

alone (*yid shes kho na'i yul du gyur*); and from among this [latter category], it is a form which is imaginary (*kun brtags pa'i gzugs*), like the appearance of the world filled with bones within the mind that has meditated upon the unpleasantness [of cyclic existence].<sup>1043</sup> The appearance that appears as imaginary hair to the sense consciousness [affected by cataracts], the appearance in which a mirage appears as water, and the appearance in which the reflection appears as one's face [within a mirror], are form elements because they are [401] forms that are the appearing objects (*snang yul*) of sense consciousness. Now we must examine the following question.

**[Sense Perception Across World Spheres: The Case of Water]<sup>1044</sup>**

[Opponent:] [If there are external objects and the world is not of the nature of mind,] how should [one consider], then, a river of water that appears to a *preta*<sup>1045</sup> as pus and blood? Is it the pus and blood that it appears to be or not? Also, is [the pus and blood] to be accepted as an external object or is it not?

[Reply:] In this regard, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* says:

Because a single thing is different for different minds,  
Depending upon what family [of beings] they belong to,  
Whether *preta*, animal, human, or god,  
We accept the object to be nonexistent.<sup>1046</sup>

In the explanation (*bshad sbyar*) of that [work] by the venerable spiritual friend *Nihsvabhāva* it says:

By virtue of the ripening of his or her own karma, a *preta* sees deposits of water such as rivers to be filled with pus and so forth. An animal, [for example, a fish,] conceives of it as its own abode. Humans conceive of it as sweet, pure, fresh water and think "I will wash in it," "I will drink it," "I will enter it." The gods who are equipoised in the element of infinite space see it as space, for they have no recognition of form.<sup>1047</sup>

[Opponent 1:] It is for this reason that all phenomena are whatever one's own mind makes them out to be. It is impossible to say in a definitive way "it is this" or "it is not this."

[Opponent 2:] Because it is true [for a being] as it appears within the purview of that being's own mind, a single entity that [has the properties] of wetness and fluidity<sup>1048</sup> is true pus within a *preta*'s purview, and true water for a human.

[Reply:] Those who advocate these positions are making themselves known to be utter fools, to be the likes of the *Nirgranthas*.<sup>1049</sup> The entity that [possesses the characteristics] of wetness and fluidity appears to be pus and

blood to the eye consciousness of a *preta*. It appears to be water to the eye consciousness of a human, and nectar to the eye consciousness of a god. At that time do you accept those eye consciousnesses to be valid cognitions or do you accept that some [among the three] are valid cognitions, whereas others are not? In the first case, it would follow that there was something that was pus and blood, clear water, and nectar [all at the same time], whereas there exists a valid cognition that is unmistaken about [these three] being mutually exclusive. Because that single entity would be established as being pus and blood by a valid cognition and not being pus and blood by a valid cognition, valid cognitions could no longer serve the slightest function as agents of verification. To accept this, and to claim that only that is true which appears to one's own mind, and that it is not therefore possible to decisively posit something to be *x* or not *x*, reduces one to being unable to decisively distinguish between the correct philosophical position of the Buddhists and the incorrect position of the heterodox. Therefore, because the teachers of the heterodox and our own teacher, the perfect Buddha, would not be distinguished in goodness, what worse karma is there than this, the slandering (*skur ba bdebs pa*) of the three jewels?

[Opponent:] Some [of these eye consciousnesses] are valid cognitions, but some are not.

[Reply:] Then which are not valid cognitions?

[Opponent:] Some gods seeing nectar and the *pretas* seeing pus and blood are mistaken appearances that have been affected by [these beings'] own particular karma, that is, those eye consciousnesses are not valid cognitions, whereas humans seeing [it as water] is a valid cognition.

[Reply:] Then tell us why humans seeing it as cool, clean water is not the [403] result of *their* karma as well. Therefore, [the humans' perception] is in every way analogous. It too could not be a valid cognition. If only the eye consciousness of a human could be a valid cognition and if the eye consciousnesses of other sentient beings could not be valid cognitions, then the same would be true of the ear consciousness. Because [this would mean] that there could then be no valid cognitions in the continua of any nonhuman beings, it would be impossible for there to arise ascertaining consciousnesses (*nges shes*), and for there to occur the elimination of reification (*sgro 'dogs chod pa*) in regard to any object within the continua of any nonhuman beings. Because that would imply that these other beings could not even recognize each other, those who advocate such a thing are more stupid than even animals.

Now if you are wondering what we ourselves accept; it is this. We believe that the eye consciousnesses of all three [beings], god, human, and *preta*, are valid cognitions. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] is the common basis of all three [substances]: clean and cool water, pus and blood, and nectar, [that is, the liquid is not all three substances]. [Instead, we believe] that *one part* is pus and blood; that *one part*

is clean, cool water; and that *one part* arises as nectar. It is not the case, however, that as soon as that vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] comes into existence, these three parts also come into existence; it is not that for as long as the continuity of the vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] exists, so long does it engage in possessing the continuity of the three parts. Instead, it is when the *preta* comes close to it that the previous moment of the wet and fluid [substance], acting as a material cause (*nyer len*), and the *preta*'s own karma, acting as the dominant cause (*bdag rkyen*), make one part of that vessel filled with wet and fluid [substance] arise as pus and blood. Likewise, when a god approaches it, the previous [moment of the] wet and fluid [substance], acting as the material cause, together with the god's own karma, which acts as the dominant cause, cause one portion to arise as nectar. When the god and *preta* leave it, however, because the karmic dominant cause is not complete, the later continuities of pus and blood and nectar do not arise. It is by virtue of the *preta*'s evil karma that he sees the pus and blood part, and it is because he has not accumulated good karma that he does not see the nectar part. By virtue of his good karma, the god sees the part of the nectar and does not see the part of the pus and blood. Therefore, when the *preta* takes that vessel in his hand and begins to drink from it, all of the parts become exclusively pus and blood as soon as it reaches the *preta*'s mouth. This is because it has become an object used exclusively by a *preta*. The other two cases should be understood in the same way, by analogy.

[Opponent:] What was this vessel filled with the wet and fluid [substance] before the three beings, god, human, and *preta*, had arrived at that place? Was it water, or pus and blood, [or nectar]? [405]

[Reply:] If it were a river, a spring, or a well that came from the earth, or were it taken from [any one] of those, then it would be originally ordinary water, as it originally arose from a karmic domain in which humans are dominant. The pools of nectar that exist in some special god realms are originally nectar, as they arise from the dominant cause of the karma for enjoying such things as pools of nectar, [that is, the karma that gods possess]. In short, whether it is water or nectar before the *preta* and so on arrive depends on the environment from which that wet and fluid [substance] came; that is, whether the environment came into existence due to the dominant cause of humans' karma, or from the dominant cause of gods' karma, and so forth.

This same method of explanation can also be applied to the following example. When the hand that has been blessed by certain special mantras touches a red-hot piece of iron, it does not feel hot, but if the hand of another man were to touch it, it would be hot and it would burn. This piece of iron has two tactile parts: one that is hot and one that is not. The hand that has been enchanted by spells experiences a tactile sensation that is not hot and does not experience the heat. When the hand of another man touches it, however, it experiences the tactile sensation of heat and does not experience the tactile

sensation of no heat. Likewise should one understand that the division into [406] parts and whole applies to such scriptural passages as:

*Pretas* in the springtime are burnt even by the moon,  
And in the winter, even the sun makes them cold.<sup>1050</sup>

So, when the rays of the moon and the karma of a *preta* come together in the springtime, the one part of the moon's rays that has become the object of the bodily sensations of the *preta* causes a feeling of heat at that time. When the rays of the sun in wintertime and the karma of a *preta* come together, the one part of the sun's rays that has become the object of the bodily sensations of the *preta* causes a feeling of coolness. Whenever it has not come together with the karma of a *preta*, the rays of the moon are not accepted as having these two different feelings, that is, the hot feeling is not accepted; also, there is no one who accepts that the sun possesses the substance of darkness.

Hence, without having understood the meaning of the texts, do not create suffering for yourself by laboriously refuting these [points that no one accepts]. Even though a single entity will arise as clear water, pus and blood, and nectar, depending on the karma of individual beings, we believe that the karma of each will not [permit them] to see the other parts, that they only see that part which is the fruit of their own karma.

[Opponent:] [A non-Buddhist] claims that when a single being is seen by a friend and a foe he is [seen] to be pleasant and unpleasant [respectively], but is not seen to be both [pleasant and unpleasant] by each, for these [two qualities] are mutually obscured by active form (*las gzugs*). This, however, has been refuted by the reasoning of Dharmakīrti. [Likewise is your position that a single entity cannot be seen in two ways, but that only different parts are seen in different ways, also refuted by Dharmakīrti].

[Reply:] You are only making it clear to all that you are completely unfamiliar with both the scriptural exegesis of Dharmakīrti and with the beliefs of those whom you are trying to refute. The lines:

If, in dependence upon sight of that,  
Another form were to arise . . .<sup>1051</sup>

[are to be interpreted as follows]. [A heterodox school believes that,] when [407] viewed up close, there arises a transparent active form between the organ and the object; and that, when viewed from afar, there arises a nontransparent active form between the organ and the object. Hence, [they believe] that there is a difference in the clarity or lack of clarity in the sense consciousness of [the object] blue and so on when close or far, but they do not attribute this to the appearance (*rnam pa shar ba*) [of the object] to the consciousness [but instead to the presence of this intervening active form]. Having expressed what this position accepts, [the Buddhist] refutes them [as follows].