

From Joe Wilson, Candrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning:  
Meditation on the Selflessness of Persons

P 8-9

Candrakīrti said (VI : 120ed)

*Having understood that the object of this is self,  
the yogi negates self.*

'Self' in the first line means the nominally existent person, the so called mere-I. This self is a phenomenon that exists conventionally. It is the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection. The false view of a transitory collection errs in conceiving this mere-I to be an inherently existent I, or inherently existent person. This inherently existent person is the self in the second line of the above quotation. It does not exist either ultimately or conventionally and it is the object to be negated\* when the yogi meditates on an emptiness of a person. The emptiness of a person is a person's lack of inherent existence.

P 17-18

'False view of a transitory collection' translates the Tibetan term 'jig-tshogs-la-lta-ba which is in turn a translation of the Sanskrit original satkāyaḍṛṣṭi. The Tibetan literally reads "view of what is a collection and is disintegrating".

Satkāya comes from the verbal sad which is from the root √sad, to perish, plus kaya, corpus, collection. The sat is not from the verbal root √as (to be) which has sat as its present participle meaning being or existent. Contemporary Sanskritists, however, appear to build the word from the sat of √as. [Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 553]

The "disintegrating collection" is the collection of mental and physical aggregates. If the object of observation of the false view of a transitory collection is the mere-I, why is it called a view of the aggregates?

Nāgārjuna says in his Precious Garland of Advice for the King:

*As long as a conception of the aggregate exists,  
So long therefore does a conception of I exist.  
Further, when the conception of I exists,  
There is action; from that further there is birth.*

Again, from that same text,

*Just as without depending on a mirror  
An image of one's face  
Is not seen, so also [there is no] I  
Which does not depend on the aggregates.*

Although the actual object of a false view of a transitory collection is the mere-I, this object will not appear unless the aggregates appear first. The mere-I, as mentioned previously, exists as an imputation to the five aggregates. If the five aggregates do not appear, then neither can it. Moreover, unless the five aggregates are conceived to exist truly the false view of a transitory collection does not come into being. Thus, Tsong-ka-pa explains that a conception of a self of phenomena other than persons is a cause of the conception of I and Mine.