

'That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system.³⁷⁵ His explanation affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] would contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.'

We [that is, Chandrakirti] view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable.

CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST THE FIRST FALLACY

The first fallacy was that Buddhapalita could not refute production from self because he did not state a reason and an example of an autonomous syllogism. Chandrakirti's answer is that through disputation with contradictory consequences an opponent can indeed come to accept that there is no production from self. Buddhapalita demonstrated the inner contradictions in production from self with two consequences:

It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity.³⁷⁶

If it is answered that the consequence is not entailed by the reason, the second consequence is:

It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production is endless because though it already exists in its own entity, there is need for its re-production.

The opponent can perceive that these consequences contradict his tenets because a Sāmkhya asserts that production again (into a manifest state) is sensible (even though he does not assert that the production again of the already manifest is sensible) and does not assert that products are produced endlessly. **Thereby, Buddhāpalita shows that the proofs for the existence of production from self are unreasonable, for a Sāmkhya can find no example of re-production of that which has already been produced. Since senseless re-production and endless production of that which has already been produced contradict his own tenets about production, the Sāmkhya is caused to fall away from his assertion of production from self.**

Furthermore, if one is able to show such inner contradictions and the opponent perceives them yet persists in his error, there is no point in further stating reasons and examples of autonomous syllogisms. Bhāvaviveka's rushing to state autonomous syllogisms just shows his liking for logic.

Also, if one is a Madhyamika who refutes all extremes as in the *King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra*, one should not use autonomous syllogisms, in which the reason has inherently existent presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. This is because a Madhyamika has no assertion of other positions among the four extremes and so forth, such as that things inherently exist, utterly do not exist, both inherently exist and inherently disintegrate, or that there is an inherently existent middle way that forsakes the two extremes of existence and non-existence. A Madhyamika has no thesis which contradicts the Madhyamika system.

Nagarjuna's *Refutation of Objections* says:³⁷⁷

If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own
thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.

It is not being said that a Madhyamika has no theses; he merely has no theses that inherently exist. He has no theses upholding

the existence of phenomena which can be found under analysis. However, Madhyamikas do have both negative and positive theses.³⁷⁸ That they have negative theses is clear in the refutations of going and coming and of production, for instance. Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* says (II.8):

Respectively, a goer is not going,
 A non-goer also is not going,
 Indeed what third other than
 A goer and a non-goer is going?

Also, (1.1):

There is never production
 Anywhere of any phenomenon
 From itself, from others,
 From both, or causelessly.

Madhyamikas also have positive theses as in Nagarjuna's *Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment*, 'I assert dependently arisen activities to be like dreams and magicians' illusions.' His *Refutation of Objections*³⁷⁹ says, 'We do not set forth a non-assertion of conventionalities.' His *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* says:

Those who assert dependent phenomena
 As like moons in water,
 As not real and not unreal,
 Are not tricked by views.

His *Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava)* says, 'You [Buddha] have taught agent and object as conventionalities. Your assertion is that they are established as mutually dependent.'

Also, Chandrakirti says in his own commentary on his *Supplement*, 'The wise should think that this position is faultless and beneficial and should definitely assert it.' Also, 'Therefore, because dependent imputation is asserted in the same way as the assertion of dependent-arising as just conditional, it does not follow for our position that all conventionalities are annihilated; it is suitable also for the opponent to assert just this.' Throughout