

page 118 “When valid cognitions are divided, there are two: direct and inferential. This enumeration of valid cognitions as two is definite, for more than these would be unnecessary and less would not include them all. However, this definite enumeration eliminates wrong conceptions, not any third possibility, for whatever is a valid cognition is not necessarily one of those two. This is because it is difficult to posit valid cognition in general as either of those two.” Dharmakīrti, in his Commentary on [Dignāga’s] ‘Compendium on Valid Cognition’, proves extensively that there are only two valid cognitions by way of showing that more than two are unnecessary and less than two would not include them all.

page 119 “The enumeration of valid cognitions as two is definite because the lord of reasoning [Dharmakīrti] said [in the third chapter of his Commentary on [Dignāga’s] ‘Compendium on Valid Cognition’], “Because objects of comprehension are two, valid cognitions are two.”

Whatever is an object of comprehension by a valid cognition is necessarily either a specifically or a generally characterized phenomenon. Specifically characterized phenomena are taken as the apprehended objects of valid direct perceptions and generally characterized ones as those of inferential valid cognitions. Because all objects of comprehension are in this sense taken as the objects of just these two valid cognitions, the number of valid cognitions is definitely two

page 77 When inferences are divided, there are three:

- 1 inference through belief (*āpta-anumāna, yid ches rjes dpag)
 - 2 inference through renown (*prasiddha-anumāna, grags pa’i rjes dpag}
 - 3 inference by the power of the fact (*vastu-bala- anumāna, dugos stobs rjes dpag)
- This is a division of inferences by way of their entities.

The definition of an inference through belief is a determinative knower that, depending on its basis, a correct sign of belief, is incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension, a very hidden phenomenon. An illustration is the inferential consciousness that realizes that the scriptural [statement], “From giving, resources; from ethics, a happy [migration],” is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it.

Thus, an inference through belief is one that has as its basis a sign of belief, a sign that is believed in, in dependence upon which one realizes a very hidden object of comprehension.

With regard to the illustration cited here, the scripture is saying that from engaging in giving, a person comes to have resources, and from maintaining pure ethics, a person attains a happy migration. However, one does not need inference through belief to realize just that through giving resources are achieved, for this is not a very hidden phenomenon; to realize the very hidden phenomena such as the specific action of giving, its entity, its object, the giver, the time of giving, and so forth involved in the arising of a specific resource, one needs inference through belief. With regard to the statement, “From ethics, a happy migration,” what is being realized is a specific entity of ethics, what one avoided, with respect to whom one kept ethics, the time of keeping it, the keeper, and so forth. All these can be realized only through an inference through belief as they are very hidden phenomena.

page 78 Such a scripture is “incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it” in that the meaning of the scripture is definite as just what it says. One realizes this incontrovertibility by means of a sign of belief. What such a sign is can be understood through stating the above illustration in syllogistic form: The subject, the scriptural statement, “From giving, resources; from ethics, a happy migration,” is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it because of being a scripture free from the three contradictions. The sign of belief — the reason believed in — is that the scripture is free from the three contradictions. To be free from such means that the scripture is not damaged, or harmed, by the three valid cognitions: valid direct perception, inference by the power of the fact, and inference through belief. These are consciousnesses realizing the three types of objects of comprehension

- 1 the manifest (abhimukhī, mngon gyur)
- 2 slightly hidden (kimcid-parokṣa, cung zad lkog gyur)
- 3 very hidden (atyartha-parokṣa, shin tu lkog gyur).

The manifest are those things that can be seen with ordinary direct perception. The slightly hidden are those that must be established for common beings in dependence on a sign by the power of the fact, such as liberation and omniscience, the selflessness of the person, the subtle impermanence of sound, and so forth. Very hidden phenomena are such things as the subtle features of the cause and effect of actions, as taught in the scriptural statement, “Through giving, resources,” where the object given, the recipient of the gift, the giver, the time of giving, and so forth [leading to a specific resource] are all very hidden phenomena. These are accessible to inference, but only that through belief, which is also called scriptural inference.