

[Reply:] At that place, pus does appear to the *preta*, and the basis of that appearance does actually have the ability to act as pus. Nectar does appear to the god in that place, and the basis of that appearance does actually have the ability to act as nectar. We believe this. It is not necessary, however, that there appear with absolute precision the same amounts; that is, a [completely] full bowl of nectar or a [completely] full bowl of pus. Were it necessary, then it would also be necessary that the amount of a bowl full [of liquid] appear even to a microbe the likes of which cannot be seen by the ordinary eye, and that lives in the bowl full of liquid [possessing the characteristics of] wetness and fluidity with the thought of its being a home. Were *that* so, then the depth, [418] width, and breadth of the ocean would have to appear exactly as it is to the tiny fish who lives in the ocean. It would also be necessary for it to appear as a bowl full of weapons when it appears as weapons to some demigods (*lha ma yin*) [which it of course does not]. Even if it *were* necessary that at that time there appear exactly similar proportions, that is, a [complete] bowl full of pus, a [complete] bowl full of nectar, and so forth, this still presents no problem for us. This is because no one could refute the assertion that, though those eye consciousnesses are valid cognitions merely in regard to pus that has the ability to act as such and in regard to nectar that has the ability to perform the function of the basis of appearance, they are not valid cognitions in regard to the aspect of the proportion; that is, of just *how much* it is that appears. In these [various] ways, this point has been misapprehended by those of small intellect using [as their source] the mere words of those who cannot analyze it, so that they do not realize the eloquence of the holy to *be* eloquence. Seeing their incertitude in regard to karma and its effects, I have explained it in a slightly more elaborate way.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3. *The Explanation of Why We Do Not Accept Autocognition (rang rig)¹⁰⁶⁶*

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1. *The Explanation of How We Refute the Position That Does Accept It*

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.1. *The Explanation of the Opponent's Position*

The autocognition accepted by the Sautrāntikas and the Cittamātrins is as follows. The *Tarkajvālā* clearly indicates this by setting forth the opponents' position:

The Cittamātrins claim that consciousness appears in two ways: self-reflectively (*rang snang ba*) and reflecting the object (*yul snang ba*).

The consciousness that reflects the object takes on the aspect of the external object. This [latter consciousness] then becomes the object of a self-reflective consciousness.¹⁰⁶⁷

yul gyi rnam par gyur pa'i gzung rnam de nyid - 'dzin rnam de nyid - 'dzin rnam gyi yul du bshad pas

Self-reflective refers to the subjective aspect ('dzin rnam), and *reflecting the object* refers to the objective aspect (gzung rnam). The objective aspect, which [419] takes on the aspect of the object, is explained to be the object of the subjective aspect. Hence, the experience of the objective aspect by the subjective aspect is the meaning of autocognition. Therefore, in the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra systems both, every consciousness has a subjective aspect which is of [that consciousness'] own nature. This [subjective aspect] is directed strictly internally, and it is devoid of all dualistic appearances.¹⁰⁶⁸ It cognizes itself. It is a subjective aspect that is independent (yan gar ba) and that cognizes both itself and the objective aspect without at all depending on the appearance of any object whatsoever. These same points are clearly expressed by many scriptures such as the *Pramāṇavārttika* in such lines as "Permanently it faces within, toward itself"¹⁰⁶⁹ and "Both the cognized and cognizer have no aspect."¹⁰⁷⁰ Moreover, in the *Satyadvayavṛtti* it says:

When refuting autocognition . . . that consciousness, [that is, autocognition,] should be understood to be the cognition of the nature [of something] nondualistically and [it should be understood] to be nonexistent. If that were not so, it would not be correct.¹⁰⁷¹

which means that because there is no such thing as autocognition devoid of all dualistic appearances, there is no such thing (gzhan dbang) as the lack of subject-object duality.

The chief form of reasoning that the realists claim proves the existence of such an autocognition is this. If they were to posit a [standard syllogism of the form]:

[Subject:] the autocognition that autoexperiences the eye consciousness

that apprehends blue

[Predicate:] exists . . .

there could be found no example possessing [the characteristics of] both the reason and predicate that could be posited, [that is, accepted by,] the opponent [to whom the syllogism is being posited]. So they do not go about proving it in this way, and instead do so as follows.

After the eye consciousness has seen blue, there arise consciousnesses that remember the object and that think, "I have seen blue." They remember the possessor of the object, [that is, the eye consciousness itself,] and think, "I have seen." Just as it is impossible for there to arise a consciousness that remembers the blue unless it was preceded by an experience of the object blue, likewise it would be incorrect for there to arise a memory of the *eye con-*

sciousness apprehending blue unless it was preceded by an experience of the possessor of the object, the eye consciousness apprehending blue. Therefore, [they claim that] there does exist the experience of the eye consciousness apprehending blue. This can only be of two types: either it is a reflexive experience (*rang myong*), or an experience of something other (*gzhān myong*). Were it experienced by a consciousness that is something different from [the eye consciousness] itself, whether cotemporal with it or occurring after it, it would be necessary to accept yet another entity that experienced [that one experience], and so on ad infinitum. If the latter moment of the eye consciousness apprehending the blue experiences the former, there would follow the absurdity that the latter moment could not transfer its attention [lit. the action of apprehension] to the blue [as it would be preoccupied with apprehending the eye consciousness, hence implying that we see everything for only one moment]. This disproves its being an experience of something other. Therefore, it is established as being a reflexive experience. Because it is impossible for it to appear distant to itself, we have established the existence of autocognition devoid of all dualistic appearances. This is what they say.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2. *The Explanation of How to Refute It*

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2.1. *The Refutation of the [Logical] Proof*

Do you infer [the existence of] this experience using as your reason the fact of memory qua inherently existent thing, or do you posit as your reason mere memory [unqualified by whether or not it inherently exists]? In the first case, because for a Prāsaṅgika there is no difference between [inherently existing memory] and autocognition, both being nonexistent, [positing the reason of inherently existing memory] as proof of autocognition is improper. In the second case, positing mere memory, the result [of the reflexive experience of autocognition], as the reason proving the existence of a preceding special cause, namely, the reflexive experience [of autocognition], involves an erroneous pervasion (*khyab pa 'khrul ba*).¹⁰⁷² It is just like inferring the [existence] of fire glass from the mere [presence of] fire and the [existence] of water glass from the mere [presence of] water.¹⁰⁷³ Even though it is possible to establish that a mere experience preceded it by reason of having a memory, that experience cannot be fit into a pattern of “reflexive experience,” and “experience of another” as accepted by both Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins. It is just like [421] the fact that one cannot repudiate that a butter lamp is of a radiant nature (*gsal ba'i rang bzhin*) even though one *can* repudiate that the lamp radiates itself and that it is radiated by an object different from itself.

[Opponent:] But a butter lamp *is* radiated by itself.

[Reply:] Then it follows, absurdly, that darkness is obscured by itself. If you accept that, then it follows, absurdly, that there should be no obstacle to

clearly seeing the form of a pot within pitch black darkness, for at that time, the darkness, being obscured by obscuration, [that is, by itself], would not be seen, [thereby leaving the seeing of the pot unhindered]. As the *Prajñāmūla* says:

If the self-, or other-, nature of a lamp
Is what makes it appear [luminous],
Then there is no doubt that the self-, or other-, nature of darkness
Is what obscures it.¹⁰⁷⁴

Because, according to you, the earlier experience and the later memory are inherently different things, they become different in such a way that they are mutually independent of each other. If that is so, they would have to be unrelated different things, and it would therefore be incorrect for the later memory to remember the earlier experience. Otherwise, [if a consciousness unrelated to another one could remember it,] then the memory consciousness within Devadatta's continuum could, absurdly, remember an experience in the continuity of Yajña.

4.2.3.3.1.2.2.3.1.2.2. *The Refutation of the Belief*¹⁰⁷⁵

By repudiating the [Yogācāra's] proof for the existence of autocognition as explained, we also repudiate the existence of autocognition itself.

If that subjective aspect, to which there appear no objects of a different nature from [the mind] itself, apprehends that very subjective aspect, then the existence of valid cognitions would not depend on the perceived [objects] (*gzhal bya*), and neither would the existence of perceived [objects] depend on valid cognitions.¹⁰⁷⁶

No matter how much thought one gives to the independent subjective aspect that is directed internally, [that is, to autocognition,] it is impossible to get an image of any difference between the cognized [object] (*rig bya*) and cognizing [subject] (*rig byed*).¹⁰⁷⁷ Were that so, [that is, were it impossible to gain a conceptual mental picture of the relationship between subject and object within autocognition,] and despite that were one to still maintain that there can be posited a cognized [object] and a cognizing [subject], then it would be just as correct to maintain that within a single sprout there exists its own arising agent, [that is, its own cause,] (*skyed byed*) and its own arisen [effect] (*bskyed bya*). If that were so, then there would ensue the absurd fault that all actions and their doers (*bya byed*) would become identical, which is why [the *Madhyamakāvatāra*] says:

When the actor, the action, and the process are not one,
Then it is not reasonable for something to experience itself.¹⁰⁷⁸