

Now here, the example is not established. Why? That example is not correct. That example is not correct for the Prasangika because *in the first syllogism* the Yogacharya says during dream, consciousness is empty of external object, they say there is no physical object. But the Prasangika view is that even during dream time, if mental consciousness sees color, shape, or mental consciousness dreams of sounds, smells and so forth, those appearances are physical things. They are forms, external forms, external objects. St, *Prasangika* says at the time of dream *they are* different entities from the mental consciousness.

*Because the dharma-entrance form exists* - any form, any physical thing, that appears only to the mental consciousness, color, shape etc, that is the *dharma-entrance form*. Earlier, Prasangika said *the dharma-entrance form* is a physical subtle form which is only an appearance to the mind, sixth mental, rather than to the senses. Any object that is seen directly by eye consciousness, color, shape, etc., that visual form is the *form-entrance form*. (Visual) form has two kinds – *dharma-entrance form* and *form-entrance form*. (*Sounds, odors, etc clearly appearing to the mental consciousness in a dream are also included in the dharma-entrance. They are forms, but not visual forms.*)

The *visual* form entrance is the direct object of eye consciousness. The *dharma entrance form* means similar kind of physical things which appear to the *mental* consciousness. Dream time, horses etc., color, shape etc., in the dream time are *dharma-entrance forms*. Later, when yogis meditate on the *entire ground pervaded by skeleton bones* everything appearing as bones etc., unattractive, good things, whatever, sometimes when yogis their mental seeing things which are not able to be seen by others' eye consciousness, but only mind sees, subtle forms. So that is talking here,

St, here *like a dream* is not a *correct* example, it is incorrect because even during dream time, there is a physical thing, an external form. External doesn't mean completely outside - we say inside and outside, but for example, do you say the intestines and so forth are external or internal? Usually, common sense, internal means inside this body. But when Yogacharya is talking about consciousness, is internal, consciousness, its own reflection, then it is internal. Is nature of consciousness, subject. Something that you see as a different entity from consciousness is called external.

The first two are incorrect. Now, SBYOR BA GSUM PA NI, – *The third syllogism, ...*

*Likewise, if the base of the fully afflicted and completely pure, dependent nature, does not exist – if there is no base of the fully deluded and the completely pure, that is the dependent nature, if there is no dependent nature, then - the fully afflicted and the completely pure are non-existent because of lacking support –*

KUN BYANG GI RTEN RANG MTSAN GYIS GRUB PA CIG SGRUB 'DOD PA YIN PAS DE LA NI, RTEN TZAM MED PA MA GRUB PA YIN LA –..*since the support of the fully afflicted and the completely pure are asserted as a characteristically existent one, the non-existence there of a mere support is not established;*

If you say *because the support does not exist*, the base does not exist. Prasangika will distinguish between talking about just a mere base or an inherently existing base. Of course it is not correct to say just a mere base does not exist, because there is a mere base. All samsaric side and purification side, all of these have a base, a mere base. But if you are talking about inherently existing kind of base, something special kind of inherently existent foundation, then not.

RANG GI MTSAN NYID KYIS GRUB PA LA BSAMS NA NI MA NGES PA'O – *If thinking about inherent existence, it is indefinite. Your logic has - kyab pa ma nges - no definite pervasion because a characteristically existent support does not exist. If thinking about inherent existence – inherently existing support, then, MA NGES pa yin no. a characteristically existent support, of course does not exist, and what your reason putting is not pervasive. kyab pa ma nges, ma nges means khyab pa. You know, tsan nyid is, subject such and such subject, such and such yin, predicate, because this – and there are three answers. First, this one is this, yin pai chir. you can say the sign is not established. This one not follow this reason doesn't follow predicate, kyab pa ma nges. Ma nges means kyab pa.*

thal 'gyur ltar snang bzhi'i nang gses/ rtags de bsgrub bya'i chos kyi mthun phyogs dang mi mthun phyogs gnyis kar 'jug pas mthun phyogs kho nar khyab pa ma nges pa/ dper na/ sgra chos can/ mi rtag par thal/ shes bya yin pa'i phyir/ zhes pa lta bu shes bya yin na mtha' gcig tu mi rtag pa yin pas ma khyab cing/ thal lan ma khyab ces sam khyab pa ma nges zhes brjod pa'o/

you can say kyab pa ma jung, same thing. If you are studying the Collected Topics, *there is no pervasion*. That is same thing as kyab pa ma nges. *The sign is not established – the pervasion does not occur.* And then if here two things. Subject to the predicate, ask accordingly, yes if you say, *accept*. No, by saying *why?* that is saying two things.