sprout. This consequence is demonstrated in the twentieth chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise*:

> If a cause and its result were the same,
> The produced and the producer would be the same.

Candrakīrti's *Introduction to the "Middle Way"* says:

> It is meaningless for a thing to arise from itself.
> It is illogical for something that has arisen to arise again.
> If you think that what has already arisen arises again,
> Then you will not find the arising of a sprout and so on.

The same text says:

> Therefore this notion that a thing arises from itself
> Is untenable in both conventional and ultimate terms.

In summary, production from self entails two sets of consequences. First, if things were produced just from themselves, as asserted by the Sāṃkhyas, then they would exist at the time of the cause; if they already exist at the time of the cause, then it would be meaningless for them to be produced again. Second, if things were produced just from themselves, then they would arise repeatedly; if they arise repeatedly, then their production would be endless.

[(2)) Refuting production from others]

All Buddhist schools except the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka accept production from other causes. Even the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school accepts that results arise from other causes and conditions conventionally. These schools try to prove their position by using logical reasoning and citing scriptures. In certain sutras Buddha teaches that there are six causes, four conditions, and four results. So, these followers argue, because Buddha says that a sense consciousness arises from four conditions, there is production from others. What are these conditions? The four necessary conditions for a

visual consciousness that sees blue, for example, are: the empowering condition, the object condition, the immediately preceding condition, and the causal condition. The empowering condition is the sense power, in this case the subtle eye organ. Any sense consciousness functions under the power of a subtle sense organ, which enables it to perceive its respective object. A sense consciousness dominated by the eye organ cannot perceive objects of other senses. The second necessary condition required for sense perception is the object itself. Without the presence of its object, in this case blue, a visual consciousness that sees blue cannot arise. The third necessary condition is the immediately preceding condition. Every moment of consciousness arises from an earlier moment of consciousness; so here the cause and the effect are the same in being moments of consciousness. In order to see a color or a shape, there must have been another moment of consciousness prior to that moment of visual perception. It may be an earlier moment of visual consciousness or a moment of mental consciousness that directed the eye to look at the object. In any case, the immediately preceding condition of any consciousness is also a consciousness; so more precisely, it is a "similar" immediately preceding condition. In contrast, although external things may also be said to have an immediately preceding condition, that cause is not necessarily similar to the result. The fourth necessary condition, the causal condition, is a general category that includes all the other causes of a sense consciousness apart from the three conditions already mentioned. There are so many other causes of visual consciousness, such as karma, the body, the eyeball that houses the eye organ, light, and so on. In brief, many followers of Buddhist tenets claim that there is arising from other causes.

It is important to bear in mind that in this context *others* means inherently existent others. Those who propound that things arise from other causes basically assume that causes and conditions exist inherently or from their own side. Thus the lower schools' position is that an inherently existent result arises from inherently existent other causes. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, if a cause and its effect exist inherently, then they must be ultimately different from each other by nature; if a cause and effect are ultimately different from each other, they must be independent. Ultimately different entities are independent of each other because they exist inherently

by their own power and do not depend on each other or anything else. Based on this understanding of inherent existence, the Prāsaṅgikas present two refuting consequences to disprove production from other causes. First, if results arise from inherently different other causes, then darkness would arise from a burning flame, because these would also be inherently different from each other. Second, if results arise from inherently different other causes, then anything, whether a result or not, would arise from anything else, whether a cause or not, because these would likewise be inherently other. There would be no way to identify an appropriate cause of something, because both an appropriate cause and an inappropriate cause would be inherently different from the result, in exactly the same way. In other words, nobody could say that a certain cause produces a particular result and not another, because all causes are similarly unrelated to their effects. A bright flame could cause complete darkness because a flame would be inherently other than that result. Generally, in our noninherently existent universe, light is the opposite of darkness, which is why lamps are lit in the evening. But if things were to arise from inherently different causes, then a burning flame and its quality of eliminating darkness would be unrelated, so there would be no reason for darkness not to be produced by a burning flame. If all causes and effects were inherently different, then anything could arise from anything else, because everything would be similarly unrelated.

Tsongkhapa explains this consequence using the example of a seed and a sprout. It is commonly accepted that a seed transforms into a sprout; they are cause and effect. But for someone who accepts that a seed and its sprout exist by their own independent nature, then the difference between a rice sprout and its seed, which is its cause, and the difference between a rice sprout and fire, which is not its cause, would appear the same. In each case, their way of differing would not be merely nominal but by their own nature. So since cause and effect — in this case a seed and its sprout — would be different by their own natures, they would appear to be just as unrelated and independent from each other as two things that cannot be causally related, such as a seed and fire. There would be no way to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate causes, because the difference between each set of things would appear the same to our mind — an inherent difference.

So how could we say that a rice sprout arises from a rice seed but does not arise from fire?

This argument reveals an internal contradiction in the view of inherent existence. If we make a distinction between a sprout being produced from one thing and not from another, then the difference between a sprout and its seed and the difference between a sprout and fire cannot be the same. It must be possible to distinguish between the way in which these two sets of things are different. However, if all these things are asserted to be inherently existent, then we cannot discern any disparity between the way an effect differs from an appropriate cause and the way it differs from an inappropriate cause. For the arising of a sprout would have no dependence on either an appropriate or an inappropriate cause. Candrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Introduction to the 'Middle Way'"* makes this point clearly:

> Just as a rice seed that is the cause of a sprout and the rice sprout that is its result are different, so fire, charcoal, a barley seed, and so on, which are not its cause, are different from it. Just as a rice sprout arises from a rice seed that is different from it, so it would arise from fire, charcoal, a barley seed, and so on. And just as from a rice seed there arises a rice sprout that is different from it, so a pot, a woolen shawl, and so on would arise. But that is never seen. Therefore this [arising from an inherently different cause] does not exist.

If a rice seed and its resultant rice sprout were completely, independently, and inherently different by their own nature, the difference between them would be absolute. They would be as different as a rice seed and a pot, or a rice seed and anything else unrelated to it. A rice seed would no more cause a sprout than it could cause a pot or a fire, because they would all be equally unrelated. Therefore a rice seed could give rise to anything, and anything could arise from it. Consequently, anything would arise from anything.

The opponents believe that we cannot establish such a general pervasion. They say that logical inference works only in a specific case;

they do not accept that what follows in one context also follows in other contexts. They do not accept that we can know a general pervasion, such as "Wherever there is smoke there is fire, so if there is no fire then there is no smoke." They assert that we can know only a specific instance of this pervasion, such as "There is fire on that mountain pass because there is smoke up there," or "There is fire in the kitchen because there is smoke in the kitchen." As a result, they may not see that if a rice sprout arises from a rice seed that is inherently different from it, then a rice sprout could also arise from fire or a barley seed. They do not accept a pervasion to be carried over to other cases but accept it to be limited to a specific case. We already considered the refutation of such a limited pervasion in chapter 14 where Tsongkhapa demonstrates the problems in Jayānanda's position. In brief, although knowledge of a pervasion is initially developed on the basis of a particular example, it cannot be limited to that basis. If it were, then this limited pervasion itself would need to be established by some other example, and so on, ad infinitum.[166] It is clear that Candrakīrti does not propound such a limited notion of a pervasion.

For someone who accepts that a result arises from an inherently different cause, it follows that everything would arise from everything; or if did not arise, it would never arise. Furthermore, for someone who believes that causes and effects are utterly unrelated things, there would be no basis on which to distinguish a correct cause from an incorrect cause. By accepting that causes and effects are independent and inherently different, one loses the special relationship between an actual cause and effect. A possible cause would be just as different from its result as an impossible cause. The twentieth chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise* says:

> If cause and effect were utterly different,
> Then a cause and a noncause would be equal.

Also, Candrakīrti's *Introduction to the "Middle Way"* says:

> If a separate thing arises in dependence on another separate thing,
> Then heavy darkness would arise from tongues of flame,
> And everything would arise from everything,

Because everything [causally related] would be utterly separate, like noncauses.

This kind of consequence cannot be rebutted by saying that a rice seed and its sprout belong to the same continuum, whereas a rice seed and a barley seed or fire do not. As explained earlier, if things are inherently different rather than dependently different, then they cannot belong to the same continuum (see chapter 18). Moreover, this kind of consequence cannot be countered by saying that it is only ever seen that a rice seed produces a rice sprout and not barley. Although it is true that specific things are definite causes of other particular things, this point cannot be used to refute the argument here. Why not? The subject under discussion is the notion of difference established on the basis of an object's inherent nature. We are not arguing about the notion of difference established by conceptual or linguistic convention, where it is certain that cows do not give birth to horses and so on. We are discussing how things exist or do not exist in an ultimate sense. When the question concerns what is examined by ultimate analysis, we cannot answer it by appealing to objects of conventional understanding.

[(3)) Refuting production from both self and others]

Certain non-Buddhists, such as the Jains, accept the view that things arise from both self and others. For example, they say that a clay pot is produced from self and others. The resultant clay pot is made of clay; the pot and the raw material used to make it are the same entity and belong to the same substantial continuum. So a clay pot is produced from itself. In addition, a clay pot is produced by a potter using a wheel, a kiln, and so on. So a clay pot is produced from others. Taking the example of the continuum of a sentient being, for instance Devadatta, they say he arises from himself, in the sense that he takes rebirth in this life in dependence on his vital life force — something that exists throughout his former lives — and he is the same entity as this vital life force. They say that Devadatta arises from others, in the sense that his birth depends on his father, mother, and his karma, and these are different from Devadatta. The Jains conclude that