

the mere existence of arising, cessation, and enduring does not need to be found by a rational mind through analysis. As for you, since you maintain that arising, cessation, etc., withstand analysis, and accept the things in those categories as well, if they are not found through the analysis we considered previously, their existence *would* be undermined, because if they exist in the way they are accepted, they would have to be found through those reasoning processes, and they are not found.

*Prasannapadā* presents the reason that the critique Candrakīrti leveled against the others does not apply to him as well as follows: We do not accept that things withstand analysis, but we do accept them according to ordinary conventions without analysis [59a]. Therefore, this is the way one should reply: One should not say that one has no position, thinking that since analytic reasoning refutes all arising, enduring, and cessation if one maintained a position, the critique that one levels against others will be seen to apply to oneself as well. This should be understood in the context of every chapter, because it enables one to draw the line between that which is to be refuted and that which is not to be refuted and to draw the distinction between that which does not withstand rational analysis and that which is undermined by rational analysis. Every chapter depends on these distinctions.

### 1.2.1.1.2.3.3 Refutation of the thesis that cessation is causeless

The third section has two parts: the arguments presented in *Prasannapadā* and the arguments presented in *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*.

#### 1.2.1.1.2.3.3.1 The arguments presented in *Prasannapadā*

Here the *Commentary* refutes the view of those who maintain that cessation is causeless and that the produced is momentary by arguing that since they would be without cause, it would follow that they would be without cessation, and how could entities that lack momentariness and cessation be produced? Therefore all of this would be inconsistent.

Those who assert the causelessness of cessation maintain that cessation— not remaining for a moment after the moment of coming into existence— arises from the very cause of that thing, [188] and that apart from that cause there is no other subsequent cause. Since the disintegration in the second moment is a nonentity, they maintain that it is utterly causeless. Therefore, suppose someone asked: How does it make sense for you to present the in-

consistency of entities not being produced and the produced being momentary to those who maintain that disintegration is causeless on the ground of the absence of momentary cessation?

In response to this, as will be explained later, cessation and noncessation are similar with respect to whether or not they are given rise to by causes. Therefore, if that which has not remained for the second moment had no cause, then, since a cause would not be necessary for that which does not remain in existence in the second moment, it would not be momentary. In that case, neither could the thing be established as a produced phenomenon nor would it be tenable to assert that the produced phenomenon is momentary [59a].

This was a refutation through argument; now here is a refutation through scripture. When the teacher said that through birth as the condition, aging and death come about, and that the characteristics of the produced are included among the compound aggregates, did he not thereby clearly say that cessation has a cause? He did, because death is the disintegration of the sentient being, and that arises conditioned by birth. Saying this, he established that cessation is given rise to by a cause [Vasubandhu, *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, *Sems tsaṃ she* 15a].

His assertion that the four characteristics—arising, enduring, aging, and ceasing—are dispositional aggregates can be illustrated as follows: If we take the example of a patch of blue, since it has the four activities—the activity of arising, etc.,—blueness is characterized as produced. Since for blueness—as an agent—to be its own activity would be contradictory, the four activities are not form aggregates. Neither are they feeling, nor perception, nor consciousness, nor psychological compounds, and therefore they are non-psycho-physical aggregates.

Nonetheless, such things as the arising of a patch of blue are not explained to be non-psycho-physical aggregates on the grounds that the patch of blue arises where it has been previously absent, endures while it exists, ceases without remaining for the second moment after the moment when it comes into existence, and ages, becoming different from what it was earlier.<sup>28</sup> [189]

The activity of the ceasing of the blue patch, since it has disintegration at the second moment after the moment of *its* coming into existence, and since it is a non-psycho-physical aggregate, must be produced through its own causes and conditions. Therefore, it is established that disintegration has a cause.

The argument that it is necessary to posit disintegration since it is the activity of the cessation of a patch of blue is this: Since it has been shown that

28. Tsong khapa is arguing that since the blue patch is a material form, its arising, enduring, aging, and cessation are material, not mental.

the nondisintegration of the blue patch while it exists and its disintegration at the second moment are similar with respect to whether they are entities or not, it follows that its disintegration would be its impermanence. The meaning of the statement that these are the characteristics of the produced is that they are merely indicators—that in virtue of having these activities things are known as the produced. But they are *not* like characteristics such as the bulbousness of the pot, which are *defining characteristics*. They are not, because the absurd consequence would follow that impermanence would not have momentariness as its defining characteristic.

By reason of the assertion that aging and death are conditioned by birth, disintegration at the second moment depends merely on having arisen at the first moment, and does not need to depend on anything else. Therefore, it is easy to prove that momentary things that do not remain for a second moment cease. So all of this fits together nicely in this system.

Suppose one thought as follows: The disintegration of a sprout is a non-entity, so why would it need to have a cause? So, it does not have a cause. Well, then, the sprout is an existent, and since it is, what is the need for it to have a cause? For what is already arisen does not need anything to give rise to it. This shows that these cases are similar: If there is no need for a cause for a disintegrated sprout, there is no need for a cause for a nondisintegrated sprout. Since that which is nondisintegrated has already come into existence, it does not need a cause now. But its coming into existence was brought about by a cause; therefore, it has a cause. This is the fundamental response. We will demonstrate the invulnerability of this response below. Moreover, the arising of the sprout, which was not there previously at the time of the seed, and exists later, has a cause. Similarly, since [190] the disintegration of the sprout—which does not exist at the time of the sprout, but exists later—exists, it has a cause.

Suppose one said that if this were the case, it would be irrational to ask what a cause would do for the disintegration of the sprout. We do not maintain that a cause in the present makes it become something else. But the disintegration of the sprout is indeed brought about by a cause. In that case, he would say, it must be an entity. We agree with this, because with respect to its nature it is an entity, though with respect the sprout it is not an entity.

Moreover, in *Daśābhūmi-sūtra* it says,

Death also involves two activities: It destroys the compounds and it provides the cause for the unbroken continuum of ignorance. [*phal chen kha* 221b]

Since it says this, disintegration can perform a function, and therefore it has a cause. In this context, in *Prasannapadā*, the usage of the word “destruction” accords with the thesis that disintegration of a thing itself is destruction. But the opponent regards destruction and disintegration as mutually incom-

patible. Therefore, here we use “disintegration.” Through the example of the sprout the disintegration of other entities should be understood.

1.2.1.1.2.3.3.2 The arguments presented in *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*

The cause of the disintegration at the second moment of the thing that existed at the first moment has already been explained. Apart from that, the cause of the disintegration of the continuum is like the exhaustion of the butter and the wick as the cause of the extinguishment of the butterlamp as explained in the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* [*dBu ma ya* 15b].

Here, according to the opponent, the exhaustion of the butter and the wick are not the cause of the extinguishment of the butterlamp; instead the exhaustion of the butter and the wick is the incompleteness of the set of conditions for the final moment of the butterlamp to give rise to a similar subsequent moment. They also say that a thing yet to come is also not arisen just because the set of causes for it to arise is not complete.

In response to that, it is said that if that were so, then when the set of causes for something is not incomplete that thing must certainly arise. The incompleteness of the set of causes is accepted as the cause of the non-arising of things that are yet to come. Therefore, it would have to be accepted that, because of the exhaustion of the cause of endurance, the effect—the endurance—is exhausted. [191]

The cause of the sprout that is to arise—not arisen at present, and yet to come—is also regarded as the incompleteness of its conditions due to conditions that existed earlier. This is because one who posits the disintegration of the sprout as an entity must maintain the same thing about that which is yet to come.

Candrakīrti responds to the argument that the exhaustion of the butter and the wick cannot be a cause by providing a similar argument to the effect that their nonexhaustion and existence could then also not be a cause: The seed, at that very stage of its existence, cannot be perceived as the cause of the sprout. The explanation of such statements has been presented earlier.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, causes and effects of things such as the sprout should be posited in accordance the way things are seen by ordinary beings. Ordinary people say, “Since there was no water my crops failed, without food, my son died, Without the former, the latter was lost.” Just as the non-exhaustion of water and the non-exhaustion of food, respectively, are regarded as the causes of good crops and the life of the son, their exhaustion is also posited as the cause of the

29. See chapter I.

respective losses. Therefore their nonexhaustion is not similar to their non-existence, which is not exhaustion and thus one should understand this with respect to the effect as well. This is the meaning of the statement, “Both things and non-things are compounded” [XXV: 13], as will be explained below, and of the following statement in *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*:

From the exhaustion of causes comes peace.  
Exhaustion is perceived. [20ab]

*Catuḥśataka* also says:

The effect destroys the cause.  
Therefore, the nonexistent does not arise. [XV: 2]

The cessation of the cause is brought about by the effect that is in the process of arising, as has been explained, and so is the view of the noble father and son. Because of the fact that they maintain that the past disintegration of the sprout is an entity, the future sprout is treated similarly. And this also means that nonexistents do not arise. This framework for understanding the past and the future is not tenable in the system according to which things exist inherently, but it is completely tenable according to the system in which essence is not acceptable even conventionally. This is explained in the *Commentary to Catuḥśataka* [*dBu ma* ya 224a] [192] and is extremely important in this system. **However, since it is little known, it has been explained in detail here.**

### 1.2.1.2 Individual refutations of the particular characteristics

Suppose one argued that although the universal characteristics of the produced—arising, enduring, and ceasing—have been refuted, the produced phenomena which have particular characteristics—solidity, dewlap-possession, etc.—do exist essentially.

33. Since arising, enduring, and ceasing  
Do not exist, there are no produced things.

Thus it follows from the fact that arising, enduring, and ceasing are not essentially existent that the produced does not exist essentially. Therefore these particular characteristics do not exist essentially either.

### 1.2.2 Showing that thereby the essential existence of the unproduced is also refuted

Suppose one argued that the produced exists essentially because its opposite, the unproduced, exists.