

1066. According to dGe lugs pa *siddhānta* literature, *svasaṃvedanā*, or autocognition, is something asserted by Sautrāntikas, Cittamātrins, and Yogācāra-Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. Specifically, it is seen in these schools as a way to explain the workings of memory. How can we, they argue, remember having had a cognition of the color blue if when we first saw the blue that very same consciousness was not perceiving itself? The Prāsaṅgikas, as will become obvious, repudiate the need for autocognition to explain the workings of memory. See MA, pp. 166 ff for a complimentary discussion of this topic; also LSN, folios 77b–81b; see also KL, pp. 110–113; SOS, pp. 195–196, 310–312 (for a discussion of Bhāvaviveka's critique based on the *Madhyamakahr̥daya*); see Bhāvaviveka, *Madhyamakahr̥daya* (V, 20–22) and *Tarkajvālā*, P no. 5356, vol. 96, folio 93; the implicit reference in MMK (VII, 8–12) may be to *svasaṃvedanā*, see Pras, p. 151 and n. 4; also J. May, *Cinq Chapitres*, p. 113, n. 284, who gives references to sources that discuss the origin of the doctrine; EE, pp. 317–321; MOE, pp. 350–351, 373–374; Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, trans. M. Hattori, pp. 28–30; PV (*Pratyakṣapariccheda*) (II, 423–502), Shastri, *Pramāṇavārttika of Acārya Dharmakīrti*; CS (XIII, 16–17); AC, pp. 122–123; CMDR, p. 332; *Śūnyatāsaptati*, v. 52–57, ed. and trans. D. Komito, pp. 162–169; and Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣa*, trans. Y. Kajiyama, pp. 47–53, for an extensive rebuttal of the critiques of the theory, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist.

1067. Toh. no. 3856, dBu ma dza, folio 205a.

1068. Dualistic appearances occur when a consciousness apprehends an object that seems or appears external to itself. In the case of autocognition, even at the level of appearances, no external object is involved because it is but one aspect of the consciousness apprehending another.

1069. PV, Shastri, ed., p. 224 (II, 428d); rGyal tshab rje's remarks on this verse in *Thar lam gsal byed* (Sarnath: Gelukpa Students Welfare Committee, 1974), p. 196, are as follows.

“[Opponent:] Even though there is no autocognition, this does not imply that there is nothing to experience [the consciousness which is later remembered], for it is experienced by another consciousness occurring afterward.

“[Reply:] How can a later mind possessing the aspect of the entity of that earlier mind experience the earlier mind? It is impossible, for at the time of the later one the earlier consciousness has ceased. It would imply, absurdly, the end of all of the experience of object *and* consciousness, for not only would it fail in [apprehending] the earlier consciousness, but it would not experience its own nature either. It would follow, absurdly, that the later consciousness which is purportedly what experiences [the earlier one], appears as being directed outwardly because it is a consciousness that possesses the appearance of a *svalakṣaṇa* of a different substance from itself as its apprehended object (*gzung don*). It is not correct to accept this because the mind in its subjective aspect, which is what apprehends the mind, is always directed only internally toward its own nature.”

1070. PV, Shastri, ed., p. 198 (II, 330); compare to PV, Shastri, ed., p. 229 (II, 446cd); rGyal tshab rje's remarks in *Thar lam gsal byed*, Sarnath ed., p. 158, are as follows.

“[Opponent:] If object and subject are not different things, then why is it that they appear [as if they were] to everyone, from sages to children, in a way that cannot be disavowed?

“[Reply:] Even though ultimately the aspects of the cognized [entity] and the cognizing [agent] are not different things, just as that which is apprehended by the consciousness to which hair [falsely] appears, [so that the imaginary hair] appears as if it were of a different substance from the consciousness, there is no contradiction in its appearing in this way, that is, erroneously.”

1071. *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti*; *P dBu ma sa*, folio 4b (commentary of kārika 6c); see Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, pp. 72–73, 157. The *rang rig 'gog pa na* of the *TTC* is missing in the *bsTan 'gyur* versions. This leads me to suggest an emendation to the text of the *TTC* so that this expression, “when refuting autocognition,” is read outside of the quote. My translation (and interpretation) here varies from Eckel's.

1072. The pervasion in the Cittamātrins's syllogism involves the assertion, “if memory of a consciousness exists, then so must the reflexive experience of that consciousness by autocognition.” The reply by mKhas grub rje is that such a pervasion is erroneous—it does not hold invariably—for there are instances of remembering an object or a thought of an object when no reflexive experience occurred at the time of the thought.

1073. According to oral commentary, apparently there is a notion in Tibet that certain kinds of glass, those having powers to magnify for example, are born from fire, whereas others, having a cooling effect on the eyes, are born from the crystallization of water into ice and eventually into rock crystal. But this process is said to be very rare, and not every fire nor every body of water gives rise to such glass. Cf. *MA*, p. 169.

1074. *MMK* (VII, 12).

1075. Whereas the previous subsection was the refutation of the reasoning used by the Cittamātrins to prove autocognition, this subsection, not restricting itself to a mere rebuttal of their position, gives independent arguments and expounds other logical fallacies involved in maintaining the position that there is such a thing as autocognition.

1076. Which is to say that if cognition is possible without an object different from the cognition itself, then object and consciousness (or perceived object and valid cognition) would not be mutually dependent entities defined in terms of each other, which of course they are.

1077. Granted that the subjective aspect (the cognizing subject) is supposed to have as its subject the objective aspect (the cognized object), but the Cittamātrins go on to maintain that that objective aspect is *of the same nature* as the subjective aspect and that it is a case of autocognition, thereby once again blurring the distinctions between subject and object. See *Thar lam gsal byed*, p. 158.

1078. *MA* (VI, 76cd), p. 172. *TTC* has *min par* for *MA's min pas*, and *myong bar* for *MA's 'dzin par*. Though I have opted for the latter's reading, the meaning is essentially unchanged from what it would be in the former.