

2 *Debate*

Sources

Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition of the Middle Way*

Kensur Lekden's oral teachings

Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings

Buddhapalita's refutation—in commentary on the first chapter of Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way*—of the Samkhya position that an effect is produced from a cause which is of the same nature as itself drew heavy criticism from Bhavaviveka.³⁴⁶

An examination of Buddhapalita's refutation, Bhavaviveka's criticism, and Chandrakrti's defense of Buddhapalita reveals central differences between the two divisions of Madhyamika: Prasangika, founded by Buddhapalita/Chandrakrti, and Svatantrika, founded by Bhavaviveka.

The Samkhya position is:

The cause of a barley shoot is a barley seed, and its minor causes are water, manure, and so forth. The nature of the cause and of the minor causes is partless, and thus the nature of the seed is the nature of the water and of the manure, and the nature of the water is the nature of the

seed and of the manure, and so on. For these causes have a common effect.

The barley shoot exists at the time of the barley seed because the barley shoot abides in the nature of its causes at the time when they are still causes and when the effect or manifestation has not yet been produced. For example, a pot exists in the nature of the clay. Therefore, the nature of the causes and the nature of the effect are one and thus are each other.

Though some Samkhyas speak not of production but of manifestation, the relationship of oneness of the nature and the manifestation is the same as with producer and produced, or cause and effect.

Buddhapalita flings consequences at the Samkhyas' assertion. First he sets his thesis:

Things are not produced from their own entities.

Then in answer to anyone's wondering what fallacies there are in asserting production of something from that which is of the same nature, he gives a brief refutation in the form of two consequences:

There are the fallacies that their re-production would be senseless and, not only that, would also be endless.

Buddhapalita's actual words are: **'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'**

The way he flings the consequence that re-production would be senseless is:

It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.³⁴⁷

The Samkhya, however, holds that what is existent but unmanifest must be made manifest. Therefore, he might answer that it is not entailed by something's already existing in its own entity

that its production again is senseless. In that case, the second consequence of the endlessness of its production is flung:

It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its production is endless because, though it already exists in its own entity, there is sense in (or a need for) its re-production.

If the existent requires re-production, then even when the effect is manifest, it would still require re-production because it exists. Buddhapalita says, 'The production again of things already existent in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent they are produced, they would never not be produced.'

The Samkhya holds that what has already been *manifested* need not be produced; therefore, he might again answer that there is no entailment. However, his answer does not hit the mark, for by switching from the vocabulary of production to that of manifestation he cannot escape inquiry about whether the manifestation exists at the time of its unmanifest state. If he says that the manifestation does not exist at the time of its unmanifest state, he would fall from his view that all products, *though formerly existent*, are manifested by causes because the manifestation would not exist at the time of its unmanifest state. Therefore, he might accept that the manifestation existed from the time of its unmanifest state. He would be saying that it is not entailed by a manifestation's existing at the time of its unmanifest state that it would not be produced again. Then the consequence of endlessness is flung:

It follows about the subject, a manifestation, that its production is endless because, though it exists from the time of its unmanifest state, it has a need for production again.

CONSEQUENCES AND SYLLOGISMS

Consequences (*prasaṅga*) are used to generate in an opponent a consciousness that infers a thesis.³⁴⁸ Unwanted consequences