearly shows, many of the Sāṃkhya texts after the tenth century are based on Vācaspati's reading of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. This is true everywhere in India in recent centuries but especially so in Bengal, where many pandits refuse to take the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* or Vijñānabhikṣu's work as serious Sāṃkhya texts. Vaṃśīdhara's *Tattvavibhākara*, Kavirāja Yati's *Tattvapradīpa*, Śrī Bhāratī Yati's *Tattvakaumudīvyākhyā*, Nyāyapañcānana's *Āvaraṇavāriṇi*, Bālarāma Udāsīna's *Vidvattoṣiṇi*, Pañcānana Tarkaratna's *Pūrṇimā*, Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya's *Kiraṇāvali*, Rameścandra Tarkatīrtha's *Guṇamayī*, Harirāma Śukla's *Suṣamā*, Śivanārāyaṇa Śāstri's *Sārabodhinī*, and Sītārāma Śāstri's *Abhinavarājalakṣmī*, works ranging from the 17th to the 20th centuries, are all important later texts that interpret the Sāṃkhya system through Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī*.

What must be noted, however, is that Vācaspati's reading of Sāṃkhya is more than a little influenced by the emerging Advaita Vedānta and its characteristic network of intellectual issues, and in this sense it should be distinguished from Pre-Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya. For convenience it can be designated simply as Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya, that is to say, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* as read through Vācaspati's *Tattvakaumudī*.

Some of the characteristic emphases in Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation may be outlined as follows (using the same format that was used earlier in the outlines of Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya):

KĀRIKĀ-KAUMUDĪ-SĀṂKHYA:

1. *Ontology*: Whereas Vācaspati closely follows Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, he is much more concerned with discussing the problem of the relation between intellect (as a manifestation of primordial materiality) and consciousness. According to Vācaspati, a theory of reflection (*pratibimba*) is required in order to explain how intellect is able to have experience. Consciousness becomes reflected in the intellect, thus making it appear as if the intellect were conscious. Experience actually occurs only in intellect, but it appears as if consciousness experiences, because its image (*chāyā*) has become reflected in the intellect (see summary of *Tattvakaumudī* under *Kārikās* 5 and 37). Such a theory of reflection is only hinted at in the *Kārikā* itself (and the other early commentaries), and it is undoubtedly the Vedānta preoccupation with the problem of consciousness and its reflection that explains Vācaspati's concern about the issue.
2. *Epistemology*: Again, Vācaspati closely follows Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, but there are at least two important extensions beyond what is found in the *Kārikā* itself (and the other early commentaries). First, regarding the problem of inference, Vācaspati discusses

the threefold inference in terms of positive (*vīta*) and exclusionary (*avīta*) types, placing both *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa* under *vīta*, and *śeṣavat* under *avīta*. Vācaspati's discussion shows a familiarity with logical problems and technical logical issues that arose considerably later than the time of the *Kārikā* itself, problems and issues that were especially prominent in Nyāya philosophy and were becoming prominent as well in the various traditions of Vedānta philosophy after Śaṃkara. Second, regarding the problem of perception, Vācaspati argues that the sense capacities are only capable of mere sensing (*ālocanamātra*), for they apprehend sense objects without any mental ordering or verbal characterization (*nirvikalpa*), whereas the mind performs the task of ordering and verbalizing (*savikalpa*) the impressions of the senses. Such a distinction had perhaps been hinted at in the earlier texts, but it was Vācaspati who spelled out this important distinction.

3. *Psychology/Physiology*: Vācaspati accepts the basic psychology/physiology of the *Kārikā* and indicates specifically that the subtle body is made up of the five subtle elements, which accompany the thirteenfold instrument in the cycle of transmigration.
4. *Phenomenology*: Vācaspati provides no new explanations of the predispositions or the intellectual creation, although he indicates that the five misconceptions, (*tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra*, and *andhatāmisra*) of the intellectual creation are equivalent to the five afflictions (*kleśas*) (*avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveśa*) of Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya.
5. *Ethics*: Again, Vācaspati closely follows the presentation of Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, but throughout he appears to be casting Sāṃkhya notions into a Vedānta idiom. Vācaspati begins his commentary with a clear allusion to the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, indicating thereby that the Sāṃkhya concern for overcoming frustration has a firm Upaniṣadic base. Moreover, in his interpretation of the Sāṃkhya rejection of Vedic means for the alleviation of frustration (under *Kārikā* 2), Vācaspati is quick to point out that only the ritual portion of the Veda is intended, and in his discussion of the perfections (under *Kārikā* 51) he correlates Sāṃkhya meditational techniques with the Vedānta triad hearing (*śravaṇa*), considering (*manana*), and meditating (*nididhyāsana*).

C. *Samāsa-Sāṃkhya*

Yet another independent tradition of Sāṃkhya philosophy is that found in a cryptic little text entitled *Sāṃkhyatattvasamāsa*.[42] Because it is not mentioned in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (from the four-

teenth century) and because none of its commentaries appears to be much earlier than the medieval period, it is usually assigned a late date (that is to say, some time after the fourteenth century). Max Müller, however, suspected that it may well be much earlier, and more recently Frauwallner has described the Sāṃkhya of Vārṣagaṇya as having close parallels with the *Tattvasamāsa*. Some of the notions of the *Tattvasamāsa* (for example, the five sources of action and the presentation of materiality in terms of eight generative principles) are either not mentioned in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* or are explained in a different manner, whereas the presentation of Sāṃkhya as found in the *Yuktidīpikā*, an authentically older Sāṃkhya text, does mirror to some extent the *Tattvasamāsa*.[43] Possibly, then, the *Tattvasamāsa* may represent an older formulation. In any case, the *Tattvasamāsa* does have a modern (largely Vedāntin) commentarial tradition reaching from the fourteenth or fifteenth century down to the present day, including such texts as the *Kramadīpikā* (possibly of the fourteenth century or even earlier), the *Tattvayāthārthyadīpana* of Bhāvāgaṇeśa (sixteenth century), the *Sarvopakāriṇīṭikā* (eighteenth or nineteenth century), the *Sāṃkhyasūtravivaraṇa* (eighteenth or nineteenth century), the *Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana* (eighteenth or nineteenth century), and the *Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsa* (nineteenth century).

According to Max Müller, the *Tattvasamāsa* has been especially popular among the *paṇḍitas* of Varanasi and presents Sāṃkhya philosophy in a manner notably different from the traditions of Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, and Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya. The important differences may be outlined as follows:

SAMĀSA-SĀṂKHYA:

1. *Ontology*: There is a distinct difference in emphasis. Whereas the *Kārikā* begins by calling attention to the three kinds of frustration and then moves on to discuss the instruments of knowledge and the various inferences for establishing primordial materiality and consciousness, the *sūtras* of the *Tattvasamāsa* begin with the ontology and cosmology of Sāṃkhya (*sūtras* 1-6). Instead of discussing primordial materiality and its seven basic emergents (intellect, etc.), which are described in the *Kārikā* as being both creative (*prakṛti*) and created (*vikṛti*), the *Tattvasamāsa* refers to "eight *prakṛtis*" (*sūtra* 1), "sixteen emergents" (*sūtra* 2), and "consciousness" (*puruṣa*) (*sūtra* 3). The presentation of the *Tattvasamāsa* calls to mind older nonphilosophical or popular accounts of Sāṃkhya such as those found in the *Mahābhārata* (the *Gītā* and the *Mokṣadharma*) and the *Purāṇas*. Moreover, in *sūtras* 5 and 6 reference is made to the creation or emergence of the manifest world (*sañcara*) and its periodic dissolution (*pratisañcara*), again calling to mind older, cosmological account

of Sāṃkhya common to popular texts such as the Purāṇas and the *Mānavadharmaśāstra.*

2. *Epistemology*: Except for one brief reference (*sūtra* 23) to the three instruments of knowledge, epistemological notions are not enumerated in the *Tattvasamāsa.* This may simply mean, of course, that the compiler of the *sūtras* is presupposing the fully developed Sāṃkhya epistemology, but it may also mean that the *Tattvasamāsa* form of Śāṃkhya represents an older, cosmological form of Sāṃkhya that did not concern itself with epistemological issues.
3. *Psychology/Physiology*: The *Tattvasamāsa* mentions none of the characteristic psychological notions of Kārikā-Śaṃkhya apart from a reference to the five "breaths" (*vāyus* or *prāṇas*). Instead, it introduces a set of distinctively new notions that are not mentioned at all in the *Kārikā* account of Śāṃkhya, namely, the "five functions of the *buddhi*" (*abhibuddhi*, i.e., *vyavasāya, abhimāna, icchā, kartavyatā*, and *kriyā*), the "five sources of action" (*karmayoni*, i.e., *dhṛti, śraddhā, sukha, vividiṣā*, and *avividiṣā*), and the "five essences of action" (*karmātman*, i.e., *vaikārika, taijasa, bhūtādi, sānumāna*, and *niranumāna*).
4. *Phenomenology*: The *Tattvasamāsa* refers to the "five misconceptions" (*avidyā*), the "twenty-eight dysfunctions" (*aśakti*), the "nine contentments" (*tuṣṭi*), and the "eight perfections" (*siddhi*)together with the "ten principal topics" (*daśamūlikārthas*), thus making a total of sixty topics, which evidently represent the enumerated components of the Sāṃkhya *ṣaṣṭitantra* ("the system of sixty topics"). The *Tattvasamāsa* then introduces the expression "*anugrahasarga*" (*sūtra* 19), which means something like "the supporting creation" and is probably synonomous with the more common expression "*pratyayasarga*" (or "intellectual creation"). Interestingly, the expression "*anugrahasarga*" is found in a number of Purāṇic texts, again suggesting that the *Tattvasamāsa* may represent an old cosmological form of Sāṃkhya.
5. *Ethics*: Unlike Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, which apparently refers only to one kind of bondage and one kind of release, the *Tattvasamāsa* refers to a "threefold bondage" (*trividho bandaḥ*) and a "threefold liberation" (*trividho mokṣaḥ*). Presumably these tripartite notions relate to the "threefold instrument of knowledge" (*sūtra* 23) and the "threefold frustration" (*sūtra* 24), but the commentaries on the *Tattvasamāsa* do not elucidate any correlation. This may be because the notions are archaic formulations that the later commentators failed to understand, or it may possibly be because these enumerations are heuristic learning devices that have no particular conceptual significance for the system as a whole. The former explanation is probably correct, since there

are references in some of the commentaries on the *Kārikā*, in some Purāṇas, and in other older literature to a "threefold bondage" and a "threefold liberation," suggesting that these were older formulations that were simplified or eliminated in later accounts of the system.

D. *Sūtra-Sāṃkhya*

Finally, there is one additional independent tradition of philosophical Sāṃkhya, that of the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and its attendant commentaries. As is the case with the *Tattvasamāsa*, possibly many or at least some of the *sūtras* may be very early, perhaps reaching back to the formative period. Unfortunately, however, there is no old commentarial tradition that would enable us to sort out the earlier from the later *sūtras*. We have only a series of modern commentaries and subcommentaries composed mainly by various Vedāntins, the chief among whom is Vijñānabhikṣu. Commentaries on the Sāṃkhyasūtra include the following: the *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* of Aniruddha (fifteenth century), the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu (sixteenth century), the *Vṛttisāra* of Mahādeva Vedāntin (seventeenth century), the *Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti* of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa or Nāgeśa (eighteenth century), the *Amalā* of Pramathanātha Tarkabhūṣaṇa (early twentieth century), the *Vṛtti* of Hariprasāda (twentieth century), the *Tattvabodhinī* of Kuñjavihāri Tarkasiddhānta (twentieth century), and the *Sāṃkhyasūtrabhāṣya* of Brahmamuni (twentieth century).

In this tradition the process of what might be called the Vedāntinization of Sāṃkhya is carried much further than it had been by Vācaspati. Vijñānabhikṣu construes Sāṃkhya in terms of a grand metaphysical cosmology on analogy with Vedānta, with a highest self (*paramātman*), a creative God (*iśvara*), and gradations of reality in terms of the old Sāṃkhya basic principles. Moreover, he documents his interpretation of Sāṃkhya with extensive quotations from the theistic portion of the *Mokṣadharma*, the *Gītā* and the Purāṇas (that is to say, largely from Proto-Sāṃkhya references). He freely offers his own views on a variety of Sāṃkhya notions (for example, the three *guṇas*, the relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, and so forth), and he argues at length that the atheistic orientation of philosophical Sāṃkhya can really be read in terms of Vedānta theism. Sāṃkhya becomes, in other words, a variation on a theme of Vijñānabhikṣu's own Vedānta, and he deals with all of the older schools of Indian philosophy (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā) in much the same manner. The differences between the older schools of Indian philosophy are transcended in the direction of a grand Vedānta synthesis, and Sāṃkhya is assigned its rung (but interestingly, a very high rung) on a ladder of Indian philosophical truth, the highest rung of which is the Vedānta philosophy.[44] Some of

the more distinctive features of this late form of Sāṃkhya may be outlined as follows:

SŪTRA-SĀṂKHYA:

1. *Ontology*:
   (A) As was noted earlier in the discussion of Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya, so also for the Sūtra-Sāṃkhya of Vijñānabhikṣu (and the other commentators on the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*), the problem of the relation between intellect (as a manifestation of primordial materiality) and pure consciousness is a dominant theme in ontological discussions. Vijñānabhikṣu argues, however, that Vācaspati's theory of reflection is not a sufficient explanation of the problem. Vācaspati had argued that pure consciousness and intellect are not in contact and that pure consciousness becomes reflected in the intellect, thus making the latter appear as if it were conscious. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, this explanation deprives pure consciousness of experience and does not adequately elucidate the subtlety of the Sāṃkhya dualism. Instead of Vācaspati's simple theory of reflection, therefore, Vijñānabhikṣu introduces his own theory of "mutual reflection" (*anyonyapratibimba*, mainly in his discussion under *sūtra* I.99 but *passim* as well), in which pure consciousness becomes reflected in intellect (whereby the *buddhi* becomes "intelligized," as it were) but in which *buddhi*'s transactions (including satisfaction, frustration, confusion, awareness, etc.) in turn become reflected back in pure consciousness as limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*)—thus making it possible for pure consciousness to "have" experience (albeit a mistaken or distorted experience). There is, therefore, a mutual contact (through this double reflection) between pure consciousness and intellect, but such contact does not in any way involve any change or activity in pure consciousness.
   (B) In addition, in Sūtra-Sāṃkhya the problem of the plurality of pure consciousness is taken further. Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya had simply asserted the classical Sāṃkhya notion of plurality. The Vedānta discussions of one ultimate Self, however, in the later centuries had obviously posed a challenge to the old Sāṃkhya view. In Sūtra-Sāṃkhya the problem is handled by arguing (primarily under I.154 but *passim* as well) that Vedic references to nonduality (*advaita*) imply only a simple, generic essence (*jāti*) of selfhood and need not

be taken to mean that there is only one undivided Self. In other words, there is a plurality of selves, but they all have one, simple, generic essence. Uncovering or discriminating the limiting adjuncts that distort this simple, generic essence of selfhood is the goal both of Sāṃkhya philosophy and the Vedic scripture.

(C) Also, in the Sūtra-Sāṃkhya of Vijñānabhikṣu, there is an inclination to make room for the notion of a God (*īśvara*). Although the *sūtras* themselves (see I.92-99 and V. 1-12) appear to be clearly non-theistic, Vijñānabhikṣu goes to great length to show that God is not really a problem for Sāṃkhya. The apparently nontheistic arguments only show that the notion of God is not really essential for establishing the rationality of Sāṃkhya. This does not at all mean, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, that God need be denied, and Vijñānabhikṣu proceeds to quote extensively from pre-Kārikā epic and Purāṇic passages to document that God has a useful role to play in the Sāṃkhya tradition.

(D) Perhaps the most significant innovation of Vijñānabhikṣu's Sūtra-Sāṃkhya, however, is his interpretation of the *guṇas*. Unlike the earlier Sāṃkhya traditions, which describe the *guṇas* as constituent processes and affective states, Vijñānabhikṣu interprets the *guṇas* as subtle substances (*dravyas*) that are originally in a condition of homogeneous equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) and then combine in various heterogeneous collocations of manifest principles (*tattva*) when the equilibrium is disrupted by the presence of pure consciousness (see I.61, VI.39 and *passim*). In other words, Vijñānabhikṣu develops an elaborate metaphysical ontology/cosmology of periodic manifestation and dissolution, more reminiscent of epic and Purāṇic cosmologies than of the older Sāṃkhya traditions as found in Kārikā-Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya or Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya. Whereas the older Sāṃkhya traditions had focused largely on epistemology, psychology/physiology, and ethics, the Sūtra-Sāṃkhya of Vijñānabhikṣu focuses on a metaphysical cosmology centering on the interaction of *guṇas* as substances. One may well argue (as, for example, S. Dasgupta argues) that Vijñānabhikṣu's metaphysical *guṇa* substances were implicit even in the earlier traditions, but there is little or no support for such an argument in the earlier Sāṃkhya texts themselves. The only support for such an argument is to be found in prephilosophical epic and Purāṇic passages, which is pro-

bably the primary reason why Vijñānabhikṣu quotes so extensively from the old cosmological literature.

(E) One further innovation of Vijñānabhikṣu's Sūtra-Sāṃkhya relates to the threefold structure of egoity (*vaikṛta*, *taijasa*, and *bhūtādi*, from *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 25). Older interpretations had suggested that *vaikṛta* is *sattva* and encompasses the elevenfold cognitive apparatus (the five sense capacities, the five action capacities, and mind); *bhūtādi* is *tamas* and encompasses the five subtle elements; and *taijasa* is *rajas*, which pertains both to *vaikṛta* and *bhūtādi* (thereby assisting both in cognition and material development). According to Vijñānabhikṣu (see under II.18), however, this is not correct. Rather, *vaikṛta* as *sattva* pertains only to *manas* or mind; *taijasa* as *rajas* pertains to the five sense capacities and the five action capacities; and *bhūtādi* as *tamas* pertains to the five subtle elements. The reference in the *Kārikā* verse to *taijasa* or *rajas* pertaining to "both" means simply that the sense capacities and action capacities mediate between *sattva* (mind) and *tamas* (matter). Vijñānabhikṣu quotes some verses from the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in support of his view, but it should be noted that this interpretation is not to be found in any of the older, extant Sāṃkhya philosophical traditions.

2. *Epistemology*:

(A) The only innovative epistemological argument of importance in Vijñānabhikṣu's Sūtra-Śāṃkhya relates to the role and function of the sense capacities in perception. Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya refer respectively to *buddhivṛtti* and *cittavṛtti* but do not spell out the specific functions in the cognitive process. Vācaspati Miśra carried the discussion further by attributing bare awareness without mental elaboration (*nirvikalpa*) to the sense capacities and mental elaboration (*savikalpa*) to mind. Vijñānabhikṣu disagrees with Vācaspati (under II.32), arguing that the sense capacities are capable of both *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa* perception. Mind only plays a role of focusing attention (*saṃkalpa*) and initiating conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*). Perception, then, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, is primarily a result of the interaction of intellect/ will and the sense capacities. Mind, as a result, plays a very minor role in Sūtra-Sāṃkhya.

(B) Although there are few other epistemological innovations by Vijñānabhikṣu, it should be noted that there are elaborate polemical discussions against other schools of Indian philosophy. There is much of interest in these

discussions, but it is difficult to know if the Sāṃkhya views expressed are those of the earlier tradition or simply possible interpretations that Vijñānabhikṣu himself favored. One has the strong sense that the latter is the case rather than the former. At V.51ff., for example, there are elaborate discussions of the validity of knowledge, *sphoṭa* theory, and the theory of error. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, Sāṃkhya philosophy accepts (V.51) the theory that knowledge is intrinsically valid (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*), rejects the theory of *sphoṭa* (V.57), and accepts a theory of error known as *sadasatkhyāti* (V.56) (wherein the basic *tattvas* are existent, or *sat*, but certain relations superimposed on the *tattvas* are nonexistent, or *asat*). All of these views are reasonable implications regarding the Sāṃkhya philosophical position, and Vācaspati Miśra in earlier times had strongly suggested the intrinsic validity argument. Overall, however, one has the sense that these discussions reflect a later philosophical period long after Sāṃkhya had attained its normative formulation.

3. *Psychology/Physiology*: Sūtra-Sāṃkhya extends the old Sāṃkhya psychology/physiology in a cosmological direction. Intellect/will becomes a cosmic entity (*hiraṇyagarbha, Brahmā*, and so forth), and the various cognitive principles (sense organs, and so forth) are linked up with various deities on analogy with the old epic and Purāṇic cosmologies.
4. *Phenomenology*: Sūtra-Sāṃkhya conflates the old Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya. Whereas Kārikā-Sāṃkhya describes ordinary experience in terms of the eight predispositions and fifty categories (misconceptions, dysfunctions contentments and perfections) and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya describes ordinary experience in terms of *cittavṛttis, saṃskāras*, and *vāsanās*, Vijñānabhikṣu's Sūtra-Sāṃkhya uses both explanatory approaches and does not distinguish one from the other. Moreover, the Sūtra-Sāṃkhya of Vijñānabhikṣu presents the various explanations in an apparently haphazard manner, which has led most interpreters to conclude that the *sūtras* either are not in proper order or represent a compilation of a variety of old Sāṃkhya traditions.
5. *Ethics*: The ethical thrust of Vijñānabhikṣu's Sūtra-Sāṃkhya is akin to the other Sāṃkhya traditions already outlined, although Vijñānabhikṣu's tendency to emphasize Sāṃkhya as a metaphysical cosmology and his predilection for quoting older, nonphilosophical theistic passages from the epics and Purāṇas gives a characteristic flavor or tone to his presentation that is clearly different from the older Sāṃkhya philosophical texts. More-

over, Vijñānabhikṣu's synthetic perspective in which Sāṃkhya and Yoga (along with the other orthodox schools) represent a *preparatio evangelium* for Vedānta strikes a distinctively different posture from the older Sāṃkhya literature.

Śaṃkara's encounter with Sāṃkhya had been intense and polemical, even bitter. Vācaspati's had been more dispassionate and descriptive, an obvious effort to lay out those dimensions of Sāṃkhya philosophy that could be appropriated with respect to the set of philosophical issues that had become pressing in his time. Vijñānabhikṣu's encounter with Sāṃkhya was generous and clearly synthetic, symptomatic probably of Vedānta philosophy's having emerged as the most favored variety of systematic reflection. There were, of course, numerous varieties of Vedānta, just as there were numerous varieties of theology among Christian groups in medieval Europe, but intellectual athletics had largely become intramural. The task now was to place the various older traditions in an appropriate hierarchical network that reflected the new intellectual environment. Vijñānabhikṣu was an expert in this task, and much of the tone and flavor of Indian philosophy in modern times is traceable to the kind of intellectual synthesizing that Vijñānabhikṣu represents. It is apparent in most of the Sanskrit philosophical texts of the modern period, and it is noticeable even in the Western-style scholarly treatments of Indian philosophy of Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Simha, and others. It has had a profound impact not only on the way Indian intellectuals think of their tradition but also on the entire tradition of the European scholarly treatment of Indian thought. The Vedānta bias is almost everywhere in modern Indian thought. There is no use in regretting this, however (except perhaps for the occasional old soul who wonders what Sāṃkhya was before the Vedāntins got their hands on it), because, for better or worse, India has allowed Sāṃkhya to subsist as an appendage to its modern Vedānta bias in much the same way as Christian thought has been characterized as a "Platonism for the masses" (Nietzsche) for generations of European and American believers.

To summarize this overview, then, it is useful to distinguish the following types of Sāṃkhya in India's intellectual heritage:

(1) Proto-Sāṃkhya: 800 B.C.E.—100 C.E.
(2) Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya: 100-500 C.E.
(3) Kārikā-Sāṃkhya: 350-850 C.E.
(4) Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya: 400-850 C.E.
(5) Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya: 850 (or 975)-present
(6) Samāsa-Sāṃkhya: 1300-present
(7) Sūtra-Sāṃkhya: 1400-present

The original philosophical formulation occurs with the emergence of Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya, and the normative formulations in summary form appear in Kārikā-Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya. Somewhere

in these ancient traditions there appears to have been a clear break with the original genius and vitality of the system, and the later traditions of Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṃkhya, Samāsa-Sāṃkhya, and Sūtra-Sāṃkhya present the system through a Vedānta prism, a prism, to be sure, that frequently irritates the Sāṃkhya interpreter, but nevertheless a prism without which one of the truly remarkable traditions of ancient philosophizing would possibly have vanished from India's intellectual heritage and from the general history of cross-cultural philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SĀMKHYA

Preliminary Remarks

Although the main outlines of the history and literature of Sāṃkhya are reasonably clear, the same cannot be said about the details of the system qua philosophical system. As was mentioned in the last chapter, there appears to have been a break in the Sāṃkhya textual tradition at an early date. Beginning with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and thereafter, there are only summaries and digests of the system, and many of the commentators are almost as much at a loss to explain the full system as is a modern interpreter. This is unfortunate, for in many ways the evidence suggests that Sāṃkhya philosophy stands at the fountainhead of systematic Indian reflection, somewhat on analogy with Pythagoreanism and other pre-Socratic systems in ancient Greece. As is well known, the influence of Sāṃkhya is ubiquitous in South Asian cultural life, not only in philosophy but in medicine, law, statecraft, mythology, cosmology, theology, and devotional literature. Sāṃkhya was evidently a direct descendent of older and unsystematic Upaniṣadic speculation, a precursor of much of India's scientific literature and an older sibling of the first philosophical efforts in South Asia (including Jain, Buddhist, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Yoga traditions).

To be sure, certain characteristic philosophical notions are continually attributed to Sāṃkhya in the history of Indian philosophy—for example, the dualism of consciousness and materiality (*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*), the *guṇa* theory, the theory that the effect preexists in the cause in a potential state (*satkāryavāda*), the plurality of *puruṣa*s, and so forth—but there is a notable absence of the larger conceptual and speculative framework from which these characteristic Sāṃkhya notions are derived, and more than that, an absence of any firm sense that these so-called characteristic notions were, in fact, central within the Sāṃ-

khya tradition itself. Regarding this latter point, one has the impression that many of the characteristic notions of Sāṃkhya were central largely to the later issues in Indian philosophy and were probably much less prominent within the original Sāṃkhya speculative environment. In other words, later commentators were interrogating Sāṃkhya philosophy from the perspective of their own philosophical agendas—for example, Nyāya argumentation, Buddhist logic, Vedānta metaphysics, and so forth—and were simply uninterested in, or unaware of, Sāṃkhya's own speculative agenda. K. C. Bhattacharya has expressed the matter well:

> Much of Sāṃkhya literature appears to have been lost, and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient times up to the age of the commentators. In such systematic works as we have, one seems to have a hazy view of a grand system of speculative metaphysics. ... The interpretation of all ancient systems requires a constructive effort; but while in the case of some systems where we have a large volume of literature and a continuity of tradition, the construction is mainly of the nature of translation of ideas in to modern concepts, here in Sāṃkhya the construction at many places involves supplying of missing links from one's imagination. It is risky work, but unless one does it one cannot be said to understand Sāṃkhya as a philosophy. It is a task that one is obliged to undertake. It is a fascinating task because Sāṃkhya is a bold, constructive philosophy.[1]

The Sāṃkhya system qua system, then, is an interesting lacuna in our understanding of ancient India's first systematic philosophizing, an intriguing intellectual puzzle that requires a "constructive effort" (to use K. C. Bhattacharya's idiom) in order to piece it together, but a puzzle that if even partly unscrambled could provide many valuable perspectives for the cultural historian, the historian of philosophy, and the pure philosopher. For the cultural historian, a fuller grasp of Sāṃkhya could possibly provide improved interpretive perspectives for understanding the complex symbol systems that underlie so much of Indian religion, art, law, mythology, and medical theorizing. For the historian of Indian philosophy, a fuller grasp of the Sāṃkhya system could possibly provide a sharper awareness of the network of archaic notions and values that launched many of the first systematic reflections in Indian philosophy. For the pure philosopher, a fuller grasp of the Sāṃkhya system could possibly provide a better grasp of that set of primordial intuitions by means of which South Asians first addressed questions about being, nonbeing, change, causation, and so forth, in a systematic way—a South Asian surrogate, as it were, for a context of primordial philosophizing that thinkers such as Heideg-

ger have pursued among the pre-Socratic traditions of the Western philosophical tradition.

In any case, the task of discussing Sāṃkhya as a philosophical system involves a good deal more than historical research, philological investigation, and comparison and contrast with the agenda items of classical Indian philosophy, though, of course, such conventional approaches are a prerequisite for reaching the threshold of the system. Historical research provides some helpful bits and pieces of the puzzle, glimpses, and hints of how the Sāṃkhya methodology of enumeration slowly emerged into a conceptual system, even though the final system qua system is nowhere fully exposed in an extant text in other than a summary fashion. Philological work takes one a bit further, helping to determine the relevant set of technical terms and providing some sense of which lists and enumerations are more important than others. The Sāṃkhya texts, however, are largely laconic lists, and the later commentators are remarkably unhelpful in explaining the relevance or meaning of the various lists (and, in this sense, notably unlike the later commentators on the other systems of classical Indian philosophy). Further progress can be made by examining the manner in which Sāṃkhya is criticized in later philosophical traditions — for example, by Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi, Mallavādin, Siṃhasūri, Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, and so forth — but as was mentioned earlier this later agenda of Indian philosophy has moved considerably beyond the older Sāṃkhya speculative environment. Moreover, there remains not a single Sāṃkhya rejoinder to these ripostes by Sāṃkhya's opponents — with the possible exception of the *Yuktidīpikā*, which is clearly a Sāṃkhya polemic vis-à-vis Buddhist and Naiyāyika critiques of Sāṃkhya. Sāṃkhya's role in the history of classical Indian philosophy is comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, to that of Cārvāka materialism, that is to say, a sort of philosophical "whipping boy" abused by all but never allowed to respond — or to shift metaphors, an intellectual "paper tiger" seldom taken seriously but providing a convenient point of departure for doing other things.

In discussing Sāṃkhya philosophy, then, after one has pursued historical work as far as possible, after one has read all of the extant texts, and after one has studied all of the criticisms of Sāṃkhya in the larger classical philosophical literature, one has only attained what K. C. Bhattacharya has aptly called "... a hazy view of a grand system of speculative metaphysics." To sharpen the view, the interpreter must engage in "... supplying of missing links from one's imagination." This cannot mean, of course, inventing notions or projecting a favored perspective on the evidence that is unwarranted. The "supplying of missing links from one's imagination" means, rather, searching for relations, bundles of relations, and possible interpretive perspectives that may not be directly expressed in the texts but that bring together

the various Sāṃkhya enumerations into more coherent patterns.

To some extent, of course, the textual tradition itself offers some halting steps in this direction. The *Yuktidīpikā*, for example, offers several intriguing interpretations that provide a larger view of the Sāṃkhya system as a whole, certainly more so than the *Kārikā* itself and all of its other commentaries. Similarly, Bhāvāgaṇeśa in his *Tattvayāthārthyadīpana* (on the *Tattvasamāsa*) provides a "constructive effort" in Bhattacharya's sense, as does Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, although both of them, unfortunately, Vedānticize Sāṃkhya more than would seem warranted. Such efforts are important, however, in providing helpful clues about the manner in which the indigenous philosophical tradition interpreted the old Sāṃkhya system, as well as in warning against the dangers of bias, excessive polemic, and anachronism in any constructive undertaking.

Among modern scholarly "constructive efforts" (apart, of course, from the standard summaries of Sāṃkhya that one finds in numerous textbooks), one can identify four distinct approaches to reconstructing the Sāṃkhya system, namely, those of Richard Garbe, Surendranath Dasgupta, Erich Frauwallner, and K. C. Bhattacharya.[2] Garbe construes the old Sāṃkhya system as primarily an ancient philosophy of nature, a unique system that must have been the product of a single mind (either Kapila or Pañcaśikha) in ancient times. There is, therefore, neither a "preclassical Sāṃkhya" nor a postclassical Sāṃkhya. There is one ancient system, and one can range freely throughout the entire scope of Sāṃkhya literature in reconstructing that system.[3] Surendranath Dasgupta approaches his construction from the opposite direction. The old Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts are notoriously difficult to interpret, and it is only with Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* (in the medieval period) that one reaches a firm basis for piecing together the contours of the Sāṃkhya system as a whole. The key notions of the system, therefore, are presented through the interpretive perspective of Vijñānabhikṣu's Vedāntin metaphysics.[4] Erich Frauwallner (following the anti-Garbe polemic of Hermann Oldenberg) focuses primarily on Sāṃkhya as an important position in the history of epistemological discussions within Indian philosophy. Frauwallner construes Sāṃkhya's philosophy of nature as deriving largely from Pañcaśikha with its epistemological grounding given by Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Kārikā* is only a later summary of the system and fails to provide an adequate account of the old Sāṃkhya epistemology, which, therefore, must be reconstructed from other sources. Frauwallner relies heavily on the *Yuktidīpikā* in his construction of the final Sāṃkhya system and reconstructs Sāṃkhya cosmology from the old Purāṇas.[5] Finally, K. C. Bhattacharya construes the Sāṃkhya system as a bold "philosophy of the subject" that is ". . . based on speculative insight" and that " . . . demands imaginative-

introspective effort at every stage on the part of the interpreter." Like Dasgupta, Bhattacharya relies heavily on Vijñānabhikṣu, although Bhattacharya is much more critical in his use of Vijñānabhikṣu than is Dasgupta.[6]

Each approach is clearly a "constructive effort" and has offered important new insights in understanding the system as a whole. Striking, however, is the divergence in perspective that each approach represents. There is usually, in the history of scholarship, an overall convergence of scholarly views, but in the case of Sāṃkhya philosophy a scholarly consensus has not obtained. Garbe and Frauwallner cannot both be correct. K. C. Bhattacharya's ". . . grand system of speculative metaphysics" bears little resemblance to Garbe's ancient philosophy of nature or Frauwallner's view of Sāṃkhya as an elementary and simplistic, though nevertheless important, epistemology. Dasgupta and Bhattacharya come close to convergence in their common use of Vijñānabhikṣu, but, whereas Dasgupta sees the genius of Sāṃkhya in the explanatory power of its *guṇa* theory (as interpreted by Vijñānabhikṣu and given an updated scientific explanation by B. N. Seal), K. C. Bhattacharya identifies the genius of Sāṃkhya in its emphasis on "reflection as spiritual function" and on its being a philosophy of spontaneous freedom.

In the present chapter, rather than following any one of these ancient or modern approaches, the Sāṃkhya system is constructed in a somewhat different manner. While, of course, benefiting from, and using where appropriate the approaches already mentioned, the "constructive effort" in the present context seeks to present Sāṃkhya philosophy as a total functioning system, on analogy with what Wittgenstein calls a "complete system of human communication." or a "form of life," or a "system of thought and action" for purposes of communicating a way of life.[7] The focus, in other words, is on grasping Sāṃkhya philosophy as a systemic, synchronic, and paradigmatic network of notions in which the various transactions within the larger system come to be exhibited in a more coherent intrasystemic way. Admittedly, such an interpretive approach is not as useful for comparing and contrasting Sāṃkhya with other kinds of modeling systems in Indian philosophy (for example, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist, or Vedānta models), nor is it an especially useful approach if one is attempting a historical treatment of Sāṃkhya. It is to be noted, however, that these latter shortcomings are notoriously typical of Sāṃkhya literature itself. That is to say, the usual intersystemic polemics of Indian philosophy are glaringly absent in most Sāṃkhya literature, and more than that, there is no concern whatever in the Sāṃkhya literature for dealing with the history of the tradition. In other words, a systemic, synchronic, and paradigmatic approach may, in fact, more accurately reflect an original and authentic Sāṃkhya method of philosophizing.

At the same time, of course, it is clear enough that the Sāṃkhya system did not emerge fully grown, like Athena from the head of Zeus, even though the Sāṃkhya texts make precisely such claims for the founder of the system, Kapila.[8] Sāṃkhya philosophy was hardly the product of a single mind in ancient times, *pace* Garbe, nor was it a blurred set of intuitions that finally got its house in order through the genius of Vijñānabhikṣu, *pace* Dasgupta. The history of the tradition has already been surveyed in the last chapter and need not be repeated here, but it may be useful to summarize briefly the diachronic, locations for the synchronic system that is to be presented in the sequel, namely:

(1) There was a coherent Sāṃkhya conceptual system, often referred to as the *ṣaṣṭitantra* ("the system or science of sixty topics"), that was widely known by the year 400 of the Common Era (that is to say, the interim period that is post-Īśvarakṛṣṇa and pre-Dignāga).

(2) The conceptual system had been in existence for some centuries earlier and had been undergoing considerable modification through the work of Pañcaśikha, Vārṣagaṇya, Vindhyavāsin, and so on.

(3) There were probably a variety of attempts in this early period to summarize the basic contours of the system, but one summary came to be accepted as a standard presentation, namely, that summary as set forth in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.

(4) This system, modified in some important respects (along the lines of Vārṣagaṇya's and Vindhyavāsin's views) is the basis of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* and its commentaries.

(5) The commentaries on the *Kārikā* come considerably later, and apart from the *Yuktidīpikā*, appear to lack a firsthand grasp of the system qua system, and even the *Yuktidīpikā* presupposes the full content of the system instead of presenting that content.

(6) The *Tattvasamāsa* and the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* together with their commentaries, though undoubtedly preserving much old material, are nevertheless late texts (post-1000) that tend to interpret the old Sāṃkhya system with a notable Vedānta bias.

I. Sāṃkhya as Enumeration

Because the term "*sāṃkhya*" means "enumeration" or "relating to number," one reasonable point of departure for presenting the Sāṃkhya philosophical system as a "complete system of human communication" is to outline the more prominent sets of enumerations.

(A) *Enumerations relating to the basic principles (tattvas)*

The set of 25. First and foremost, of course, is the set of 25 that encompasses the basic principles of the system, namely:

(1) pure consciousness (*puruṣa*),
(2) primordial materiality (*mūlaprakṛti*),
(3) intellect (*buddhi* or *mahat*),
(4) egoity (*ahaṃkāra*), and
(5) mind (*manas*)—both a sense capacity and an action capacity;

(6) hearing (*śrotra*),
(7) touching (*tvac*),
(8) seeing (*cakṣus*),
(9) tasting (*rasana*), and
(10) smelling (*ghrāṇa*);
} the five sense capacities (*buddhindriyas*)

(11) speaking (*vāc*),
(12) grasping/prehending (*pāṇi*),
(13) walking/motion (*pāda*),
(14) excreting (*pāyu*), and
(15) procreating (*upastha*);
} the five action capacities (*karmendriyas*)

(16) sound (*śabda*),
(17) contact (*sparśa*),
(18) form (*rūpa*),
(19) taste (*rasa*), and
(20) smell (*gandha*);
} the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*)

(21) "space"/ether (*ākāśa*),
(22) wind/air (*vāyu*),
(23) fire (*tejas*),
(24) water (*ap*), and
(25) earth (*pṛthivī*).
} the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*)

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, among these twenty-five principles, only the first two are independent existents, namely, pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) and primordial materiality (*mūlaprakṛti*). In other words, only items (1) and (2) exist in some sense as "distinct" or "separate" from one another. The two are described in Sāṃkhya philosophy as being ungenerated, outside of ordinary space and time, stable, simple, unsupported, nonmergent (or nondissolvable), without parts, and independent (SK 10).[9] The relation between them is one of simple copresence (SK 19). Pure consciousness is inherently inactive, but primordial materiality is inherently generative in the sense that it is capable of generating a set of discrete or manifest subdivisions when activated by the catalytic presence of pure consciousness. Items (3) through (25) make up the various subdivisions of primordial materiality and are, thus, internal to primordial materiality or represent

"parts" of a totally functioning "whole," which is primordial materiality. These twenty-three subdivisions are described as being generated, temporal, spatial, unstable, composite, supported, mergent (or dissolvable), made up of parts, and contingent (SK 10). Seven of the subdivisions of primordial materiality, namely, intellect, egoity, and the five subtle elements are described as being both generated, that is to say, emergents from primordial materiality, and generative, that is to say, capable of generating subsequent subdivisions. The remaining sixteen subdivisions, namely, the mind, the five sense capacities, the five action capacities, and the five gross elements are only generated, that is to say, incapable of generating additional subdivisions. Intellect is generated out of primordial materiality but also generates egoity. Egoity is generated out of intellect but also generates the mind, the five sense capacities, the five action capacities, and the five subtle elements. The five subtle elements are generated out of egoity but also generate the five gross elements. Subtle elements are so called because they are the generic (*aviśeṣa*) material essences for all specific (*viśeṣa*) elements. They are imperceptible to ordinary persons, whereas gross elements can be perceived by ordinary persons.

The subtle elements are the generic presuppositions for the experience of all specific objectivity. Five kinds of specific sensations may be experienced, namely, specific vibrations via the ear (speaking, music, sounds, and so forth), specific contacts via the skin (hot, cold, and so forth), specific forms via the eyes (colors, shapes), specific tastes via the tongue (bitter, sweet), and specific smells via the nose. According to Sāṃkhya, the apprehension of a specific vibration is only possible if there is an undifferentiated generic receptivity for sound, or put differently, if the experiencer is in some sense actually constituted by the generic, material essence of sound, that is, actually made up of a subtle sound element. The subtle sound element itself is not any particular sound. It is the generic essence of sound, the presupposition for all particular sounds, the universal possibility of sound-as-such. Similarly, the apprehension of a specific contact is only possible if there is an undifferentiated generic receptivity for touch, the universal possibility of touch-as-such, namely, the subtle touch element, and so forth. The subtle elements, therefore, are not functions or capacities (as are, for example, the five senses or the motor capacities of an organism) nor are they the actual sense organs (eye, ear, and so forth) which, of course, are aggregates of gross elements. They are, rather, subtle, material essences or presuppositions with which perceptual and motor functioning correlate and through which certain aspects of the material world become differentiated. If such subtle, material essences or presuppositions were not present, no specific objects could possibly be experienced or become manifest, and in this sense the subtle elements correlate with and may be said to "generate" the gross elements. In

the absence of subtle elements, in other words, there would only be an unmanifest mass of primordial materiality. Some have suggested that the subtle elements might be usefully compared to Platonic ideas or universals, but it must be kept in mind that for Sāṃkhya all such ideas or universals have some sort of subtle, material basis (requiring, in other words, a reconceptualization of idealism in terms of reductive materialism, as will be discussed further in the sequel).[10]

Regarding the manner in which gross elements are derived from subtle elements, the important Sāṃkhya texts differ, suggesting that the manner of derivation was an open issue even in the classical period. The *Kārikā* itself simply asserts that the five gross elements are derived from the five subtle elements (SK 22 and 28). Some commentaries (*The Tattvakaumudī*, *Māṭharavṛtti*, *Jayamaṅgalā*, and so forth) argue for a so-called "accumulation theory" of derivation, according to which each successive subtle element combines with the preceding ones in order to generate a gross element.[11] The subtle sound element generates the space/ether gross element (*ākāśa*); the subtle touch element and the subtle sound element generate the gross air/wind element (*vāyu*); the subtle form element with the subtle sound and touch elements generate the gross fire element (*tejas*); the subtle taste element with subtle sound, touch, and form elements generate the gross water element (*āp*); and the subtle smell element with the subtle sound, touch, form, and taste elements generate the gross earth element (*pṛthivī*). According to the *Yuktidīpikā* (Pandeya edition, p. 91 and pp. 117-118, and hereafter all page references are to the Pandeya edition), this "accumulation theory" is attributed to Vārṣagaṇya. The commentary of Gauḍapāda argues, however, that each subtle element is capable of generating each gross element singly. The Chinese commentary on the *Kārikā* offers yet another interpretation.[12] According to it, each subtle element generates not only a respective gross element but a respective sense capacity as well. Thus, the subtle sound element generates not only *ākāśa* but also the sense capacity of hearing (*śrotra*), and so forth. Although an attractive idea, it tends to confuse the actual physical sense organ with an actual sense capacity. This may well be an old notion, but it is hard to imagine that the final philosophical system would have settled for such a view. Still other East Asian commentaries offer further interpretations, according to one of which the five subtle elements generate not only gross elements (in an accumulation manner) but the entire set of eleven sense and action capacities as well.[13] For Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the classical tradition, however, it is clear enough that the five subtle elements are only generative of the five gross elements (and not the various sense and action capacities), although the manner of derivation was evidently a continuing matter of debate. All specific objects (*viṣaya*) in the phenomenal empirical world of ordinary experience are collocations or aggregations of the various

gross elements and are never themselves numbered as basic principles.

Given these various distinctions regarding their derivation, the initial listing of 25 principles may now be more precisely exhibited in a chart.



Principles (5) through (15), and (21) through (25) are generated products (*vikāra*, SK 3).[14] Principles (3), (4), and (16) through (20) are both generative and generated (*prakṛti-vikṛti*, SK 3). Principle (2) is generative but ungenerated (*avikṛti*), and (1) is neither generative nor generated (*na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ*, SK 3).

The set of 3. Principles (3), (4), and (5), namely, intellect, egoity, and mind, taken together are referred to as the "internal organ" (*antaḥkaraṇa*, SK 33), and their three respective functions are "reflective discerning" (*adhyavasāya*), "self-awareness" (*abhimāna*), and "intentionality" (*saṃkalpaka*). Together they perform the task of intellectual awareness, which functions not only in immediate experience but encompasses the past and future as well (SK 33).

The set of 10. Items (6) through (10), and (11) through (15), namely, the five sense capacities and the five motor functions, taken together are referred to as the "external organ" (*bāhyakaraṇa*, SK 33), and their respective activities provide mere sensings (*ālocanamātra*, SK 28), namely, hearing, touching, and so forth; and basic motor skills, namely, speaking, grasping, and so forth (SK 28). These operate only in immediate or present experience (SK 33).

The set of 13. Items (3) through (15), namely, intellect, egoity, mind, the five sense capacities, and the five motor functions, taken together are referred to as the "thirteenfold instrument" (*trayodaśakaraṇa*, SK32), or what is often called simply the "essential core" (*liṅga*, SK 40), which is the presupposition for all experience. The

"thirteenfold instrument" or *liṅga* functions as a whole by "seizing" (*āharaṇa*) (presumably through the motor capacities), "holding" (*dhāraṇa*) (presumably through the sense capacities), and "illuminating" (*prakāśa*) (presumably through the "internal organ") (SK 32).[15] The tenfold "external" divisions of the *liṅga* are referred to as the "doors" (*dvāra*) of awareness, and the three divisions of the "internal organ" are referred to as the "door-keepers" (*dvārins*) (SK 35).

The set of 17. Items (4) through (20) represent the structure of egoity (*ahaṃkāra*), and it should be noted, therefore, that "self-awareness," according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, is a complex phenomenon encompassing mental states (mind, sense capacities, and motor functioning) and physical components (the subtle elements).[16]

The set of 18. Items (3) through (20), namely, intellect, egoity, mind, the five sense capacities, the five motor functions, and the five subtle elements, taken together are referred to as the "subtle body" (*liṅgaśarīra* or *sūkṣmaśarīra*), which is detachable from any particular gross body and is, therefore, capable of transmigration in a continuing series of gross embodiments.[17] Gross bodies (*sthūlaśarīra*) are one-time-only aggregations of gross elements. In the case of human gross bodies, these are genetically derived from mother and father (with hair, blood, and flesh from the maternal line, and bone, tendon, and marrow from the paternal line). Such human gross bodies are "womb born" (*jarāyuja*) and become enlivened when linked with a transmigrating "subtle body." There are also "egg born" (*aṇḍaja*), "seed born" (*udbhijja*) and "moisture born" (*svedaja*) gross bodies for other sorts of sentient beings (and see *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 120 on SK 39).

(B) *Enumerations relating to the fundamental predispositions* (*bhāva*).

The set of 8. Inherent to the intellect, in addition to its basic *tattva* nature of reflective discerning, is a set of 8 fundamental predispositions (*bhāva*) or instinctual tendencies that guide the life-trajectory of a sentient being, namely:

(1) the predisposition toward meritorious behavior (*dharma*),
(2) the predisposition toward knowledge (*jñāna*),
(3) the predisposition toward nonattachment (*vairāgya*),
(4) the predisposition toward power (*aiśvarya*),
(5) the predisposition toward demeritorious behavior (*adharma*),
(6) the predisposition toward ignorance (*ajñāna*),
(7) the predisposition toward attachment (*avairāgya*), and
(8) the predisposition toward impotence (*anaiśvarya*) (SK 23).

Whereas reflective discerning represents the material dimension of *buddhi*, the fundamental predispositions represent the "efficient" possibilities of the *buddhi*. The fundamental predispositions, therefore, are

called "efficient causes" (*nimittas*) and are correlated with eight resulting (*naimittika*) trajectories, namely:

(1) the tendency to move upward in the cycle of transmigration (*ūrdhva*),
(2) the tendency to move toward final release (*apavarga*),
(3) the tendency to move toward merger in primal materiality (*prakṛtilaya*),
(4) the tendency to move toward increasing control over life (*avighāta*),
(5) the tendency to move downward in the cycle of transmigration (*adhastāt*),
(6) the tendency to move toward increasing attachment and bondage (*bandha*),
(7) the tendency to move toward further involvement in transmigration (*saṃsāra*),
(8) the tendency to move toward declining control over life (*vighāta*) (SK 42-45).

The fundamental predispositions are innate or inherent (*sāṃsiddhika* or *prākṛtika*), but they can be modified (*vaikṛta*) in terms of intensity or dominance of one (or more) over another (or others) through the cycle of continuing transmigration (SK 43). The "essential core" (*liṅga*) or the subtle body carries a particular constellation of these predispositions as it proceeds in the process of rebirth, and a particular sentient being, which becomes enlivened by the coalescence of a *liṅga* with a gross body, is, as it were, "coded" or "programmed" at birth by these tendencies and, hence, predisposed to a certain life trajectory.

Comparing this set of 8 predispositions with the earlier set of 25 basic principles, it is perhaps helpful to use a computer or a linguistic metaphor. Regarding a computer metaphor, it might be suggested that the set of 25 basic principles is the "hardware" of the Sāṃkhya system, whereas the set of 8 predispositions with the resultant trajectories represents the "software" of the Sāṃkhya system. Or, using a metaphor from linguistics, it might be suggested that the set of 25 basic principles represents the deep structural "syntactic" component of the Sāṃkhya system, whereas the set of 8 predispositions with the resultant trajectories represents the deep structural "semantic" component of the Sāṃkhya system. In any case, the Sāṃkhya system asserts that these two sets are fundamental and presuppose one another.

> The *liṅga* (namely the realm of *tattvas*) cannot function without the *bhāvas*. The *bhāvas* cannot function without the *liṅga*. Therefore, a two fold creation (*sarga*) operates (or functions) called *liṅga* and *bhāva*. (SK 52).

The set of 5 *life breaths* (*vāyu prāṇa*). In addition to the set of 8 fundamental predispositions that determine the life trajectory of an organism,

a particular life-support system is also necessary for the maintenance of a given life. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, this support system is provided by a network of five "winds" or "breaths," namely:

(1) "respiration" or "breathing" (*prāṇa*), located in the heart primarily, but also circulating in the mouth, nose, and lungs,
(2) "excretion" or "disposing breath" (*apāna*), located in the navel and lower portions of the body,
(3) "digestion" or "nutrient breath" (*samāna*), located primarily in the region between the navel and the heart, but carrying nutrients equally to all parts of the body,
(4) "cognition" or "up breath" (*udāna*), located primarily in the nose and brain and enabling an organism to utter intelligible sounds (communication, language, and so forth), and
(5) "homeostasis" or "diffused breath" (*vyāna*), pervading the entire body and presumably maintaining the general physical and emotional balance of an organism (SK 29).

The author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, interestingly, further relates these biological "winds" or "breaths" to certain external or social tendencies as well, with *prāṇa* being related to social obedience, *apāna* being related to striving for a higher or lower social status, *samāna* being associated with social cooperation, *udāna* being related to a sense of social superiority, and *vyāna* being linked with a strong sense of devotion or any deep bond of love (*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 106 on SK 29).

The set of 5 *sources of action* (*karmayoni*). Although the *Kārikā* does not mention the set of 5 *karmayonis*, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* indicates that the set of sources of action is related to the set of 5 "winds" or "breaths" just enumerated (*Yuktidīpikā*, pp. 107-108). The set explains the basic motivations for the maintenance of life, namely:

(1) "perseverance" (*dhṛti*), an organism's innate urge to follow through over a given period of time on a particular trajectory,
(2) "faith" (*śraddhā*), an organism's innate urge to maintain a trajectory on the basis of belief or trust in the validity of a social or religious heritage,
(3) "the desire for satisfaction" (*sukha* or *icchā*,) an organism's innate urge to seek its own self-gratification.
(4) "the desire to know" (*vividiṣā*), an organism's innate urge to be curious and critical, and
(5) "the desire not to know" (*avividiṣā*), an organism's innate urge to be insufficiently discriminating.

The sources of action are also mentioned in the *Tattvasamāsa* (*sūtra* 9) and appear just before the five "breaths" or "winds," lending perhaps some support to the *Yuktidīpikā's* claim that the sources of action should be construed together with the breaths. The commentaries vary widely in their interpretations of the sources of action, possibly suggesting that they are very old notions that eventually became less important as the

system developed. In any case, the sources of action appear to be related to the same sorts of concerns that find expression in the set of 8 predispositions, that is to say, basic attitudes and dispositions that propel an organism in a given direction. Unlike the predispositions, however, which are quite unconscious and represent the inherited karmic propensities of an organism, the sources of action appear to be conscious and could presumably represent the dispositional possibilities available to an organism in any given life. Furthermore, it would appear that these sources of action can be construed either positively or negatively.[18] Positively, they would suggest that an organism can be disciplined, faithful, pleasant, thoughful, and circumspect in avoiding matters that cannot be known. Negatively, they would suggest that an organism can be stubborn, gullible, pleasure seeking, overly critical, or skeptical, and insensitive or thick headed regarding obvious truths.

(C) *Enumerations relating to the phenomenal, empirical world of ordinary life* (*pratyayasarga*) (*bhautikasarga*).

The set of 50 "*categories*" (*padārthas*). The set of 25 basic principles interacting with the set of 8 predispositions within the intellect generate what the Sāṃkhya system calls the "phenomenal creation" (*pratyayasarga*), made up of the set of 5 fundamental "misconceptions" (*viparyayas*), the set of 28 "dysfunctions" (*aśaktis*), the set of 9 "contentments" (*tuṣṭis*) and the set of 8 "spiritual attainments" (*siddhis*). Taken together, they are referred to as the set of 50 "categories," namely:

(1-5) the five categories of fundamental misconception (*viparyaya*) with the ancient technical names *tamas*, *moha*, *mahāmoha*, *tāmisra*, and *andhatāmisra* (or, according to Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, called the five "afflictions" or *kleśas*, namely, *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *abhiniveśa*):[19]

(1) "darkness" (*tamas*) or "ignorance" (*avidyā*), described as having 8 subdivisions in the sense that there is a failure to discriminate (*aviveka*) pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) from the eight generative principles (or, in other words, the failure to distinguish *puruṣa* from primordial materiality, intellect, egoity, and the five subtle elements) (SK 48),

(2) "confusion" (*moha*) or preoccupation with one's own identity (*asmitā*), also described as having 8 subdivisions in the sense that finite beings seek to overcome their finitude by pursuing the eight well-known omnipotent or supernatural powers (*siddhis*) (including becoming atomic in size, becoming exceedingly large in size, becoming light or buoyant, becoming heavy, becoming all-pervasive, attaining all desires, gaining lordship over elemental forces and immediate gratification) (SK.48),

(3) "extreme confusion" (*mahāmoha*) or passionate attachment (*rāga*), described as having 10 subdivisions either (a) in the sense that one becomes attached to the five subtle elements and the five gross elements (according to most of the *Kārikā* commentaries) or (b) in the sense that one becomes attached to the 10 basic social relationships (including father, mother, son, brother, sister, wife, daughter, teacher, friend, or colleague) (according to the *Yuktidīpikā* under SK 48), (4)"gloom" (*tāmisra*) or aversion (*dveṣa*), described as having 18 subdivisions in the sense that one becomes frustrated and cynical because of the failure to attain the eight conventional *siddhis* or supernatural attainments and one becomes angry or hateful toward the tenfold material existence (subtle and gross) or the 10 basic social relationships (SK 48), and (5) "utter darkness" (*andhatāmisra*) or the instinctive fear of death (*abhiniveśa*), described also as having 18 subdivisions in the sense that although one has become cynical about material and social life one nevertheless clings to it tenaciously (SK 48). These five fundamental "misconceptions" with their 62 subdivisions are characteristic of most conventional sentient life and represent the core afflictions of ordinary finite existence;

(6-33) the twenty-eight categories of perceptual, motor, and mental dysfunction (*aśakti*), 11 of which are correlated with disorders of the five sense capacities (for example, deafness, blindness, and so forth), the five motor capacities, and the mind, and 17 of which are correlated with disorders of the intellect (the number 17 representing the negation of the 9 *tuṣṭis* and 8 *siddhis* next to be described) (SK 49);

(34-42) the nine categories for a reasonably balanced and conventional mendicant life, the contentments (*tuṣṭi*), described as referring to certain more advanced forms of sentient life who have not yet overcome the first of the fundamental misconceptions but who have made considerable progress in understanding sentient existence, both internally (in terms of a proper conception of primordial materiality, a proper conception of the appropriate means for living a conventional mendicant existence, a proper conception of delayed gratification, and the ability to withstand the vicissitudes of ordinary existence) and externally (in terms of not being excessively attached to the fivefold structure of material existence and thereby not being involved in the acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, or injury of ordinary worldly life) (SK49);

(43-50) the eight categories that represent the authentic attainments (*siddhi*) (in contrast to the conventional supernatural

attainments as already described above under "confusion") that are conducive to final discrimination and release, namely:

(43) rational reflection and reasoning (ūha),
(44) appropriate verbal instruction from a qualified teacher (*śabda*),
(45) careful study (*adhyayana*),
(46) thoughtful discussion with appropriate peers (*suhṛtprāpti*),
(47) an open yet disciplined temperament (*dāna*),
(48) a progressive overcoming of the frustrations of body and mind,
(49) a progressive overcoming of the frustrations of material and social existence, and
(50) a progressive overcoming of the frustrations related to the cycle of rebirth and transmigration (the three being construed together and referring to overcoming the three kinds of frustration or *duḥkhatraya*) (SK 51).[20]

The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* correlates this set of 50 categories with the set of the 8 predispositions in the following fashion: the primacy of the predisposition toward ignorance (*ajñāna*) accompanied by nonmerit (*adharma*), passionate attachment (*avairāgya*), and impotence (*anaiśvarya*) generates the fundamental misconceptions (*viparyaya*) that are at the core of most ordinary sentient life; the primacy of the predisposition toward impotence (*anaiśvarya*), accompanied by *adharma*, *ajñāna*, and *avairāgya* generates the disorders of perceptual, motor, and mental functioning (*aśakti*); the primacy of the predisposition toward non-attachment (*vairāgya*), accompanied by *dharma* and *aiśvarya*, generates conventional mendicant life (*tuṣṭi*); and the predisposition toward knowledge (*jñāna*) generates the spiritual attainments (*siddhi*) conducive to final discrimination and release (*Yuktidīpikā*, pp. 124-136). The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* also relates the set of 50 categories to an old creation myth, thereby linking the *pratyayasarga* or "phenomenal creation" to what is apparently an archaic cosmogony reminiscent of the old Upaniṣads. According to the myth, at the beginning of the world cycle, the Great Being (*māhātmyaśarīra*, presumably Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha), though endowed with all the requisite organs, was nevertheless alone and needed offspring to perform his work (*karman*). Meditating, he first created from his mind a set of 5 "fundamental streams" (*mukhyasrotas*), but he found them insufficient for satisfying his needs. He next created a set of 28 "horizontal streams" (*tiryaksrotas*) but again was dissatisfied. He then created a set of 9 "upward moving streams" (*ūrdhvasrotas*), but his work still could not be accomplished. Finally, he created a set of 8 "downward streams" (*arvāksrotas*), which did fulfil his needs. These streams (*srotas*), of course, are the

5 *viparyayas*, the 28 *aśaktis*, the 9 *tuṣṭis* and the 8 *siddhis*. The fundamental streams are characteristic of the plant realm (or the simplest forms of life). The twenty-eight horizontal streams are characteristic of the realm of animals, birds, and insects. The nine upward streams are characteristic of the divine realm, and the eight downward streams are characteristic of the human realm (*Yuktidīpikā* on SK 46, p. 127).

The set of 14 *types* (*caturdaśavidha*) *of sentient life* (*bhautikasarga*). There are fourteen levels or realms of sentient creatures "from Brahmā down to a blade of grass" (SK 53-54):

(1) the realm of Brahmā,
(2) the realm of Prajāpati,
(3) the realm of Indra,
(4) the realm of the Pitṛs,
(5) the realm of the Gandharvas,
(6) the realm of the Yakṣas or Nāgas,
(7) the realm of the Rakṣases, and
(8) the realm of the Piśācas.

} The eightfold celestial realms (*daiva*)

(9) the human realm (*mānuṣaka*)

(10) the realm of (domestic) animals (*paśu*),
(11) the realm of (wild) animals (*mṛga*)
(12) the realm of birds and flying insects (*pakṣin*),
(13) the realm of crawling creatures (*sarīsṛpa*), and
(14) the realm of plants and immovables (*sthāvara*).

} fivefold animal and plant realms (*tairyagyona*)

The set is obviously a hierarchical cosmology or cosmogony encompassing the divine or celestial realm (*adhidaiva*), the external natural world (*adhibhūta*) apart from the human condition, and the human realm (*adhyātma*), and it is within these realms that one encounters the three kinds of frustration (*duḥkhatraya*) SK 55 and SK 1). The human realm and the animal/plant realm are relatively easy to understand. The divine or celestial realm, however, is not as clear, but there are some passages in the *Yuktidīpikā* that offer some clarification. From one point of view, the divine realm is the realm of the *māhātmyaśariras*, Brahmā, Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, and so forth, who perform specific tasks (*adhikāra*) in the cosmos and who are able to generate their own bodies by a simple act of will. From another point of view, the divine realm is the realm of the great Sāṃkhya precursors, especially Kapila who emerges at the beginning of the world cycle fully endowed with the positive fundamental predispositions of meritorious behavior, knowledge, renunciation, and power. Kapila passes on his knowledge to six other great Sāṃkhya *sādhus*, namely, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Āsuri, Voḍhu, and Pañcaśikha, and an old verse refers to the group together as the "seven great seers" (*saptamaharṣis*) (quoted by Gauḍapāda under SK. 1). From still another point of view, the divine realm is clearly

linked up with the process of transmigration through the heavenly spheres. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, in explaining the adjectives "*sāṃsiddhika*," "*prākṛta*," and "*vaikṛta*" as modifiers of the term "*bhāva*" in verse 43 of the *Kārikā* (*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 124) comments that those beings endowed with "modified" (*vaikṛta*) predispositions transmigrate in the usual fashion through a continuing process of rebirth, (b) those beings endowed with "inherently powerful" (*prākṛta*) predispositions (namely, the *māhātmyaśarīras*, or Great Beings) can generate whatever bodies they wish; and (c) those beings endowed with "innate" (*sāṃsiddhika*) or perfect predispositions have subtle bodies that transmigrate among "the planets, the lunar mansions, and the stars" (*grahaṇakṣatratārādi*). Furthermore, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* introduces a mythical scheme of "six ways of reproduction" (*ṣaṭsiddhi*) that was presumably an ancient way of explaining the manner in which divine realm reproduction differs from natural reproduction. According to the myth (*Yuktidīpikā*, pp.120-121), in the time prior to creaton, spiritual entities simply willed or desired themselves into existence. Such is the *manaḥsiddhi* or the "spiritual power of simple willing or desire." When this capacity became weakened, entities reproduced themselves with the "spiritual power of amorous glances" (*cakṣuḥsiddhi*). When this became weakened, reproduction occurred by the "spiritual power of speaking with one another" (*vāksiddhi*). When this weakened, reproduction took place by the "spiritual power of touching" (*hastasiddhi*). When this weakened, reproduction occurred through the "spiritual power of embracing" (*āśleṣasiddhi*). Finally, when even this weakened, reproduction required the "spiritual power of sexual intercourse" (*dvandvasiddhi*), and from then onward the ordinary process of transmigration was in operation.[21]

The *daiva* realm is given a further explication in the late text, *Kramadīpikā*, and although it is difficult to be sure if the interpretation therein is an authentic reading of the old Sāṃkhya philosophy, it nevertheless provides an interesting set of correlations. In explaining *sūtra* 7 of the *Tattvasamāsa* (namely, "*adhyātmam adhibhūtam adhidaivataṃ ca*") the author of the *Kramadīpikā* offers the following correlations:[22]

	adhyātma	*adhibhūta*	*adhidaiva*
(1)	intellect (*buddhi*)	what can be ascertained (*boddhavya*)	Brahmā
(2)	egoity (*ahaṃkāra*)	what can be thought (*mantavya*)	Rudra
(3)	mind (*manas*)	what can be intended (*saṃkalpitavya*)	Candra

(4)	hearing	what can be heard	Diś
(5)	touching	what can be touched	Vāyu
(6)	seeing	what can be seen	Āditya
(7)	tasting	what can be tasted	Varuṇa
(8)	smelling	what can be smelled	Pṛthivī
(9)	speaking	what can be spoken	Agni
(10)	grasping	what can be grasped	Indra
(11)	walking	what can be gone to	Viṣṇu
(12)	excreting	what can be expelled	Mitra
(13)	procreating	what can be sexually enjoyed	Prajāpati

The scheme in the *Kramadipikā* is clearly different from the scheme of Īśvarakṛṣṇa in *Kārikā* 53, but both schemes may well have in common a tendency to make the divine realm recapitulate the human realm (or vice versa, of course). In this regard one wonders if Īśvarakṛṣṇa's scheme in *Kārikā* 53 might be a recapitulation, for example, of the old eightfold *prakṛti*,[23] namely:

(1)	primordial materiality (*avyakta* or *prakṛti*)	(1)	Brahmā
(2)	intellect (*buddhi*)	(2)	Prajāpati
(3)	egoity (*ahaṃkāra*)	(3)	Indra
(4)	sound-*tanmātra* or space/ether (*bhūta*)	(4)	Pitṛs
(5)	touch-*tanmātra* or wind (*bhūta*)	(5)	Gandharvas
(6)	form-*tanmātra* or fire (*bhūta*)	(6)	Yakṣas or Nāgas
(7)	taste-*tanmātra* or water (*bhūta*)	(7)	Rakṣases
(8)	smell-*tanmātra* or earth (*bhūta*)	(8)	Piśācas

Or possibly the first three levels of the divine realm may be a recapitulation of the threefold "internal organ" in the following fashion:[24]

(1) intellect	(1) Brahmā
(2) egoity	(2) Prajāpati
(3) mind	(3) Indra
(4) sound or space/ether	(4) Pitṛs
(5) touch or wind	(5) Gandharvas
(6) form or fire	(6) Yakṣas or Nāgas
(7) taste or water	(7) Rakṣases
(8) smell or earth	(8) Piśācas

One also wonders if a similar recapitulation may be operating with respect to the action capacities in relation to the mythical notion of "the six ways of reproduction" in the following fashion:[25]

(1) *buddhi/ahaṃkāra/manas*	(1) *manaḥsiddhi*
(2) speaking	(2) *vāksiddhi*
(3) grasping	(3) *hastasiddhi*
(4) walking	(4) *cakṣuḥsiddhi*
(5) expelling	(5) *āśleṣasiddhi*
(6) procreating	(6) *dvandvasiddhi*

Such reconstructions are admittedly risky and may well be wrong, but there is ample evidence in the texts that the old Sāṃkhya teachers did make methodological use of correlations and recapitulations in their speculative attempts to synthesize an overall view of the world.

Thus far, three kinds of Sāṃkhya enumerations have been presented, and it may be useful to pause at this point to summarize in outline form the material that has been covered.

(A) Enumerations relating to the basic principles:
- (1) The set of 25 principles;
  - (a) The set of 2 principles that are actually distinct or separate, namely, pure consciousness and primordial materiality;
  - (b) The set of 23 subdivisions of primordial materiality;
    - (i) The set of 7 that are generated and also generative, including intellect, egoity, and the five subtle elements;
    - (ii) The set of 16 products that are generated but not generative, including mind, the five senses, the five motor capacities, and the five gross elements;
- (2) The set of 3 making up the "internal organ," including intellect, egoity, and mind;
- (3) The set of 10 making up the "external organ," including the five senses and the five motor capacities;
- (4) The set of 13 making up the "essential core" that is a prerequisite for experience, a combination of the threefold internal organ and the tenfold external organ;
- (5) The set of 17 representing the complex mental and physical structure of egoity;

(6) The set of 18 making up the "subtle body" that transmigrates through successive rebirths, including the thirteenfold *liṅga* together with the five subtle elements;[26]

(7) Collocations of gross elements that generate one-time-only gross bodies that are womb-born, egg-born, seed-born, and moisture-born.

(B) Enumerations relating to the fundamental predispositions:

(1) The set of 8 predispositions inherent in the intellect, carried by the essential core in the course of transmigration, "coding" or "programming" a particular life trajectory in successive rebirths, including meritorious behavior, knowledge, nonattachment, power, demeritorious behavior, ignorance, attachment, and impotence—called also "efficient causes";

(2) The set of 8 resultant life trajectories, including moving upward, final release, dissolution in primordial materiality, nonrestraint, moving downward, bondage, transmigration, and declining control;

(3) The set of 5 "winds" or "breaths" that support the embodied condition;

(4) The set of 5 sources of action that enable an organism to persevere through an embodiment;

(C) Enumerations relating to the phenomenal, empirical world of ordinary life:

(1) The set of 50 categories or the phenomenal creation;

(a) The set of 5 fundamental misconceptions; 62 subdivisions;

(b) The set of 28 dysfunctions;

(c) The set of 9 contentments;

(d) The set of 8 spiritual attainments;

(2) The set of 50 "streams," which cosmologically recapitulate the 50 *padārthas*;

(a) The set of 5 *mukhyasrotas* (plant and other simple life forms);

(b) The set of 28 *tiryaksrotas* (animal life);

(c) The set of 9 *ūrdhvasrotas* (divine or celestial realms);

(d) The set of 8 *arvāksrotas* (human realm);

(3) The set of 14 levels of sentient life, including the eightfold celestial realm, the one human realm, and the fivefold animal and plant realm, or, in other words, *adhidaiva*, *adhyātma*, and *adhibhūta*;[27]

(4) The set of 6 "spiritual powers, of reproduction" (*ṣaṭsiddhis*) (in descending order from mind-only, amorous glances, speaking, touching, embracing and, finally, sexual intercourse).

When one inquires into the manner in which these three kinds of enu-

merations are related to one another, a crucial clue is available from the *Yuktidīpikā*. In referring to the various levels of creation in the Sāṃkhya system (*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 21, on SK 2), the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* offers the following observation concerning the manifest world (*vyakta*):

> The manifest world has three dimensions: (1) a "form (*rūpa*) dimension, (b) a "projective" (*pravṛtti*) dimension, and (c) a "consequent" (*phala*) dimension. To be specific, the "form" dimension is made up of intellect, egoity, the five subtle elements, the eleven sense and motor capacities, and the five gross elements. The "projective" dimension, generally speaking, is twofold: getting what is advantageous (*hitakāmaprayojana*) and avoiding what is disadvantageous (*ahitakāmaprayojana*). Specifically, it involves the various functions of the "sources of action" and the maintenance of life (*prāṇa*, and so forth) in terms of the five "winds." The "consequent" dimension is (likewise) twofold, namely, the perceptible, manifest, or apparent (*dṛṣṭa*) and the imperceptible or latent (*adṛṣṭa*). The perceptible or manifest relates to the attainments, contentments, dysfunctions, and fundamental misconceptions. The imperceptible or latent relates to the acquisition of a particular body in the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*) within the hierarchy of manifest life from the realm of the gods (Brahmā, and so forth) to simple plant life.[28]

Elsewhere, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* refers to the three dimensions of the manifest world with a slightly different terminology, namely, under SK 56 (p. 140):

> (There is a dimension) called *tattva*, made up of intellect and so forth; (a dimension) called *bhāva*, made up of meritorious behavior, and so forth; (and a dimension) called *bhūta*, made up of the atmosphere, and so forth.[29]

Bringing together, then, the three kinds of enumerations presented thus far with these references from the *Yuktidīpikā*, there would appear to be three distinct yet related dimensions in the full Sāṃkhya system:

(A) The "constitutive" dimension, referred to as the "form" (*rūpa*), the "principle" (*tattva*) or the "essential core" (*liṅga*) realm;

(B) The "projective" dimension, referred to as the "projecting" or the "intentional" (*pravṛtti*), the "predispositional" (*bhāva*), or the "efficient cause and effect" (*nimittanaimittika*) realm; and

(C) The "consequent" dimension, referred to as the "resultant" (*phala*), the "creaturely" or "what has become" (*bhūta*), or the "phenomenal creation" (*pratyayasarga*) realm, or, in other words, the phenomenal, empirical world of ordinary experience (*bhautikasarga*).

Dimensions (A) and (B) interact or combine with one another in gene-

rating dimension (C). Referring once again to the computer and linguistic metaphors mentioned earlier, if (A) is the "hardware" of the Sāṃkhya system and (B) the "software," then dimension (C) is, as it were, the "printout" of the functioning system. Or, again, if dimension (A) is the deep-structural "syntactic" component of the Sāṃkhya system, and dimension (B) the deep-structural "semantic" component of the system, then dimension (C) is, as it were, the surface-structural phonological component. Such metaphors, of course, are only rough approximations, but they have at least a heuristic value in directing attention to the systemic aspects of the old Sāṃkhya philosophy.

II. Sāṃkhya as Process Materialism

At the outset of the discussion of Sāṃkhya enumerations, primordial materiality was described as being inherently generative, but attention was thereafter focused on the various principles, predispositions, and categories of the Sāṃkhya world view, or what the *Yuktidīpikā* calls the "constitutive" or "form" (*rūpa*) realm, the "projective" or "intentional" (*pravṛtti*) realm, and the "consequent" or "resultant" (*phala*) realm. As a result, the basic components and core structures of the Sāṃkhya world have been exhibited, but little has been said about the Sāṃkhya conceptualization of the inner essence or the underlying reality of primordial materiality itself. Regarding this latter issue, Sāṃkhya philosophy makes use of a formulation that is unique in the history of Indian philosophy (and unique, for that matter, in the general history of philosophy as well), namely, the notion of *triguṇa* or *traiguṇya*, which may be translated in this context as "tripartite constituent process."

The word "*guṇa*" in Sanskrit usually means a "cord," "string," or "thread." The term can refer to a "rope" or to the various "strands" that make up a rope. Moreover, the word can be used in the sense of "secondary" or "subordinate," and in much of Indian philosophical discussion (for example, especially in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) the term is used to refer to the notion of a "quality" or "attribute" of a "substance" (*dravya*) or thing. The term also comes to be employed in moral discourse, so that "*guṇa*" may refer to "outstanding merit" or "moral excellence."

In Sāṃkhya philosophy, however, the term takes on a peculiar technical sense, which combines many of the above meanings but goes much further as well. On one level in Sāṃkhya, *guṇa* is a "cord" or "thread," a constituent "strand" of primordial materiality. On another level, *guṇa* is "secondary" or "subordinate" in the sense that it is secondary to what is primary or principal (*pradhāna*). On still another level, *guṇa* implies moral distinctions in that it refers to the activity of *prakṛti* as the basis of satisfaction, frustration, and confusion, or moral excel-

lence, moral decadence, and amoral indifference. On yet other levels, *guṇa* refers to aesthetic and intellectual matters and is said to pervade the entire sphere of ordinary experience. The term "*guṇa*," in other words, comes to encompass, according to Sāṃkhya, the entire range of subjective and objective reality, whether manifest (*vyakta*) or unmanifest (*avyakta*). It becomes the "thread" that runs through all of ordinary experience and throughout the natural world, tying together, as it were, the *tattva* realm, the *bhāva* realm, and the *bhūta* realm.

In attempting to understand the Sāṃkhya notion of *guṇa*, it is important to recognize at the outset that *guṇa* is never enumerated or counted as a *tattva*, a *bhāva*, or a *bhūta* (that is to say, *guṇa* is never included within the list of 25 *tattvas*). It is not an "entity," a "predisposition," or a phenomenal "structure," nor is it any combination of these, although, to be sure, it is presupposed in the formulation of all entities, predispositions, and structures. Moreover, although three *guṇas* are mentioned, namely, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, the basic Sāṃkhya conceptualization is that of one, continuous and unique process with three discernible "moments" or "constituents." There is one continuous process of transformation (*pariṇāma*), which is the inherent generativity of primordial materiality, but this one continuous process manifests itself in three inextricably related "constituents" that intensionally define the unique, continuous process itself. Rather than referring to "three" *guṇas*, therefore, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to a "tripartite process," which the Sanskrit language permits with such expressions as "*triguṇa*" or another word meaning the same thing, "*traiguṇya*" (meaning "possessed of three constituents" or "the state or condition of being made up of three constituents").

This tripartite process, which *is* primordial materiality, may be described either with reference to objectivity or with reference to subjectivity, because, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the tripartite process underlies both sorts of descriptions. From an objective perspective, Sāṃkhya describes the tripartite process as a continuing flow of primal material energy that is capable of spontaneous activity (*rajas*), rational ordering (*sattva*), and determinate formulation or objectivation (*tamas*). Primal material energy can activate or externalize (*pravṛtti, cala*) itself in a manner that is transparent or intelligible (*laghu, prakāśaka*) and substantial or determinate (*guru, niyama*), and all manifestations of primary material energy are, therefore, purposeful, coherent, and objective. From a subjective perspective, Sāṃkhya describes the tripartite process as a continuing flow of experience that is capable of prereflective spontaneous desiring or longing (*rajas*), reflective discerning or discriminating (*sattva*), and continuing awareness of an opaque, enveloping world (*tamas*). The continuing flow of experience actively seeks continuing gratification (*cala, upaṣṭambhaka*), reflectively discerns the intelligible dimensions within the flow of experience (*prakhyā,*

prakāśa), and continually encounters contents within experience that are opaque (*varaṇaka*) and oppressive (*viṣāda*). Moreover, the quest for gratification is frequently frustrated (*duḥkha*), and, although there are occasional times of reflective discernment that bring satisfaction (*sukha*), there are also moments when experience is completely overwhelmed by the sheer plenitude of the world (*moha*). In everyday, ordinary life, therefore, experience tends to vacilate between the discomforting failure (*ghora*) to attain gratification, occasional moments of reflective comprehension that bring a sense of comfort (*śānta*), and moments of confused (*mūḍha*) uncertainty.

Philosophy (*jijñāsā*) begins, according to Sāṃkhya, as a result of the experience of failure and frustration and represents a desire to overcome that frustration. Reflection reveals, however, what might be called a double-bind problem. There is, first of all, the recognition of tripartite process within the flow of experience itself, that is to say, the realization that frustration (*ghora, duḥkha*) is but a moment or modality inextricably linked with occasional other moments of comfort (*śānta, sukha*) and confused uncertainty (*mūḍha, moha*). There is no possibility, in other words, of permanently overcoming frustration without also relinquishing the other constituents of the tripartite process that are inextricably allied with it. The constituents of the tripartite process presuppose one another in a dialectical fashion. There can be no gratification unless there is something external to be appropriated; there can be no reflective discerning in the absence of discernibles; and there can be no confused uncertainty in the absence of someone seeking discernment. Thus, the constituents of the tripartite process are described as being "mutually dominant over, dependent upon, generative of, and cooperative with, one another" (*anyonyāśrayajananamithunavṛttayaś ca guṇāḥ*, SK 12). Although apparently distinct and contradictory in function to one another, the constituents of tripartite process nevertheless operate together as the wick, oil, and flame of a lamp operate together in producing light (SK13). More than this, however, there is, secondly, the recognition that the subjective dilemma of the flow of experience is the obverse side of the inherent objective dilemma of primordial materiality itself. That is to say, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, there is no polarity or bifurcation of subjective and objective within tripartite process, no ontological distinction between "mind" and "matter" or "thought" and "extension." The subjective flow of experience is simply another way of describing the objective primal material energy that unfolds in a continuing tripartite process of spontaneous activity, rational ordering, and determinate formulation. Put another way, the subjective flow of experience that is at one and another time frustrating, pleasurably discernible, and overwhelmingly encompassing is nondifferent from the primal material energy that is at one and another time purposeful, coherent, and objective. The

tripartite process of *mūlaprakṛti* is, in other words, a sort of philosophical Klein bottle or Möbius strip in which the usual distinctions of subjective/objective, mind/body, thought/extension simply do not apply. Therefore, the subjective dilemma of frustration is an inherent dilemma of the world itself, or as the refrain in the *Gītā* puts it, "...*guṇā guṇeṣu vartanta iti*," or "...the constituents (primordial materiality) flow on (endlessly)."[30]

From the perspective of the analysis of the inner essence or underlying reality of primordial materiality itself, therefore, the notion of tripartite process in Sāṃkhya philosophy is clearly tending in the direction of a reductive materialism in the sense that it "reduces" our usual notions of mind, thinking, ideas, sensations, feelings, and so forth, to constituents of primal material energy.[31] Intellect, egoity, or mind are as much manifestations of tripartite process as are trees, stones, or other manifestations of gross matter. Ordinary awareness or thinking (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti, cittavṛtti, buddhi*) is but a "moment," or constituent, of continuous tripartite process that is inextricably linked with spontaneous activity and determinate formulation.

The constituents of tripartite process (*sattva, rajas, tamas, guṇapariṇāma, triguṇa, traiguṇya*) encompass manifest and unmanifest reality from "Brahmā down to a blade of grass" (*brahmādistambaparyanta*, SK 54). Therefore, the three realms described in the previous section on Sāṃkhya enumerations (namely, the "constitutive," the "projective," and the "consequent") have tripartite process as their underlying reality or essence, but, according to Sāṃkhya, actual transformation (*pariṇāma*) only occurs in the first realm (the *rūpa* or *tattva* realm). In the other two realms, that is to say, in the "projective" and "consequent" realms, there is apparently only simple "continuing activity" (*praspanda*).

The transactions in the first or *tattva* realm represent what K. C. Bhattacharya has aptly called actual "causal" or "noumenal" transformations.[32] That is to say, the *tattvas* (*buddhi*, and so forth) that emerge from *mūlaprakṛti* (because of the catalytic presence of *puruṣa*) are actual material transformations of primordial materiality made up of the constituents of tripartite process. The set of 23 "evolutes" or emergents are called material effects (*kārya*) of a primary material cause (*kāraṇa*), which is *mūlaprakṛti* or *pradhāna*. These 23 effects preexist (*satkārya*) in the material cause in the sense, described earlier, that they are specifications of the inherent generativity of primordial materiality. Put another way, they are actual manifestations (*vyakta*) of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) potencies that reside inherently in primordial materiality. Moreover, because materiality itself is construed primarily in terms of tripartite process, it follows that the emegence of the various effects together with the causal matrix from which they derive is characterized in terms of continuing dynamic transformation. Because

tripartite process encompasses both "subjective" and "objective" (or "mind" and "matter" or "thought" and "extension"), dynamic transformation is both analytic and synthetic (or both a priori and a posteriori). Analytically, each manifest component is a "part" of the "whole" that is primordial materiality. Synthetically, each emergent is the manifestation of an actual "effect" that preexists in the unmanifest potentiality of the primary material "cause." The tripartite process of emergence is, thus, both "logical" and "natural."[33]

From the perspective of the "logic" of tripartite process, it would appear that Sāṃkhya wishes to argue that prereflective spontaneous activity (*rajas*) implies an inherent, though latent, rational ordering (*sattva*) and determinate formulation (*tamas*), for an awareness of spontaneous activity could not arise in the absence of reflective discerning vis-à-vis some kind of formulation. Reflective discerning (*sattva*) implies an inherent, though latent, determinate formulation (*tamas*) and spontaneous activity (*rajas*), for reflective discerning could not occur in the absence of a content discernible through some kind of process of appropriation. Determinate formulation (*tamas*) implies an inherent, though latent, reflective discerning (*sattva*) and spontaneous activity (*rajas*), for a determinate formulation could not arise in the absence of a spontaneous process that allows for reflective discerning. All three constituents of tripartite process are always present to, or presuppose, one another. If one refrains from attempting to formulate an interpretation of tripartite process, then the process is simply "unmanifest" (*avyakta*). When, however, any attempt at formulation takes place, a logical sequence manifests (*vyakta*) itself in which each constituent implies or presupposes the other two.[34]

From the perspective of the "nature" of tripartite process, it would appear that Sāṃkhya wishes to argue that, although it must be conceded that prereflective spontaneous activity (*rajas*) is a prerequisite for all process (whether logical or natural), reflective discerning (*sattva*) is nevertheless first in the emergence of manifest "effects" insofar as tripartite process only begins to be aware of itself in that constituent. Thus, intellect as a principle or an effect is said to be the first manifestation of primordial materiality. Its unique function is reflective discerning, ascertainment, or determination (*adhyavasāya*, SK 23), largely derivative, in other words, of *sattva* as reflective discerning or rational ordering but presupposing the latent possibilities of spontaneous activity (*rajas*) and determinate formulation (*tamas*). It reflects, therefore, or encompasses the complete content of tripartite process, at least implicitly, so that the entire order of manifest being is present in it as the reflective constituent of primordial materiality. It is presubjective (or intersubjective) and preobjective in the sense that it is at one and the same time the inherent reflective discerning and the inherent rationality of tripartite process. Moreover, to the extent that its

discerning reveals the necessity for prereflective spontaneous activity (*rajas*) as preceding (at least logically) its inherent discerning, the *buddhi* also becomes the locus for what might be called prereflective "willing," not in the sense of egoistic willing (which comes "later" with the emergence of egoity), but in the sense of being predisposed to certain kinds of activity, and in the sense of being capable of initiating or creating new courses of action and various transformations within experience. The *buddhi*, in other words, is also the locus of the fundamental predispositions and is capable of generating the *pratyayasarga* or "phenomenal creation." Reflective discerning by the intellect, therefore, is both passive and active, passive in the sense that it reflectively discerns the ongoing transactions of tripartite process and active in the sense that it is able to project its own destiny and its own formulation of itself.

Egoity is implicit in intellect as reflective discerning becoming aware that it functions as only one constituent of tripartite process, which also implies spontaneous activity and determinate formulation or objectivation. Reflective discerning loses its innocence, as it were, as it recognizes that its pure reflecting function cannot be disembodied from that which it reflects. Egoity, therefore, is "self-awareness" (*abhimāna*, SK 24), not in the sense of free-floating and creative discerning, but, rather, in the sense that creative discerning is dependent upon and derivative of embodiment. The pleasure or joy of reflective discerning gives way to the emergence of a sense of finitude or, as K. C. Bhattacharya puts it, egoity is "...the mind as active I becoming the standing me." Egoity, in other words, is ordinary subjectivity in which reflective discerning is always revealed as being inextricably involved with spontaneous activity (*rajas*) and determinate formulation (*tamas*), that is to say, the "...I *becoming* the standing me." As a result, egoity is the locus of frustration and is largely derivative of *rajas*, for it is on this level that tripartite process begins to reveal itself as the embodied specifications upon which both reflective discerning (*sattva*) and determinate formulation (*tamas*) are dependent. Egoity generates (*taijasād ubhayam*, SK 25) a "twofold creation" (*dvividhasarga*, SK 24), the "specified" or "modified" (*vaikṛta*, SK 25) presuppositions for all reflective discerning (*sattva*), namely, the functions of conceptualizing or "explicating" (*saṃkalpaka*, SK 27) or thinking (*manas*) together with sensing (the five *buddhīndriyas*) and motor functioning (the five *karmendriyas*), and the first (*bhūtādi*, SK 25) determinate formulation (*tamas*) or objectivation, namely, the five subtle elements (*tanmātras*). Finally, the five subtle elements, generated out of egoity in its *tamas* modality as determinate formulation, generate the further *tamas* specifications of the gross elements (*mahābhūtas*).

That the five subtle elements as *tamas* or determinate formulation are derived from egoity and in turn generate gross material existence under-

scores in the most radical fashion the Sāṃkhya claim that tripartite process is overall a closed, causal system of reductive or process materialism in which the most pleasurable reflective discerning (*sattva, sukha, buddhi*) differs neither in essence nor in kind from the most painful transactions of frustrated gratification (*rajas, duḥkha, ahaṃkāra*) nor from the most oppressive presence of opaque formulation (*tamas, moha, tanmātra/bhūta*). Ordinary thinking, willing, and feeling are but the "subjective" obverse side of the "objective" ongoing transactions of tripartite process in its constituent unfoldings as *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas.* It has been said that the intention of Hegelian philosophy is to show that, finally, substance is subject. The Sāṃkhya conceptualization of the tripartite process appears to intend precisely the opposite. For Sāṃkhya the apparent subject (namely, internal awareness in terms of *buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas,* and so forth) is really substance (*mūlaprakṛti* as *triguṇa*).[35]

Such, then, is the underlying nature of the "causal" or "noumenal" *tattva* (or *rūpa*) realm with its transactions as the tripartite process. The transactions in the second and third realms (that is to say, the *bhāva* and *bhūta* realms) are also related to tripartite process but presumably not in terms of the "causal" tripartite process. The *bhāva* and *bhūta* realms are secondary or derivative constructions that can be generated or projected by the ongoing simple "continuing activity" (*praspanda*) of the tripartite process. Again, to use K. C. Bhattacharya's idiom, if the *tattva* realm is the realm of "causal" or "noumenal" transformations, then the *bhāva* and *bhūta* realms are the realms of "noncausal" or "phenomenal" transactions.[36] Residing in the *buddhi,* in other words, in addition to its constitutive *tattva* identity as reflective discerning or ascertainment is a special projective capacity (the *bhāvas*) capable of generating a derivative, secondary set of manifestations, constituted to be sure by *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas,* (as are all manifestations), but not unfolding in terms of the tripartite process. This derivative, secondary set of manifestations unfolds, presumably, by simple continuing activity, and its components are related to one another as *nimittanaimittika* (efficient causes and effects), or, in other words, the karmic transactions of ordinary life and experience (*bhoga, upabhoga*). The *Yuktidīpikā* provides some documentation for such an interpretation in its discussion of the inherent activity of *triguṇa*:

> ...activity or change can be construed in two ways, namely (a) fundamental transformation and (b) simple continuing activity. When there emerges a new state or condition of manifestation that has distinctly different characteristics, there is a fundamental transformation. The maintenance of ordinary life and its ongoing activities, like speaking, and so forth, may be referred to as simple continuing activity.[37]

Fundamental transformation is chiefly characteristic of the *rūpa* or *tattva* realm. Simple continuous activity is characteristic of the *pravṛtti* (*bhāva*) and *phala* (*bhūta*) realms. Or, putting the matter in terms of causation, the *rūpa* or *tattva* realm is that realm in which material (*kāraṇakārya*) causation operates, the *pravṛtti* and *phala* realms are those realms in which efficient (*nimittanaimittika*) causation operates.

Within the predispositional or projective realm (*bhāva* or *pravṛtti*), those predispositions of the intellect that evoke the inherent reflective discerning of the *buddhi* principle are referred to as its *sāttvika* predispositions (namely, meritorious behavior, knowledge, nonattachment, and power, SK 23). Those predispositions of the *buddhi* which evoke the objectifying or reifying tendencies of the *buddhi* principle are referred to as its *tāmasa* predispositions (namely, demeritorious behavior, ignorance, attachment, and impotence). Presumably, as mentioned earlier, the predispositions themselves, as the active or creative capacity of intellect in contrast to its passive tattvic constitution as reflective discerning, are derivative of the spontaneous externalizing activity of prereflective *rājasa* tendencies within primordial materiality, though this is nowhere directly stated in the extant Sāṃkhya texts. In any case, the constellation of predispositions residing in the *buddhi* principle in any particular rebirth predisposes the transmigrating *liṅga* to project a resultant phenomenal creation with its fifty categories of ordinary experience, with *sattva* tendencies dominant in the divine or celestial regions, *rajas* tendencies dominant on the human level and *tamas* tendencies dominant in the external gross world.[38]

Whereas the progression of fundamental principles in terms of the tripartite process and material causality cannot be changed inasmuch as they constitute the "causal" or "noumenal" reality of everything that is, the transactions of the projective (*bhāva*) and consequent (*phala*) realms inasmuch as they are "noncausal" (in a material, constitutive sense) or "phenomenal" tendencies in terms of *guṇapraspanda* and efficient causality, are subject to change. In other words, one cannot change what is, but one can change one's perspective or one's predisposition toward what is. Thus, knowledge or knowing (*jñāna*) and insufficient discriminating or ignorance (*ajñāna*), according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, pertain only to the projective and consequent realms. Knowledge and ignorance are only predispositions. They are never principles. Put another way, knowing can never change or reconstitute being; it can only change our predisposition toward what is and the manner in which we pursue our life trajectories.

Before proceeding to discuss the Sāṃkhya notion of *puruṣa* and the Sāṃkhya epistemology, it may be useful to offer a chart, which brings together the material presented thus far.



III. Sāṃkhya as Contentless Consciousness

The discussion of the Sāṃkhya system has thus far focused almost exclusively on the notion of primordial materiality, its underlying essence as tripartite process, its "causal" or "noumenal" transformation into the manifest *tattva* realm, and its "noncausal" or "phenomenal" projections and permutations in terms of the fundamental predispositions, the intellectual creation, and the spheres of rebirth and transmigration. Thus, although twenty-four of the twenty-five basic principles have been discussed, in reality, according to Sāṃkhya, only one "thing" or "entity" or "existent" has been described, namely, primordial materiality. The twenty-three fundamental principles (intellect, and so forth) that "manifest" (*vyakta*) themselves from "unmanifest" (*avyakta*) primordial materiality are all "parts" of a totally functioning "whole," which is primordial materiality, or material "effects" (*kārya*) of a primal material "cause" (*kāraṇa*). The "thread" that ties the "whole" together is tripartite process.

The Sāṃkhya notion of tripartite process was an attractive and

powerful solution to many of the older speculative problems in South Asian thought, attractive and powerful because it pulled together so many loose ends from the older speculative potpourri of random theorizing, but attractive and powerful also because it provided an independent rational basis for serious reflection quite apart from received revelation, but nevertheless very much in harmony with the received heritage. There had been a variety of speculations in the ancient brahmanical and heterodox periods regarding the notion of selfhood, ranging from the cosmic *ātman* of the oldest Upaniṣads through such notions as *kṣetrajña*, *bhūtātman*, *mahān ātman* the Jain notion of *jiva*, and, of course, archaic Buddhist notions of no-self (*anātman*).[39] Similarly, there had been a variety of speculations concerning the cosmos, the process of rebirth and transmigration, and the manner in which the physical world had come into existence — including archaic element lists in the Upaniṣads, the atomism of the early Vaiśeṣika, the *pratītyasamutpāda* of the Buddhists, theories about a creative "Lord" or *īśvara* among early *bhakti* followers, and even "arguments" about random chance among materialists.[40] Moreover, the issue of the relation between selfhood, on the one hand, and the phenomenal, empirical world, on the other, was a pressing issue even in the earliest phases of speculation. What Sāṃkhya philosophy accomplished with its conceptualization of the tripartite process was an intuitively cogent intellectual synthesis of many of these older strands of speculation. The transactions of intellect, egoity, and mind were now construed as rational manifestations of an intelligible, uniform, and real world "from Brahmā down to a blade of grass," and the process of rebirth and transmigration was given a meaningful interpretation. More than this, however, as already indicated, this was accomplished largely on the basis of independent reasoning, aided to be sure by the "reliable testimony" of the *ṛṣis* and the pronouncements of scripture, but independently derived nevertheless. It is perhaps hardly surprising, therefore, that Sāṃkhya philosophy should have been so influential in ancient Indian culture. Its conceptualization of the tripartite process became a kind of intellectual charter for many aspects of scientific and rational endeavour, widely used both in its technical sense and as a useful heuristic device in such divergent fields as medicine, law, ethics, philosophy, and cosmology.

In addition to the twenty-four principles that make up the one "entity" or "existent" that is primordial materiality as tripartite, however, the Sāṃkhya system also asserts that there is a second kind of "existent," distinct from primordial materiality and uninvolved in its transactions, yet nevertheless a crucial component for the manifest functioning of that materiality. The Sāṃkhya system refers to this second kind of "existent" as "*puruṣa*." The term "*puruṣa*," though in origin meaning "man" or "person" and used synonymously in prephilosophical contexts with the old Upaniṣadic notion of *ātman* or Self,

came to have a peculiar technical meaning in philosophical Sāṃkhya in much the same way as the old word "*guṇa*" was reinterpreted and given a new sense by the Sāṃkhya teachers.[41] It is quite likely, in fact, that the two technical notions of the constituent process and consciousness developed in tandem, for it is clear enough that the precision and comprehensiveness of the notion of *triguṇa* would require a fundamental rethinking of the old Upaniṣadic "ghost in the machine".[42] To be sure, one might anticipate that the notion of the constituent process with its tendency toward a "reductive materialism" might well have rendered the older Upaniṣadic notions of selfhood superfluous. In other words, one might anticipate that Sāṃkhya would have moved in the direction of some sort of no-self theory on analogy with comparable developments within archaic Buddhist traditions or in the direction of a thoroughgoing materialism. This did not happen, however. Instead, the Sāṃkhya teachers worked out an eccentric form of dualism with primordial materiality or the tripartite constituent process (encompassing twenty-four fundamental principles) as one kind of "existent," and pure consciousness (*puruṣa*, a twenty-fifth *tattva*) as a second kind of "existent."

The term "eccentric" is meant to indicate simply that the Sāṃkhya dualism does not fit the usual or conventional notions of dualism. If one looks, for example, at the classic expression of the dualist position in Western thought, namely, that of Descartes, one realizes immediately that the Sāṃkhya somehow misses the mark. In his *Principles of Philosophy* Descartes comments as follows about the dualist position:

> Thus extension in length, breadth and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. For all else that may be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is but a mode of this extended thing; as everything that we find in mind is but so many diverse forms of thinking.[43]

In his *Meditations* Descartes sets forth the essence of the dualist perspective as follows:

> ...because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I (that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am), is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body and can exist without it.[44]

A modern statement of the conventional dualist position is that of the analytic philosopher Kai Nielsen, who puts the matter as follows:

> The core of the dualist claim...could...be put in this way: There are at least two radically different kinds of reality, existence or

> phenomena: the physical and the mental.... Physical phenomena or realities are extended in space and time and are perceptually public, or, like electrons and photons, are constituents of things that are perceptually public .... Mental phenomena or realities, by contrast, are unextended, not in space, and are *inherently* private.[45]

Whether one considers the Cartesian position or the modern, analytic restatement of it, according to Kai Nielsen, the interpreter of Sāṃkhya must admit that the Sāṃkhya is not a dualism in these senses. Similarly, if one considers the theological or ethical dualism of Christian thought — in the manner of Pauline theology or later treatments such as those of Augustine, and so forth — again, the Sāṃkhya is not a dualism in these senses. Similarly, if one considers the dualistic analyses in Plato or Aristotle, or the Kantian dualism of noumenon and phenomena, or a phenomenological dualism of *noesis* and *noema*, the Sāṃkhya is not really dualist in any of these senses. Even within the framework of Indian philosophy, the garden-variety dualisms of the later Vedānta schools or the older archaic *jīva-ajīva* dualism of the Jains do not adequately fit the Sāṃkhya case. Regarding all of these positions, Sāṃkhya philosophy with its notion of tripartite process would be a critique of the traditional or conventional dualist position and approaches, rather, as has been shown in the preceding section, the opposite position or what modern Western philosophy of mind would call "reductive materialism," that is to say, a philosophical view that "reduces" "mind" talk, or "mentalistic" talk to "brain-process" talk, or, in other words, construes mind, thought, ideas, sensations, and so forth, in terms of some sort of material stuff, or energy, or force (as has been argued, for example, by such thinkers as H. Feigl, J. J. C. Smart, Kai Nielsen, and others).[46] For, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the experiences of intellect, egoity, and mind, and the "raw feels" such as frustration or satisfaction — or, in other words, what conventional dualists would consider to be "inherently private"— are simply subtle reflections of a primordial materiality, a primordial materiality undergoing continuous transformation by means of its constituent unfolding as spontaneous activity, reflective discerning, and determinate formulation. Thus, the modern reductive materialists' claim that "sensations are identical with certain brain processes" would have a peculiar counterpart in the Sāṃkhya claim that "awarenesses" (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* or *cittavṛtti*) are identical with certain *guṇa* modalities. Or again, the modern reductive materialists' claim that the conventional notions of the "inherently private" or the "mental" are only linguistic fictions that inhibit a more correct understanding of the human situation would find its peculiar counterpart in the Sāṃkhya claim that the notion of the discreet "individual" or the "individual ego" seriously inhibits a more correct understanding of an organism

as a composite constellation of a subtle material transmigrating *liṅga* (made up of intellect, egoity, mind, and so forth) periodically being reborn in gross physical bodies. Both positions, in other words, appear to criticize the notion of an inherently private, mentalistic "ghost in the machine" as being a product of verbal carelessness (*vikalpa*) brought about by the failure to make relevant distinctions (*aviveka, avidyā*).

At this point, however, the comparison of Sāṃkhya philosophy with reductive materialism breaks down, for instead of expelling the traditional or conventional "ghost in the machine" and getting on with the task of describing the world and experience without "ghost talk," Sāṃkhya as it were refurbishes the "ghost," stripping it of its conventional attributes and reintroducing it in the framework of an "eccentric" dualism in the sense that the "ghost" no longer has to do with "mind talk, "mentalist" talk, or "ego" talk, all of which latter are fully reducible to *guṇa* talk in good reductive materialist fashion. Sāṃkhya designates its eccentric ghost as "consciousness" (*cetana, puruṣa*), thus introducing a fundamental distinction between "awareness" (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti, cittavṛtti*) and "consciousness" (*cetana, puruṣa*) and requiring a radically different kind of dualism, namely, a dualism between a closed, causal system of reductive materialism (encompassing "awareness" or the "private" life of the mind), on the one hand, and a nonintentional and contentless consciousness, on the other. Whereas awareness (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) (namely, intellect, egoity and mind) is active, intentional, engaged and at every moment a reflection of subtle materiality; consciousness (*puruṣa*) cannot think or act and is not ontologically involved or intentionally related in any sense to primordial materiality other than being passively present. Consciousness, in other words, is sheer contentless presence (*sākṣitva*). Sāṃkhya philosophy thereby rejects idealism without giving up an ultimately transcendent "consciousness." It also rejects conventional dualism by reducing "mentalist" talk to one or another transformation of material "awareness"; and it modifies reductive materialism by introducing a unique notion of "consciousness" that is nonintentional and has nothing to do with ordinary mental awareness.

This eccentric Sāṃkhya dualism is set forth in verses 3, 10, and 11 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The dualism is introduced in the following fashion: Primordial materiality is ungenerated; the seven — intellect, and so forth — are both generated and generative. The sixteen are generated. Consciousness is neither generated nor generative. (SK 3)

The four hemistichs of the verse may be exhibited as follows:

(I) Primordial materiality is ungenerated (*mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir*);
(II) The seven — intellect, and so forth — are both generated and generative (*mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta*);
(III) The sixteen are generated (*ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro*);

(IV) Consciousness is neither generated nor generative (*na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ*).[47]

The *puruṣa* is clearly distinguished from all other fundamental principles in the sense of not being implicated in what is generating or generated. Moreover, the first hemistich is a negation of the third hemistich, and the fourth hemistich is a negation of the second hemistich. It follows, then, that whatever is predicated of the second part will provide a negative description of the fourth part, and whatever is predicated of the third part will provide negative descriptions of both the first part and the fourth part (inasmuch as the fourth part is similar to the first part to the extent that it too is ungenerated). The sequences of predications are then presented in verses 10-11 and may be exhibited in the accompanying chart.



The first sequence establishes the manner in which the manifest world differs both from unmanifest materiality and consciousness. Both unmanifest materiality and consciousness, in other words, are alike in the sense of being uncaused, nontemporal, nonspatial, and so forth.[48] The second sequence establishes the manner in which unmanifest and

manifest taken together differ from consciousness, the crucial difference having to do with the tripartite process. Because both the unmanifest and manifest dimensions of primordial materiality are inherently tripartite process, it follows, according to Sāṃkhya, that primordial materiality is uniform overall (*avivekin*) in the sense that it is one "existent" in which "parts" and "whole" or "effects" and "cause" make up one undifferentiated entity; that it is, therefore, a content of consciousness (*viṣaya*); that it can be rationally or relationally characterized (*sāmānya*); that it is not conscious (*acetana*); and that it is inherently productive (*prasavadharmin*).[49] Consciousness, therefore, according to Sāṃkhya, refers to an "existent" that is distinct from tripartite process and thus differentiated from all of the transactions of awareness (intellect and so forth), transcending all objectivity whether specific or unspecific, utterly unique or uncharacterizable, sentient or intelligent, and incapable of producing anything.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, such a notion of contentless consciousness is essential for several important reasons (SK 17). First, because the combinations (*saṃghāta*) of tripartite process appear to be purposeful (*parārthatva*) overall and because these transactions are themselves finally only objective or manifestations of primal material energy, there must be some ultimate grounding for such purposefulness that is itself not objective, or, in other words, not implicated in tripartite process. This ultimate grounding is pure consciousness and it is that *for* which primordial materiality functions. Second, although pure consciousness is nonintentional and incapable of producing anything, nevertheless, there must be a sentient principle that by its mere presence exercises a function of passive overseeing (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Third, there must be a substratum that is the recipient or beneficiary (*bhoktṛbhāva*) of the various awarenesses of primordial materiality. Finally, because the quest or urge for liberation is such a crucial component in all experience, there must be a principle of sentience apart from the closed causal system of reductive materialism that renders such a quest intelligible. All of these arguments amount to one basic claim, namely, that the very notion of tripartite process itself becomes unintelligible in the absence of a distinct principle of sentience. In other words, tripartite process, although a powerful intellectual synthesis or conceptualization, cannot stand alone in and of itself, for even the awareness of the concept presupposes a ground or basis, or perhaps better, a "medium" through which and for which the concept becomes meaningful. Otherwise what appeared to be a uniform, rational, and meaningful world "from Brahmā down to a blade of grass" would finally show itself as an endless mechanical process in which the transactions of ordinary experience would amount to little more than occasional pleasurable respites from an endlessly unfolding tragedy. Or, putting the matter another way, one would come upon the remarkable paradox that an

apparently uniform, rational, and meaningful world is finally pointless.

Moreover, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the notion of contentless consciousness requires that it be construed pluralistically (*bahutva*). That is to say, because consciousness is a contentless, nonintentional presence incapable of performing any activity, it, therefore, cannot know or intuit itself. The presence of contentless consciousness can only be intuited by the intellect in its reflective discerning (*sattva*) and in an intuition by the intellect that in itself is *not* consciousness. The presence of consciousness, thus, is an awareness that occurs within intellect, an awareness that the intellect itself is not consciousness. According to the *Yuktidīpikā*, this realization of the presence of consciousness emerges as an awareness of the difference between tripartite process and consciousness (*jñānaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaraupalabdhilakṣaṇam*). Because there is a plurality of intellects engaging in reflective discernment; because these intellects are following various life trajectories; and because they are functioning, therefore, at various times and under varying circumstances in accordance with the varied manifestations of tripartite process, contentless consciousness can only be disclosed pluralistically (SK 18), or, putting the matter somewhat differently, there may be as many disclosures of contentless consciousness as there are intellects capable of reflective discernment. Sāṃkhya philosophy, therefore, rejects the old cosmic *ātman* of the Upaniṣads and argues instead that contentless consciousness accompanies every intellect, stressing thereby that the awareness of consciousness is an achievement of the intellect and is a negative discernment of what the intellect is not. The Sāṃkhya arguments for a plurality of pure consciousnesses, in other words, appear to be directed at epistemological concerns rather than ontological matters. Because contentless consciousness can never be a content and cannot be characterized as are materiality or the tripartite process, it is hardly likely that the Sāṃkhya teachers were thinking of the plurality of consciousnesses as a set of knowable entities to be counted.[50] They were thinking, rather, of a plurality of intellects through which the disclosure of contentless consciousness occurs. Vijñānabhikṣu (in his commentary on *Sāṃkhyasūtra* I.154) makes a somewhat comparable point when he suggests that the Sāṃkhya plurality of consciousnesses does not contradict the evidence of the Veda that there is only one Self or subject. In the Veda, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, oneness or uniformity refers to the essential nature (*svarūpa*) of selfhood in terms only of genus (*jāti*). Vedic references to oneness need not be construed as implying entirety or undividedness. There are numerous passages in the Veda that show that selfhood shows itself under limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*), and, hence, there is no contradiction between Vedic testimony and the Sāṃkhya notion of the plurality of consciousnesses. Whether in fact Vedic references can be so construed, of course, is a matter for

debate and textual interpretation. (Generally speaking, it would appear that Vijñānabhikṣu is wrong. Vedic references to selfhood do seem to imply entirety or undividedness.) Vijñānabhikṣu is probably correct, however, in suggesting that Sāṃkhya's intention with its notion of a plurality of consciousnesses was largely epistemological.

Putting all of this together, contentless consciousness, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, is (a) pure passive presence (*sākṣitva*); (b) distinct from the tripartite process (*kaivalya*); (c) uninvolved in the transactions of the three *guṇas* except for its passive presence (*mādhyasthya*); (d) the foundation for subjectivity or pure consciousness (*draṣṭṛtva*); and (e) incapable of activity (*akartṛbhāva*) (SK 19).

It is outside the realm of causality, outside space and time, completely inactive, utterly simple, unrelated apart from its sheer presence, uninvolved in emergence or transformation, without parts, completely independent, transcendent yet always immanent by reason of its presence, the presupposition for all apparent discrimination or differentiation, neither an object nor a subject (in any conventional sense), verbally uncharacterizable, a pure witness whose only relation to primordial materiality is sheer presence, utterly isolated, completely indifferent, the presupposition for apprehending unmanifest or manifest being, a nonagent, and potentially present in the awareness of all intellects as *not* being that awareness.

Sāṃkhya philosophy strips consciousness of most of the usual attributes of a mutable subject. Even the discrimination (*viveka*) of its very presence is delegated to the intellect as a negative apprehension that intellect is not contentless consciousness (*nāsmi, na me, nāham ity apariśeṣaṃ*, SK 64). As the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* (III.75) puts it, "The attainment of the discrimination (of *puruṣa*) occurs as a result of the meditative analysis (*abhyāsa*) of the fundamental principles through which one progressively abandons (*tyāga*) all contents, saying 'It is not this,' 'It is not that.'"

Such an unusual notion of consciousness entails, of course, some equally unusual corollaries. First of all, if consciousness is inactive and distinct from the tripartite process, then consciousness is neither the material nor the efficient cause of the transactions of primordial materiality, and yet all causal transactions occur in the presence of consciousness and are illuminated by consciousness. Second, if consciousness is only a contentless passive presence, it can only appear as what it is not, passively taking on all content (whether subjective or objective) as a transparent witness. Third, tripartite process appears to be conscious until such time as it is realized that consciousness is the radical absence of content (whether subjective or objective). A double negation occurs, in other words, whereby contentlessness appears to have content (*guṇakartṛtve 'pi tathā karte 'va bhavaty udāsinaḥ*, SK 20) and content appears to be conscious (*acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgam*, SK 20). Fourth,

when contentless consciousness is present to primordial materiality, this double negation occurs quite spontaneously or naturally and becomes the occasion for the manifest world and experience to occur. Hence, because consciousness and primordial materiality (in any given world cycle) are all-pervasive "existents" it can be said that this spontaneous double negation is beginningless. Fifth, the manifest world and experience, therefore, though fully real, are nevertheless distorted appearances in which pure consciousness appears to be bound up in the transactions of tripartite process (and hence caught in the closed causal system) and tripartite process appears to be conscious (and hence lacking any basis outside of the closed causal system for the possibility of freedom or release). Whether this double negation is construed with a simple theory of reflection (*pratibimba*), whereby consciousness becomes reflected in intellect (thereby occasioning experience) — as in Vācaspati Miśra — or with a double theory of reflection (*anyonyapratibimba*), whereby consciousness becomes reflected in intellect and intellect in turn is reflected back on consciousness — as in Vijñānabhikṣu — makes little difference in terms of the basic thrust of the Sāṃkhya position, which is that there is a basic epistemological distortion at the root of experience.[51] Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation is perhaps cleaner in the sense that all transactions of experience occur only in intellect after it has been "intelligized" by consciousness. Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation has the merit of ascribing experience to consciousness (because the contents of intellect awareness are reflected back on consciousness). In either case, however, the crucial point is that intellect is only a surrogate for contentless consciousness, and only proper discrimination (*viveka*) by the intellect is sufficient finally to eliminate the beginningless distortion (*aviveka*). Finally, and most important, bondage and release, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, are never ontological problems. The two ultimate "existents" (pure consciousness and primordial materiality) in fact both exist, and their presence to one another cannot be changed. What can change is the fundamental epistemological distortion that is the occasion for the appearance of the manifest world and experience. The intellect is capable finally of discriminating the presence of contentless consciousness, thereby intuiting a radical foundation for liberation that dissipates the pain or frustration of ordinary experience. Both bondage and freedom, in other words, pertain to intellect, the former being the case when beginningless nondiscrimination, occasioned by the natural copresence of consciousness and materiality, obtains and the intellect is on a trajectory toward ordinary experience (*upabhoga*), the latter being the case when discrimination (*viveka*) arises — occasioned by the intellect's sufficiently distinguishing itself from consciousness — and the intellect is predisposed toward liberation and/or isolation. As Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts the matter in verse 62: "Therefore, it is surely the case that (*puruṣa*)

is never bound, nor released nor subject to transmigration. Only *prakṛti* in its various forms transmigrates, is bound and is released." Primordial materiality, therefore, provides both ordinary experience and the extraordinary knowledge that consciousness exists.

Ultimately, of course, contentless consciousness and primordial materiality go beyond what can be reasonably described in ordinary discourse. Both the notions of consciousness and materiality (or the tripartite process) are like certain ultimate notions in Plato's thought for which Plato turned to the language of myth, metaphor, and simile. It is hardly surprising, then, that Sāṃkhya philosophy should also make use of metaphor and simile regarding its ultimate conceptions. To some extent, of course, such metaphors and similes were often used in Indian philosophy as "illustrations" (*dṛṣṭānta*) in framing the so-called Indian syllogism, but metaphors and similes were also used as vivid images for evoking a brief intuitive glimpse of an idea that did not easily lend itself to rational formulation.[52] Thus, the relation between contentless consciousness and primordial materiality is like that between a lame man and a blind man, whereby each functions for the other in accomplishing a common goal. Or again, consciousness is the crystal; materiality the China rose that distorts the clarity of the crystal and makes it appear as what it is not. Consciousness is the spectator; materiality is the dancer performing for him until such time as the aesthetic performance has been completed. Consciousness is the young calf; materiality the nourishing milk. Consciousness is the young lover; materiality is the shy virgin who withdraws from his sight having been seen by him in her nakedness. Consciousness is the master; materiality is the obedient servant. (See SK 13, 21, 36, 41, 42, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, and 67; see also Book IV of the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, which is given over to reciting various narratives, metaphors, and similes about the basic Sāṃkhya conceptions.)

IV. Sāṃkhya as Rational Reflection

Now that the basic components and overall contours of the Sāṃkhya system have been presented, attention can be directed, finally, to the manner in which the Sāṃkhya teachers argued their case. That is to say, it is appropriate now to address such issues as the philosophical methodology, logic, and epistemology of the Sāṃkhya. To some extent, of course, such matters have been implicit throughout the preceding sections, for it has become clear enough that the genius of the Sāṃkhya in the ancient Indian context was its success in formulating a tight set of conceptualizations that pulled together a great variety of speculative loose ends from the older heritage. The notions of *triguṇa*, *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, *manas*, *mūlaprakṛti*, *puruṣa*, and so forth, set forth in a systematic pattern that rendered the world and human experience

intelligible was a remarkable intellectual achievement by any measure, and it is no accident, therefore, that Sāṃkhya exercised an enormous influence in so many areas of ancient Indian intellectual life. To be sure, Sāṃkhya was vigorously criticized by later and more sophisticated philosophical traditions, but that in itself is a measure of its stature in the formative phase of Indian intellectual history. As Frauwallner and others have eloquently argued, Sāṃkhya's contribution to Indian philosophy was evidently fundamental and basic, perhaps even seminal.[53] That its later opponents were quick to pounce on the obvious weaknesses of the system should not deflect our attention from an appreciation for Sāṃkhya's crucial contribution in its own time. Only Vaiśeṣika, early Nyāya, and early Buddhist thought came even close to exercising a comparable influence in terms of Indian systematic philosophizing. Yoga, Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā in these early centuries had not yet (and perhaps really never did) adequately differentiate themselves from their religious roots. Moreover, even when these latter traditions did finally emerge as philosophical (cum religious) movements, the influence of Sāṃkhya in them was extensive (to the extent that "Yoga philosophy" can really only be taken as itself a theme and variation on Sāṃkhya). As was mentioned in Chapter One, later Vedānta is really only a warmed over Sāṃkhya, upgraded somewhat with the sophisticated dialectic of Mādhyamika and Nyāya but in most respects a regression to prephilosophical religious intuition and scriptural authority.

Be that as it may, the task now is to piece together in as systematic a way as possible Sāṃkhya's contribution in such areas as philosophical methodology, logic, and epistemology. In many ways, unfortunately, this is the most difficult dimension of Sāṃkhya to uncover, for the extant Sāṃkhya textual evidence contains very little information. Unlike the other systems of classical Indian philosophy, there is no lengthy ancient Sāṃkhya *sūtra* collection, which would be the normal source for uncovering such issues (if not in the *sūtras* themselves, certainly in the detailed commentaries that accompany such collections). There is, of course, a *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, commented on by Aniruddha, Vijñānabhikṣu, and others, but this is a medieval tradition (fifteenth or sixteenth century) that is largely useless for purposes of studying the old Sāṃkhya system. Whether Sāṃkhya, in fact, ever had a set of ancient *sūtras* is difficult to know. There are fragments quoted here and there in the general philosophical literature of India (attributed to Pañcaśikha, Vārṣagaṇya, and so on) that suggest there may have been *sūtra* collections that were subsequently lost or discarded. There is also the little *Tattvasamāsasūtra*, which may well be very old, but its laconic presentation makes it impossible to decipher without commentaries; and the extant commentaries on the text are very late (with the possible exception of the *Kramadīpikā*). In any case, the *Tattvasamāsa* offers little

of importance about matters of methodology, logic, or epistemology.

What evidence is available tends to indicate that Sāṃkhya probably did not have an ancient *sūtra* collection. Instead, there are numerous references to a so-called *ṣaṣṭitantra* or "system or science of sixty topics," which, as suggested earlier, may refer to an extensive literature or to a tradition of presenting Sāṃkhya in terms of sixty topics. Authorship of the *ṣaṣṭitantra* has been attributed variously to Kapila, Pañcaśikha, or Vārṣagaṇya, suggesting, according to Frauwallner, that there were several editions or reworkings of an original *ṣaṣṭitantra*. Possibly the *ṣaṣṭitantra* was originally a collection of verses (on analogy perhaps with a *sūtra* collection), later greatly expanded in verse and prose by Pañcaśikha and Vārṣagaṇya as the system developed. Another possibility, of course, as has already been mentioned, is that Sāṃkhya in ancient times was simply known as *ṣaṣṭitantra* ("the system of sixty topics") and that, therefore, there may have been a variety of texts with that appellation.[54]

What presumably happened was that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, which is purportedly a summary of the *ṣaṣṭitantra* tradition, supplanted the older material in classical times (namely, after the fifth and sixth centuries) and came to be accepted as an adequate account of the old Sāṃkhya philosophy, which by classical times had already had its day and was being superseded by newer philosophical developments. Unfortunately, however, whereas Īśvarakṛṣṇa neatly summarized the components of the system as a whole, he dealt with the philosophical methodology, logic, and epistemology of the system only in the most cursory fashion in the first twenty-one verses of his text. According to the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa dealt only briefly with these matters, because they had been exhaustively dealt with by other Sāṃkhya *ācāryas* (Vārṣagaṇya, Vindhyavāsin, and others.) and, hence, did not require extensive treatment in his summary compilation. In other words, the reason for his cursory treatment was not that methodology, logic, and epistemology were unimportant. Quite the contrary, they had been dealt with extensively in the tradition of *ṣaṣṭitantra* and were so well known as not to require further elucidation. Thus, there appears to have occurred a most unfortunate historical anomaly, namely, that one of the crucial aspects of Sāṃkhya philosophy became lost because the summarizer of the system in later times, whose work has come down to us, had simply assumed that everyone knew this dimension of the system.

Whether the methodology, logic, and epistemology of Sāṃkhya can ever be adequately recovered is still an open question in Sāṃkhya studies. Frauwallner and Oberhammer have devoted much attention to the problem, and in more recent times Nakada and Wezler have addressed these issues.[55] The *Yuktidīpikā* has been an important new source of information, and some progress has been made in recons-

tructing the old Sāṃkhya epistemology from occasional references to Sāṃkhya views in the classical philosophical literature (for example, in the work of Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi, Candramati, Kumārila, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Kamalaśīla, Mallavādin, Siṃhasūri, and others). It is clear enough, especially as a result of the research of Frauwallner with respect to crtitiques of Sāṃkhya in Dignāga and Candramati (and related commentaries), that Sāṃkhya philosophy as set forth in the *ṣaṣṭitantra* tradition made some important contributions to the formulation of the "instruments of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*), the definitions of these means, the theory of inference, and the manner in which inferences are to be framed.[56] These contributions are usually linked to the names Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin, but the relation of these latter names to the work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa remains obscure. Presumably Īśvarakṛṣṇa knew about these contributions, but, as indicated above, passed over them in a cursory manner because they had been written about extensively and were generally well known.

In reconstructing the methodology, logic, and epistemology of Sāṃkhya in what follows, therefore, it is important to keep in mind that these matters are far from clear and may require considerable revision or refinement as further research proceeds.

Philosophical methodology: dyads, triads and pentads. In examining the extant texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition, one is impressed, first of all, with the predilection for enumeration (from which predilection, of course, the term "*sāṃkhya*" itself derives). Although the method of enumeration is common in Indian philosophy (primarily for mnemonic reasons relating to the aphoristic style of Indian scientific writing), and although Sāṃkhya enumerations encompass a variety of what appear to be random sequences, it is notable that the preponderance of enumeration tends to be dyadic, triadic, and pentadic.[57]

Some of the more common dyadic analyses include the following:

Consciousness (*puruṣa*)	/	Materiality (*prakṛti*)
Unmanifest (*avyakta*)	/	Manifest (*vyakta*)
(Material Cause) (*kāraṇa*)	/	(Material Effect) (*kārya*)
Generative (*prakṛti*)	/	Generated (*vikṛti*)
"Causal" (*liṅga*)	/	"Projective" (*bhāva*)
Subtle (*sūkṣma*)	/	Gross (*sthūla*)
Nonspecific (*aviśeṣa*)	/	Specific (*viśeṣa*)
Noumenal (*nirupabhoga*)	/	Phenomenal (*upabhoga*)

Internal Organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*)	/	External Organ (*bāhyakaraṇa*)
(Efficient Cause) (*nimitta*)	/	(Efficient Effect) (*naimittika*)
Merit (*dharma*)	/	Demerit (*adharma*)
Knowledge (*jñāna*)	/	Ignorance (*ajñāna*)
Nonattachment (*vairāgya*)	/	Attachment (*avairāgya*)
Power (*aiśvarya*)	/	Impotence (*anaiśvarya*)
Upward Going (*ūrdhva*)	/	Downward Going (*adhastāt*)
Liberation (*apavarga*)	/	Bondage (*bandha*)
Dissolution in *prakṛti* (*prakṛtilaya*)	/	Transmigration (*saṃsāra*)
Nonrestraint (*avighāta*)	/	Restraint (*vighāta*)

Moreover, the sequence of predications for establishing the basic Sāṃkhya dualism, which was presented in the preceding section on *puruṣa*, is also dyadic in structure.

Some of the triadic analyses include the following:

Intelligibility (or reflective discerning) (*sattva*)	/	Activity (or spontaneous unfolding) (*rajas*)	/	Inertia (or determinate formulation) (*tamas*)
Illuminating (*prakāśa*)	/	Externalizing (*pravṛtti*)	/	Objectifying (*niyama*)
Intellect/will (*buddhi*)	/	Egoity (*ahaṃkāra*)	/	Subtle Elements (*tanmātra*)
Divine/Celestial (*daiva*)	/	Human (*mānuṣya*)	/	Animal/Plant (*tairyagyona*)
Generated (*vaikṛta*)	/	Fiery (*taijasa*)	/	Elemental (*bhūtādi*)
Satisfaction (*sukha*)	/	Frustration (*duḥkha*)	/	Confusion (*moha*)
Agreeable (*prīti*)	/	Disagreeable (*aprīti*)	/	Depressing (*viṣāda*)
Peaceful (*śānta*)	/	Uncomfortable (*ghora*)	/	Confusion (*mūḍha*)

Furthermore, most of the ethical and epistemological notions of the Sāṃkhya system appear to be discussed in triadic analyses:

Internal Frustration (*ādhyātmika*)	/	External Frustration (*ādhibhautika*)	/	Celestial Frustration (*ādhidaivika*)

Natural Bondage (*prakṛtibandha*)	/	Generated Bondage (*vaikārikabandha*)	/	Sacrificial or Celestial Bondage (*dakṣiṇābandha*)
Final Liberation (*mokṣa* or *jñāna*)	/	Release from Passion (*rāgakṣaya*)	/	Release as Total Destruction (*kṛtsnakṣaya*)
Perception (*dṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa*)	/	Inference (*anumāna*)	/	Reliable Authority (*āptavacana*)
Inference from cause to effect (*pūrvavat*)	/	Inference from effect to cause (*śeṣavat*)	/	Inference based on general correlation (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*)
Reflective discerning (*adhyavasāya*)	/	Self-awareness (*abhimāna*)	/	Intentionality (*saṃkalpa*)

Finally, some of the common pentadic analyses include the following:

Sound (*śabda*)	/	Touch (*sparśa*)	/	Form (*rūpa*)	/	Taste (*rasa*)	/	Smell (*gandha*)
Space-Ether (*ākāśa*)	/	Wind (*vāyu*)	/	Fire (*tejas*)	/	Water (*ap*)	/	Earth (*pṛthivī*)
Hearing (*śrotra*)	/	Touching (*tvac*)	/	Seeing (*cakṣus*)	/	Tasting (*rasana*)	/	Smelling (*ghrāṇa*)
Speaking (*vāc*)	/	Grasping (*pāṇi*)	/	Walking (*pāda*)	/	Procreating (*upastha*)	/	Expelling (*pāyu*)
Life Breath (*prāṇa*)	/	Up Breath (*udāna*)	/	Diffuse Breath (*vyāna*)	/	Digestive Breath (*samāna*)	/	Down Breath (*apāna*)
Steadfastness (*dhṛti*)	/	Faith (*śraddhā*)	/	Pleasure (*sukha*)	/	Desire to Know (*vividiṣā*)	/	Desire not to Know (*avividiṣā*)

In addition, the arguments presented for proving the basic Sāṃkhya conceptualizations are presented in the format of pentads. There are five arguments for the notion of the "preexisting" effect (*satkārya*) (SK 9); five arguments for proving that the "unmanifest" (*avyakta*) is the cause (*kāraṇa*) (SK 15); five arguments for the existence of *puruṣa* (SK 17); five arguments for establishing the plurality of *puruṣas* (*puruṣa-bahutva*) (SK 18); five predications of *triguṇa* (SK 11); and five basic predications of *puruṣa* (SK 19).

Dyadic, triadic, and pentadic analyses are, of course, common in the older Indian religious literature (Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jain), and in this sense Sāṃkhya is clearly a descendent from those older speculative contexts. Whereas those older analyses represent what Edgerton once aptly called an archaic "logic of identification," however, the Sāṃkhya analyses appear to represent something more sophisticated. The dyadic analyses in Sāṃkhya appear to be concerned with ontology and with the logic of basic relations. The triadic analyses in Sāṃkhya are clearly concerned with tripartite process, ethics, and epistemology. The pentadic analyses in Sāṃkhya appear to be concerned primarily with the natural world and the psychophysiology of

biological life or what might be called the phenomenal, empirical world of ordinary life. This is also true for the various pentadic arguments given for establishing the basic Sāṃkhya conceptualizations, for in each instance the arguments are derived from ordinary empirical experience.

Taken together, the dyads, triads, and pentads appear to provide a mechanism of mediation. The goal of Sāṃkhya is to intuit or discriminate certain basic relations, the primary one of which is the ontological distinction between consciousness and materiality. Experience occurs, however, within the fivefold realm of ordinary awareness and life (through the senses, motor capacities, and an organism's encounter with the external world). That which mediates between the ordinary (pentadic) phenomenal realm and the extraordinary (dyadic) ontological realm is the epistemological (triadic) mediating realm. This latter mediating realm encompasses tripartite process, thereby positively defining materiality and negatively defining consciousness and serving as the locus both for (a) the awareness of satisfaction, frustration, and confusion characteristic of all ordinary life and (b) the awareness of liberation. The basic ontic dyad (consciousness and materiality) activates the basic epistemic triad (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas* or *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *moha* as the internal structure of materiality), and the dyad and triad together generate the basic phenomenal pentad (*tanmātra*, *bhūta*, *buddhīndriya*, *karmendriya*). In such fashion is the realm of ordinary experience generated, but the very process of generation cloaks or hides the basic ontic dyad (or, in other words, makes it appear as an epistemic triad). From the other side, ordinary (pentadic) experience generates the epistemological triad of frustration, which issues in the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) or discriminate, which in turn may finally reveal the basic ontic dyad but which also reveals that the structure of frustration itself is only epistemic. Sāṃkhya philosophy, then, would not deny the existence of consciousness or the natural world; but it would argue that our epistemic perspectives concerning what is real are seriously distorted or insufficiently discriminating and that the task of philosophy is to clarify the nature of what is (namely, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) and thereby to eliminate epistemological distortions that generate frustration.

Sāṃkhya numbers. The numbers 2, 3, and 5 (presupposed in the dyads, triads and pentads) are, of course, the first three prime numbers, 3 being the arithmetic mean between 1 and 2, and 5 being the arithmetic mean between 2 and 3. When one combines this observation with the further observation that other prime numbers are prominent among the 25 Sāṃkhya fundamental principles — for example, 7 as the principles that are both generative and generated; 11 as the principles that make up the set of capacities; 13 as the number of principles that make up the *liṅga*; 17 as the number of principles relating to egoity;

and 23 the total number of principles that are subdivisions or components of primordial materiality—it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that Sāṃkhya philosophy was making use of some sort of archaic mathematical methodology perhaps not unlike the mathematical theorizing characteristic of Pythagoreanism in the ancient Greek tradition.[58] Unfortunately, there is at the present time insufficient evidence for making any strong claims along these lines one way or the other. The predilection for prime numbers on the principles level may have had some deeper meaning that the ancient Sāṃkhya teachers were consciously using in building their system (on analogy with Pythagorean attempts to link "numbers" with "things"). On the other hand, such numbers may have been well known in learned religious circles as having some sort of religious or mystical significance that could naturally be employed for speculative purposes. In other words, the use of such numbers may not have had any rational purpose whatever.

One suspects, however, that the former, rather than the latter, is the case, not only because the predilection for primes suggests a rational motivation rather than a purely religious motivation but also because other Sāṃkhya numbers also appear to be more than random mnemonic sequences. It appears to be hardly accidental, for example, that the intellectual creation and its 50 categories, which the *Yuktidīpikā* characterizes as the "consequent" (*phala*) creation, is a doubling or replication of the 25 fundamental principles. Moreover, just as there are 1+7 principles that generate the form or "causal" (*rūpa*) level, so there are 1+7 predispositions (namely, knowledge and the other 7 predispositions) that generate the "noncausal" or phenomenal world. Furthermore, the numbers within the 50 "categories" appear to be more than random lists. There are 62 subvarieties of the 5 misconceptions, 28 varieties of dysfunction, and 9 varieties of contentment, all of which numbers have astronomical significance.[59] Twelve lunar months make only 354 days, and the conflict between the lunar year and the solar year was dealt with in ancient India by inserting an extra month every thirty months. Sixty-two lunar months are approximately equivalent to 60 solar months, and so by inserting an extra month every 30 months, the problem was solved. Twenty-eight (specifically, 27 days plus 8 hours) is, of course, the approximate number of solar days needed for the moon to pass through its cycle of relations to the fixed stars, and the heavens were divided into 27 or 28 portions (*nakṣatra*) to mark this cyclic progression. The number 9 is likewise common in ancient India as the number of "planets" (sun, moon, the five basic planets, plus Rāhu and Ketu). The numbers 62, 28, and 9, in other words, appear to be largely nocturnal and/or lunar variants of diurnal and/or solar numbers such as 30 and 60. In ancient India there were 360 days in the solar year, 30 days in the month and 7 days in the week. Seasons were determined by combining months

in dyads (of 60 days each), making a total of 6 seasons for one year (or, in other words, 360 days).[60] The ancient Indians, of course, learned most of their astronomy from the Greeks and from ancient Near Eastern sources, and one important system of calculation for astronomical purposes was the sexagesimal system (as opposed to the decimal system) in which 1 = 60 (and which comes down even to modern times in our 60-minute hour and 60-second minute).[61] One cannot help but wonder if the Sāṃkhya use of the number 60 (*ṣaṣṭitantra*) ("the system or science of 60 topics") may be somehow related to archaic astronomical traditions such as this.

Some further hints about the possible significance of Sāṃkhya numbers may also be found in the apparently unlikely context of ancient acoustical theory. Ernest McClain in his *Myth of Invariance* has shown that the ancient Greek-Hindu diatonic scale with two similar tetrachords encompasses D e^{b} f G A b^{b} (b) c D (when rising) and D c ♯ b A Gf♯ (f) e D (when falling).[62] The octave increment is a ratio of 1 :2, and if one wishes to give expression to the ratios between the 7 tones of the scale in the smallest possible whole numbers, the sequence is 30, 32, 36, 40, 45, 48, (50), 54, 60 or the ratio 30:60. Moreover, if one wishes to reduce this sequence to its smallest integers in a formulaic manner, one has the formula $2^{p}.3^{q}.5^{r}.\leqq 60$.[63] That is to say, all of the tones in the basic scale can be reduced to 2, 3, and 5 in the following manner: $30 = 2\cdot3\cdot5$; $32 = 2^{5}$; $36 = 2^{2}\cdot3^{2}$; $40 = 2^{3}\cdot5$; $45 = 3^{2}\cdot5$; $48 = 2^{4}\cdot3$; $50 = 2\cdot5^{2}$; $54 = 2\cdot3^{3}$ and $60 = 2^{2}\cdot3\cdot5$.[64] Similarly, if one wishes to give expression to the 11 semitones of the chromatic scale, one needs a multiple of 60, namely, 360, and the resulting set of smallest whole numbers to express the ratios would be 360, 384, 400, 432, 450, 480, 540, 576, 600, 648, 675, and 720, and a revised formula $2^{p}\cdot3^{q}\cdot5^{r}\leqq 720$.[65] McClain argues that both formulas were widely known in the ancient world, and that the Ṛg Vedic poets knew of these sequences (as can be seen in the number sequences of such hymns as RV I.164). McClain also argues that many of the large cosmological numbers in the epics and Purāṇas reflect these ancient acoustical or "tonal" formulas.[66] The former formula ($2^{p}\cdot3^{q}\cdot5^{r}\leqq 60$) is basic to ancient Greek and Indian tonal theory. The latter formula $2^{p}\cdot3^{q}\cdot5^{r}\leqq 720$) was the "tonal basis" for astronomical extensions based on the 360-day solar year.

Returning, however, to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the system is built largely on dyads, triads, and pentads with other prime numbers playing an important role on the principles level, and the system overall is referred as "the system or science of 60 topics." The formula $2^{p}\cdot3^{q}\cdot5^{r}\leqq 60$, in other words, does appear to fit the Sāṃkhya case in an intriguing and provocative way, and one wonders if such ancient traditions of mathematical (and astronomical/musical) theorizing represent the intellectual

environment in which the ancient Sāṃkhya teachers first began their philosophical work. Moreover, we know that Sāṃkhya philosophy did involve cosmology and/or astronomy and that some of the Sāṃkhya numbers reflect possible astronomical phenomena. We know, furthermore, that Sāṃkhya philosophy (along with other traditions of ancient Indian speculation) sought to correlate macrocosmic and microcosmic phenomena so that each appears to recapitulate the other. Then, too, from the evidence of Yoga and Tantric materials, which frequently make use of Sāṃkhya notions, we know that there were elaborate speculations about the role and function of certain "tones," *mantras*, and patterns of recitation. In this connection, it might be briefly noted, one wonders if the Sāṃkhya conceptualization of "subtle element" (*tanmātra*) may be related to older phonetic speculation in which attempts were made to measure the length of sounds in terms of *mātrās*.[67] The term "*mātrā*" is, of course, also well known in Yoga traditions, in which the Yogin's breathing discipline is measured in *mātrās*.

It could be the case, therefore, that the Sāṃkhya enumerations overall are far from being arbitrary or random. There may have been operating some sort of archaic, but nevertheless rational, mathematical theorizing in which prime numbers, archaic acoustical theory (in music and sacred recitation), and cosmological/astronomical observation were crucial concerns. Again, of course, the possible parallel with Pythagoreanism in the ancient Greek tradition is obvious, for the Pythagoreans were likewise keen on relating number theory, musical acoustics, and astronomy to philosophy.[68]

It must be stressed once more that all of this is highly speculative and that further research is essential for building a plausible case. As Frauwallner, Hacker, and others have noted, however, the origins of Sāṃkhya appear to be very different from many of the other traditions of Indian philosophy.[69] Whereas much of Indian philosophy appears to have emerged from religious meditation and dialectical disputation, Sāṃkhya may well have derived from older "scientific" traditions. That Sāṃkhya does not appear to have a set of ancient *sūtras*, that it refers to itself as a *tantra* (specifically, *ṣaṣṭitantra*) and makes use (according to the *Yuktidīpikā*) of *tantrayuktis* or systematic "methodological devices," that it has affinities with cosmology/astronomy and medical theorizing, and that it unfolds seemingly endless patterns of enumeration may all suggest that the point of origin for Sāṃkhya is to be found in early scientific theorizing (in such subject areas as mathematics, astronomy, acoustics, and medicine). If such is the case, then a basic philosophical methodology focusing on rational enumeration would not at all be surprising.

Logic and epistemology. In attempting to piece together Sāṃkhya's logic and epistemology, a convenient point of departure is to refer to

what the Sāṃkhya teachers themselves considered to be the ten "fundamental matters" (*mūlikārtha*) requiring rational elucidation. These matters are as follows (using the formulations set forth in the *Jayamaṅgalā*, the *Tattvakaumudī*, and the *Yuktidīpikā*):

(1) The existence of materiality and consciousness (*astitva*);
(2) The uniformity or oneness of materiality (*ekatva*);
(3) The objectivity of materiality (*arthavattva*);
(4) The purposefulness or inherent teleology of materiality (*pārārthya*);
(5) The ontological distinction of consciousness (from materiality) (*anyatva*);
(6) The nonagency or nonactivity of consciousness (*akartṛbhāva*);
(7) The transactions that occur when materiality and consciousness are not distinguished from one another (*yoga*);
(8) The transactions that occur when materiality and consciousness are distinguished from one another (*viyoga*);
(9) The plurality of consciousnesses (*puruṣabahutva*);
(10) The continuous functioning of gross and subtle things even after consciousness and materiality have been distinguished (*sthitiḥ śarīrasya...śeṣavṛttiḥ*).[70]

These matters evidently pertain both to the "basic principle" realm and to the "predispositional" or "projective" realm (or, in other words, the "twofold creation" mentioned in SK 52). They also obviously refer to Sāṃkhya's two fundamental existents, consciousness and materiality. Items (2), (3), and (4), according to most commentators, deal with materiality in and of itself. Items (5), (6), and (9) deal with consciousness. Items (1), (7), (8), and (10) deal with the relation between consciousness and materiality. Commentaries inform us, further, that item (2) refers to preexistence of the effect and material causality or, in other words, the twenty-three inherent subdivisions of materiality; item (3) refers to the tripartite process; item (4) refers to the predispositions; items (5) and (6) refer to the absence of the tripartite process in consciousness; and items (7), (8), and (10) refer to the experience of frustration or liberation when materiality and consciousness are in relation to one another.[71]

These ten "fundamental matters" (*mūlikārtha*), making up the "form" realm and the "projective" realm (*tattva* and *bhāva*), when combined with the fifty "categories" (*padārtha*) of the "consequent" (*phala*) or "intellectual creation" (*pratyayasarga*), made up of the five misconceptions, the twenty-eight dysfunctions, the nine contentments, and the eight attainments, represent the "system or science of sixty topics" (*ṣaṣṭitantra*). The *ṣaṣṭitantra*, in other words, appears to be a shorthand way of referring to the three realms (*tattva*, *bhāva*, and

bhūta) that have been referred to throughout this exposition, the *tattva* realm being the ontological dyad, the *bhāva* realm being the epistemological triad, and the *bhūta* realm being the phenomenal, empirical pentad. Referring again to the computer and linguistic metaphors mentioned earlier, the *tattva* and *bhāva* realms represent as it were the hardware and software of the Sāṃkhya system, and the *bhūta* realm, the resulting printout; or, the *tattva* and *bhāva* realms represent as it were the deep-structural syntactic and semantic components of the Sāṃkhya system, and the *bhūta* realm the level of surface structure.

From an epistemological standpoint, the *bhūta* realm would obviously be the sphere of perception (*pratyakṣa, dṛṣṭa*) for this is the realm of ordinary experience. The *tattva* and *bhāva* realms, however, transcend ordinary experience (or are *nirupabhoga*) and can only be established on the basis of inferential reasoning (*anumāna*). Inference, therefore, must have had pride of place among the "instruments of knowledge" to the early Sāṃkhya teachers, for the ten "fundamental matters" could not persuasively be established in any other way. Moreover, if the sequence of inferences establishes that frustration itself is epistemic, then it certainly would follow that release from frustration is only possible by means of the path of inferential reasoning pursued in an appropriate meditative context. As Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts the matter in *Kārikā* 2.

> The revealed (or scriptural, means of removing frustration) are like the perceptible (that is to say, ultimately inadequate), for they are connected with impurity, destruction, and excess (or, in other words, are bound up with finite relations); a superior means, different from both, is the (discriminative) knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower (*jña* or *puruṣa*).

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that a significant portion of the so-called *ṣaṣṭitantra* would involve careful consideration of the logic of inference, and Frauwallner has provocatively shown that this was probably the case.[72] Piecing together quotations of Sāṃkhya authors from the work of Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi, Mallavādin, and Siṃhasūri, Frauwallner was able to reconstruct portions of an older Sāṃkhya discussion regarding the logic of inference. Frauwallner argues that his reconstructed text is a portion of Vārṣagaṇya's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and can be dated about the beginning of the fourth-century of the Common Era.[73] Whether or not one agrees with Frauwallner's conclusions regarding authorship and date of the reconstructed material, the content of the discussion is interesting and provides useful insights into early Sāṃkhya discussions of epistemology.

According to the reconstructed material, Sāṃkhya philosophy assigned primary status to inference among the instruments of knowledge

but also accepted perception and reliable testimony.[74] With respect to inference, the task is one of identifying what sort of relation (*sambandha*) is relevant in a given instance and then to infer an appropriate imperceptible or unknown relatum on the basis of a given perceptible relatum (*saṃbandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam*). In Sāṃkhya philosophy, according to the reconstructed material, seven types or kinds of relation (*saptasambandha*) were basic and fundamental, namely:

(1) "The relation between possession and possessor" (*svasvāmibhāvasaṃbandha*)—for example, a king and his servant;
(2) "The relation between primary and derivative" or "principal and secondary" (*prakṛtivikārasaṃbandha*)—for example, sweet milk and sour milk;
(3) "The relation between material effect and cause" (*kāryakāraṇasaṃbandha*)—for example, a wagon and its parts;
(4) "The relation between efficient cause and effect" (*nimittanaimittikasaṃbandha*)—for example, a potter and a pot;
(5) "The relation between source and offspring" (*mātrāmātrikasaṃbandha*)—for example, a tree and its branch;
(6) "The relation of cooperation or association" (*sahacārisaṃbandha*)—for example, two Cakravāka birds;
(7) "The relation of opposition or hostility" (*vadhyaghātakasaṃbandha*)—for example, a snake and an ichneumon.

Regarding the application of these relations to the fundamental principles of Sāṃkhya, the following would appear to be the case, according to Frauwallner's reconstruction:

(1) Possession and possessor—the relation between consciousness and materiality;
(2) Principal and secondary—the relation between materiality and its twenty-three subdivisions;
(3) Material effect and cause—the relation between *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*;
(4) Efficient cause and effect—the relation between *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* in their predispositional projections;
(5) Source and offspring—the relation between the subtle elements and the gross elements;
(6) Cooperation or association—the cooperating modality of the tripartite process; and
(7) Opposition or hostility—the negating modality of the tripartite process.[75]

Furthermore, according to the reconstructed discussion, various types of inference can be framed. Basically, there are two fundamental types, namely, inferences based on a specific perception in one situation

(*viśeṣato dṛṣṭa*) and inferences based on a specific perception in more than one situation (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*). The former would be the inference of fire because of the presence of smoke in a sepecific location so that each time one perceives the same smoke in that location, one infers the presence of fire. The latter would be the more general inference of the relation between fire and smoke so that whenever one perceives smoke, one infers the presence of fire. This more general inference, that is to say, inference based on general correlation (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*) in turn, is twofold, namely, *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat*. The former is inference-from-cause-to-effect : the imminent occurrence of rain may be inferred from the perception of gathering storm clouds. The latter is inference-from-effect-to-cause: when one perceives the rising level of water in a river, one infers that it has rained upstream. Moreover, it is also possible to infer what is in principle imperceptible (*atīndriya*) by means of inference based on general correlation, and such inferences may be framed directly (*vīta*) or through exclusion (*avīta*). The direct *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference is when an argument for a specific conclusion is set forth in its own form without reference to its opposing thesis. Such an inference follows a fivefold format of (a) an assertion to be proved (*sādhya*); (b) an appropriate reason (*sādhana*); (c) a concrete example (*nidarśana*); (d) an explanation relating the example to the assertion (*upasaṃhāra*); and (e) a drawing of the appropriate conclusion (*nigamana*). An exclusionary (*avīta*) *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference establishes a conclusion as a definite possibility or a distinct remaining possibility. One proceeds by refuting an opposing thesis and establishing one's own as a distinct remaining possibility. A *vīta* inference in Sāṃkhya philosophy, for example, might argue that sensations (hearing, touching, and so forth) give rise to experiences of pleasure, pain, and indifference. An *avīta* inference, for example, might seek to refute those who argue that the manifest world arises out of nonbeing and to seek to establish the existence of a primordial undifferentiated materiality as a distinct remaining possibility.[76]

Unfortunately, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and the subsequent commentarial tradition add little if anything to the Sāṃkhya treatment of the discussion of inference. Īśvarakṛṣṇa simply asserts that there are three varieties of inference (*anumāna*) (SK 5) and that inference is based on a relation between a "characteristic mark" (*liṅga*) and that which possesses or bears such a mark (*liṅgin*). He mentions only *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* as one of the three types, and he indicates that *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* can be used for establishing matters that are in principle imperceptible (*atīndriya*) (SK 6). He also comments that primordial materiality is imperceptible in principle because of its subtlety but that its existence can be inferred on the basis of its effects (SK 8). The various commentaries on the *Kārikā* suggest that the three types of inference Īśvarakṛṣṇa had in mind were *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato*

dṛṣṭa, but, generally speaking, the commentators seem to be following later Nyāya accounts of inference. Overall it must be admitted that the various discussions of inference in the Sāṃkhya literature proper are less than satisfactory and are not as informative as the reconstructed material that Frauwallner has put together from citations in the work of Sāṃkhya's opponents. Gauḍapāda suggests that *pūrvavat* is inference-from-cause-to-effect, *śeṣavat* is inference from a part to a whole (as when one infers that sea water is salty because a drop of it tastes salty), and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* is inference based on analogy (Gauḍapāda under SK 5). The *Jayamaṅgalā* (under SK 5) suggests that *pūrvavat* is inference-from-cause-to-effect and has to do with the future; *śeṣavat* is inference-from-effect-to-cause and has to do with the past; and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* is inference by analogy that has to do with the present. The *Māṭharavṛtti* (under SK 5) follows Gauḍapāda. Vācaspati Miśra's, *Tattvakaumudī* (under SK 5) appears to be following yet another approach when it is suggested that *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inferences are of the *vīta* type and *śeṣavat* is only *avīta* or exclusionary. The *Yuktidīpikā* suggests that *pūrvavat* is inference-from-cause-to-effect (for example, rain from gathering storm clouds), *śeṣavat* is inference-from-effect-to-cause (for example, seeing a child one infers a prior parental act of intercourse), and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* is inference related to generalities (*jāti*) that pertain at various times and places (for example, the general observation that where there is smoke, there is fire) (p. 38).

Regarding the manner in which inferences are to be framed, the discussions in the various Sāṃkhya texts are also less than satisfactory. Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself says nothing about the issue. The *Māṭharavṛtti* (SK 4-5) suggests that inferences may be framed with three members (namely, the assertion to be proved, or *pratijñā*, the reason, or *hetu*, and an appropriate illustration, or *udāharaṇa*) or with the standard five members (*pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, plus application, or *upasaṃhāra*, and conclusion, or *nigamana*). The latter more elaborate format is for convincing others (*parārtham anumānam*). The *Yuktidīpikā* suggests interestingly that older Sāṃkhya teachers used a ten-membered inferential format, the first five members of which provide a preliminary explication of a problem (*vyākhyāṅgabhūta*) in terms of (1) the desire to know (*jijñāsā*), (2) the occasion for doubt (*saṃśaya*), (3) the purpose for the undertaking (*prayojana*), (4) the likelihood of a solution (*śākyaprāpti*), and (5) the elimination of extraneous doubts (*saṃśayavyudāsa*), and the last five members of which constitute a persuasive demonstration or proof (*parapratipādanāṅgabhūta*), namely (6) the basic assertion to be proved (*pratijñā*), (7) the reason (*hetu*), (8) an appropriate illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*), (9) an appropriate application (*upasaṃhāra*) and (10) the drawing of a final conclusion (*nigamana*).[77]

As is well known, later classical Indian philosophy pursues the logic

of inference in a much more sophisticated and detailed manner, but very little remains of any important Sāṃkhya contribution to these discussions. It is perhaps clear enough, however, that Sāṃkhya's early concern for defining certain precise and important relations (*sapta saṃbandha*) and its concern for giving pride of place to inference (*anumāna*) and the proper formulation of the types of inference, all represent important bits of evidence for suggesting that Sāṃkhya philosophy played an important role in the formative stages of the history of epistemological and logical reflection in India.

Epistemology, of course, is not simply philosophical methodology, the logic of relations, and the framing of persuasive inferences, important as these matters were to the early Sāṃkhya teachers. Equally important were such issues as the number and definition of the instruments of knowledge, the functioning of the senses, mind, egoity, and intellect/will in the process of experience, the actual content of the arguments for such key notions as *satkārya*, *kāraṇakārya*, and *triguṇa*, the manner in which nondiscrimination occurs, the status of the external world, the manner in which knowing affects being, the relation between awareness (the transactions of intellect, egoity, and mind) and consciousness, and most important, the function of knowing with respect to ordinary experience and the ultimate experience of liberation from frustration. Most of these matters have been discussed in passing throughout this essay on the philosophy of Sāṃkhya, and the only remaining task is to bring them together in a systematic manner so that the Sāṃkhya epistemology is shown to be an integral part of the system as a whole.

Regarding the instruments of knowledge, Sāṃkhya philosophy accepts a threefold classification, namely, perception, inference, and reliable authority. Because knowing as reflective discerning is a constituent of tripartite process, there is a basic uniformity in the knowing process "from Brahmā down to a blade of grass," and it would be a mistake, therefore, to interpret the threefold classification as suggesting separate kinds of knowing. The process of knowing is uniform, according to the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (p. 29), but because of limiting conditions certain methodological variations can be described. Reflective discerning occurs through ascertainment or determination by the intellect, assisted by the self-awareness of egoity, the explication or intellectual elaboration of mind, and the functioning of the various sense and action capacities. Specific awarenesses (*vṛtti*), whether derivative from external objects or internal states, are processed through contacts with the sense capacities, mind, and egoity, and a determinate judgment is accomplished by the intellect. To the extent that reflective discerning occurs in immediate experience (SK 33) as a result of the contact of a sense capacity with an object (or a mind with an internal feeling), such reflective discern-

ing is known as perception. For ordinary persons such perceptions are limited to "specific" (*viśeṣa*) awarenesses related to the gross aspects of experience, but Yogins and other higher beings (for examples, gods) are also able to perceive "nonspecific" (*aviśeṣa*) matters such as the subtle elements (*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 35). To the extent that reflective discerning occurs as a result of reasoning from ordinary experience to the more general principles or relations invariably associated with ordinary experience and required in order to have ordinary experience, such reflective discerning is known as inference. There are three varieties of inference, as already described, and inferences, though dependent on perception, may extend, if properly framed, to matters that are imperceptible in principle (for example, establishing the existence of such matters as materiality and consciousness). To the extent that reflective discerning occurs as a result of the trustworthy verbal testimony of the Veda and *smṛti* teachings, or from the *ṛṣis* or holy men, who are free from personal biases, such reflective discerning is known as reliable authority and concerns matters that transcend perception and cannot be framed in a proper inference (for example, the precise sequence and ordering of the fundamental principles and matters relating to higher beings like the *māhātmyaśarīras*, and so forth).

All knowing transactions, however, whether from perception, inference, or reliable authority are for the sake of the consciousness (*puruṣārtha*) (SK, 31, 37, and 57).[78] That is to say, reflective discerning as the *sattva* constituent of tripartite process is but a part of its total functioning as a teleological but unconscious (*acetana*) material process, in much the same way, says Īśvarakṛṣṇa in *Kārikā* 57, as unconscious milk nourishes a young calf. The results of all knowing transactions, therefore, together with the total functioning of primordial materiality, are ascribed or belong finally to consciousness (*puruṣārtha*).

Moreover, because reflective discerning (*sattva*) is a constituent of a continuous tripartite process, Sāṃkhya describes the knowing process in terms of intellect, egoity, mind, and the various sense capacities actually assuming or becoming the various forms or manifestations that appear. Hearing assumes or becomes the vibration or sound heard; seeing becomes the color or form seen, and so forth. So, likewise, mind becomes the idea elaborated; egoity is the assimilation of the contents of experience to oneself (so that egoity, as it were, "makes" or "forms" itself, *ahaṃkāra*, *ahaṃ karomi*); and intellect becomes the final, total configuration insofar as it can be reflectively discerned in a pure *sattva* transparency.[79] Put another way, the process of knowing is simply a subtle material process in which reflective discerning (through intellect, egoity, mind, and the capacities) is inextricably allied with spontaneous activity (*rajas*)

and determinate formulation (*tamas, tanmātra, bhūta*). Hence, according to Sāṃkhya, all experience deriving from the pentadic or fivefold realm (*indriya, tanmātra, bhūta*) manifests itself initially as specific (*viśeṣa*) comfortable (*śānta*), uncomfortable (*ghora*), or bewildering (*mūḍha*) experiences, which upon reflection will finally reveal themselves as one or another constituent of tripartite process. The apparent subject-object dichotomy of ordinary experience will progressively show itself through the process of reflective discerning as *not* being a dichotomy. That is to say, ordinary or apparent subjectivity (intellect, egoity, mind, and the other internal capacities) will show itself as a modality of objectivity (*triguṇa* as *viṣaya*). Perception, inference, and reliable authority, then, represent one continuous process of reflective discerning (*sattva*) that progressively reveals the absence of consciousness, or perhaps better, that reveals the process of knowing as a material process "for the sake of another" (*parārtha, puruṣārtha*). As mentioned earlier, Sāṃkhya philosophy is, therefore, the antithesis of Hegelian philosophy. For Hegel, knowing is the progressive revelation of substance as subject. For Sāṃkhya, knowing is the progressive revelation of the ordinary or apparent subject (*antaḥkaraṇa, citta, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas*) as substance![80]

Primordial materiality as tripartite process is, according to Sāṃkhya, (a) undifferentiated (*avivekin*), (b) a content (*viṣaya*) (c) general (*sāmānya*) and, hence, intelligible in principle, (d) unconscious (*acetana*), and (e) inherently productive (*prasavadharmin*) (SK 11).

Moreover, primordial materiality can be shown to exist as the ultimate material cause,

(a) because that which is manifest is perceived to be limited (*parimāṇa*) (and no limited thing can itself serve as an ultimate cause without getting into an infinite regress),

(b) because all manifest things, insofar as their characteristics are uniform and/or homogeneous (*samanvaya*), require a single, ultimate cause as their causal source,

(c) because the emergence and/or process of that which is manifest presupposes a causal capacity (*śakti*) that enables emergence or process to occur,

(d) because that which is manifest is just a transformation and, hence, presupposes an ultimate cause different from it which is not a transformation, and

(e) because that which is manifest and, hence, defined in terms of ordinary space and time, presupposes an ultimate cause that is not so defined, and, hence, in which the manifest can reside prior to manifestation (SK 15-16).

Furthermore, according to Sāṃkhya, all manifest material effects

(*kārya*) already exist (*satkārya*) in the primal material cause in a potential state or condition prior to manifestation, because (a) something (namely, any material effect) cannot arise from nothing, (b) any material effect must have a common material basis (namely, a real relation) with its cause, (c) anything (namely, any manifest effect) cannot arise from just everything, (d) something (namely, an ultimate cause) can only produce what it is capable of producing, and (e) the very nature or essence of the cause is nondifferent from the effect (as, for example, a cloth and its threads) (SK 9).

The manifest world, then, is a series of material effects from a primal material cause. The effects preexist potentially in the cause and, thus, are only manifest transformations of one basic "existent" (viz, primordial materiality). That which links material effect to material cause is tripartite process, which first shows itself as specific satisfying, frustrating, and confusing experiences but is finally reflectively discerned as a closed causal system of reductive materialism in which consciousness is absent.

As mentioned earlier in the section on contentless consciousness, Sāṃkhya presumably could have settled with the elimination of the old Upaniṣadic "ghost in the machine" and developed itself as a pure materialism or as a variant of Buddhist no-self theorizing. Such moves, however, would have required a rejection of the Vedic heritage or a rejection of any significant notion of freedom or release. More than that, however, it would have required reducing its epistemology to some sort of epiphenomenal status within an overall materialist position. Sāṃkhya philosophy rejected such moves and introduced, instead, its "eccentric" dualism and its anomalous notion of contentless or nonintentional consciousness, which has already been described.

Epistemologically, the introduction of consciousness means a shift from reductive materialism to critical realism.[81] Knowing and the content of knowing are separated from an uncharacterizable (*asāmānya*) "presupposition for knowing" (*jña, puruṣa*) that is neither the material nor efficient cause of the manifest world and can only be pointed to as being "not this, not that" (*neti, neti*). Moreover, the "presupposition of knowing" cannot really know, because the process of knowing resides finally in intellect as the focus of reflective discerning (*sattva*). Consciousness is only a mysterious, transcendent, yet immanent, presence (*sākṣitva*) that enables knowing to function but finally reveals that knowing itself falls outside of consciousness or, put another way, that knowing itself is only a dimension of manifest being. Thus, finally, for Sāṃkhya, the manifest-external world is fully real, as is the mysterious presence of transcendent consciousness, and the final discrimination (*viveka*) of the intellect is the realization that the two "existents" are distinct (*guṇapuruṣāntraopalabdhi,*

as the *Yuktidīpikā* characterizes it), with knowing itself being reduced to the *guṇa* side of the dualism.

What shows itself as being unreal for Sāṃkhya are the misconstrued relations (*anyathākhyāti*, *sadasatkhyāti*) projected on what is real prior to the discrimination of the triparite process from consciousness. Because consciousness is contentless and nonintentional, it appears to take on the content of the tripartite process, and that process appears as if possessing consciousness. There is a beginningless predisposition towards nondiscrimination, which leads naturally towards the experiences of bondage and frustration (SK 55), and this beginningless predisposition towards nondiscrimination functions in Sāṃkhya almost like a Kantian a priori form of intuition—in the sense that ordinary experience always shows itself under this limitation or condition. This basic nondiscrimination is a fundmental predisposition of the intellect and generates along with the other predispositions the "intellectual creation" and the phenomenal, empirical world of ordinary space, time, and causality (the *phala* realm or the *bhūta* realm). Also inherent in the intellect, however, is a natural tendency towards discrimination that reflects the true or real *tattva* dimension of what is. Seven of the predispositions, in other words, foster the primal nondiscrimination and predispose the transmigrating intellect to become further involved in the experiences of bondage and frustration; only one predisposition (namely, knowledge) fosters a predisposition towards a correct apprehension of what truly is, namely, the tripartite process and pure consciousness (SK 63), in which ordinary space, time, and causality show themselves as the ongoing transformations (*pariṇāma*) and combinations (*saṃghāta*) of an undifferentiated (*avivekin*) or uniform primordial materiality (*mūlaprakṛti* as *triguṇa*, *satkārya*, and *kāraṇakārya*) in which consciousness is absent and to which consciousness is indifferent (*udāsīna*, *mādhyasthya*). Sāṃkhya, in other words, wants to make a clear distinction between "phenomenal" and "noumenal," almost in a Kantian sense, but with the important difference, of course, that the Kantian "noumenal" is knowable.[82] For Sāṃkhya what is finally truly "noumenal" is consciousness, but unlike Kant, Sāṃkhya dissociates "consciousness" from "awareness" ontologically, thereby making a claim that Kantian philosophy or Western philosophy in general does not address.[83]

Finally, however, *both* frustration and liberation are shown to be related to the epistemological transactions of the intellect in its ongoing functioning. In other words, bondage and release pertain only to the tripartite process, never to consciousness, although the presence (*sākṣitva*) of consciousness allows all transactions to become manifest. Knowing, therefore, cannot change what is; it can only create interpretive perspectives that either perpetuate conventional

views about the world that are insufficiently discriminating, or that reflect the true nature of things. Knowing, then, when insufficiently pursued, is at the root of our bondage to frustration and rebirth (*duḥkha*, *saṃsāra*, *bandha*), but it may also become the occasion, when properly cultivated, for a glimpse of the true nature of things, one aspect of which is an intelligible, coherent, and determinate world (*triguṇa*, *mūlaprakṛti*) and the other aspect of which is the presence of nonintentional consciousness (*puruṣa*) *for* which the world exists.