

desire, namely (that one should eliminate) existence and craving, since the speaker here wants this sort of disciple to understand the actual meaning as explicitly expressed (albeit symbolically). Therefore, our position is that the non-definitiveness (of a teaching) is proven by showing a (logical) refutation of its literal meaning, the explicit meaning having necessarily been expressed, since no subject of the expression is shown other than the literal one, and there must be some subject of expression (in any even interpretable teaching). Therefore, there are two kinds of cases, one where (a teaching) is both the expressed meaning of the scriptural passage as well as the intention of the speaker, and another where it is necessarily established as the meaning of the scriptural passage, even when it is not the intention of the speaker.²³

THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE (*ELUCIDATION OF INTENTION*) AND THE *QUESTIONS OF MAITREYA* (CHAPTER OF THE *TRANSCENDENT WISDOM EIGHTEEN THOUSAND*)

(Here, it is commonly objected that) if the *Elucidation of Intention* presentation of the three natures is as explained in the Idealist system, do we likewise accept the *Questions of Maitreya* chapter? Or do we not? If we do, then, as in the case of the *Elucidation of Intention*, it is not correct to accept the *Mother Scripture* literally. If we do not, then (how do we account for the fact that) the following passage—“Maitreya, consider that imagined form as insubstantial. Consider that constructed form as substantial, not because of its independence, but because of the substantiality of construction. Consider that ultimate form as neither substantial nor insubstantial, but as derived from the ultimate”²⁴—agrees with the *Elucidation of Intention* by mentioning the substantiality of the relative and by proving the mere nominality of things from form to Buddhahood with the three reasonings (given above)²⁵ such as “because there would be no cognition prior to the name,” etc.?

To explain: Maitreya, wishing to learn how the bodhisattva practices the transcendent wisdom, asked how he should learn (to understand) things from forms to Buddhahood, and was answered that he should learn them as being “mere names.”²⁶ (Maitreya) then asked (further) about how to learn

that forms, etc., were “mere names,” since, as names such as “form” are apprehended along with the things that serve as their referents, “forms,” etc. are not properly “mere names.” If there is no referent, a name is not suitably a “mere name”; since, if the objective referent exists, the word “mere” excludes nothing, and if it does not exist, neither does the name, since it is without referential basis.²⁷ (The Buddha) then answers that (names) from “form” to “Buddhahood” are coincidentally designated upon their referents, that is, that nominal designation is coincidental. Since “coincidental” here has the meaning of “artificial,” it refutes the intrinsic reality (of the referents or the names).²⁸

If, as the Idealist would have it, this passage does not negate the truthstatus of forms, etc., but (merely) negates the truth-status of “forms, etc.” as nominally designated entities, then the intention of the above statement that (all things) from form to Buddha are mere names should be demonstrable (as meaning that) entities designated by such as “this form, etc.” are mere nominal designations (which is not so stated in the passage). In the subsequent passage, where (Maitreya) asks if forms, etc., are non-existent with respect to any nature, and the (Buddha) says he does not say that, (Maitreya) again asks “then how is it?” and (the Buddha) replies that “they exist by mundane terms and conventions, but not in the ultimate.”²⁹ Thus (if the Idealist interpretation were correct), then this statement that (all things) from form to Buddha are equally non-existent in the ultimate, and equally existent in the conventional would be wrong. Therefore, it is mistaken to urge that this chapter elucidates the interpretability of the *Mother Scripture* by showing the intention of the (scripture’s) earlier statements that all things are ultimately non-existent and conventionally existent.

Therefore, the import (of the chapter) is that, since nominally designated things are artificial, that is, established as existent in conventional terms, there is no referent to which names are attached which (itself) is not established as merely conventionally existent. And since that is not to say that in general there is no phenomenal basis for using names, the statement of the existence of that (conventional referent) and the statement that (all things) are mere nominal designations are not contradictory.

Thus, (Maitreya) asks how it is correct that “form” should be coincidentally nominally designated, since the consideration “this form” does not arise by virtue of seeing a manifestation of form without

(knowing) the name “form,” but arises by virtue of the name. (The Buddha) answers that it is correct for the thought “form” to arise since form is established on strength of convention, existing in that mode even before a name has been attached to it. (He) then asks Maitreya himself if a cognition that thinks “form” with regard to a phenomenon arises without depending on the name (“form”). (Maitreya) answers that such does not happen, and (the Buddha) states that for that very reason “forms, etc.” are coincidental nominal designations.³⁰ This (passage) indicates that that reason is the proof that forms, etc., are established on strength of conventions, and is not proof of the opposite, as (he) implies that if form had intrinsically identifiable status, the thought “form” would have to arise without requiring any designation of the name (“form”); just as a sprout would grow without requiring any seed if it were established by its intrinsic identity. (Further), the statement of the coincidentalness of designations of forms, etc., by the (further) reasons of a single thing having many names and many things being designable by one name,³¹ means that it is mistaken (to think) that nominal conventions are used on strength of intrinsic identifiability and are not just established coincidentally on strength of conventions.

When one uses these (three) reasons to prove something, it is not at all required that they be used in the way they are used in the *Universal Vehicle Compendium*. For (Nagarjuna), in his *Subtle Weaving*, uses the latter two (of the three) reasons to negate the ultimate status (of phenomena): “Furthermore, ultimate status is not established because (realistic cognition) is not possible; because of the obvious fault of the confusion of multiple aspects of expressions and their referents, and because of the indeterminacy (of expressions with respect to their referents).”³²

(Returning to the scripture), (Maitreya) asks if, when one apprehends phenomena from “form” to “Buddha,” it is not so that one only perceives that reality of forms, etc., which consists of nominal and conventional designations. (The Buddha queries in turn then) that since there are phenomena which serve as referential bases of nominal designations, is it not the case that forms, etc., have intrinsically real status? (Maitreya) responds that, as for the reality of forms, etc., the referents of conventional designations such as “forms, etc.,” it is no more than mere mental construction. (Finally the Buddha,) at that “mere construction” statement, responds: “Well then, what were you thinking when you questioned as before?”³³ This passage indicates that there is no contradiction between the

statement that phenomena which are referential bases of names exist, although not as intrinsically identifiable entities, and the statement that such are mere nominal designations.

Thus (Maitreya) suggests that, if forms, etc., are merely names and conventions, would not the reality of forms, etc., then be apprehended, meaning thereby that it would be contradictory to say both the above “it is mere designation” as well as “its reality is not apprehended”; which means that it is not contradictory for the reality of form etc., to exist, since even one who advocates “mere designation” must accept (the relationship of) designation and referent. In answer, (the Buddha counters, asking that) if (those things are) mere nominal designations, do they have production and destruction, addictive defilement and purification? (Maitreya) then answers that they do not, and (Buddha finally) declares, “Well then, is the question ‘If things are mere designations, wouldn’t they have their own reality?’ appropriate?”³⁴

Then, as explained above, they engage in the exchange beginning “Well, are forms, etc., totally non-existent with respect to any nature?” indicating that the negations of reality, production, destruction, addictive defilement, and purification are in terms of the ultimate and that forms, etc., exist conventionally.³⁵ Thus, since even mere designations (only exist) in terms of convention, how can the mode of exposition (of this chapter) possibly agree with that of the *Elucidation of Intention*? Even the Brother-Masters (Asanga and Vasubandhu) did not consider that this chapter revealed the interpretability of (the rest of) the *Mother Scripture*, but that this chapter is the same (as the rest of the *Mother Scripture*) since it teaches the ultimate non-existence and conventional existence of all things; and hence, according to the explanation of the *Elucidation of Intention*, it is not fit to be literally accepted.³⁶

(To understand how) this is not contradicted by the fact that (this scripture) states the relative (nature) to exist substantially, one must first know the scripture’s mode of representing the three realities. To explain, the scripture identifies the imagined nature (as follows):

Maitreya, this imaginative construction of a form-reality founded on the name, concept, designation, and convention “form” (ascribed) to the phenomena of the conditional process (is the imagined reality, including all things) from imagined “form” to imagined “Buddha-qualities.”³⁷

Here, “founded on ” means “apprehending in form the referent of the nominal designation.” “Imaginative construction of a form-reality” indicates that the imagined is the reality which is imaginatively constructed, not (mere) imagination (itself).

The scripture goes on to identify the discriminatively constructed reality (as follows):

The discriminatively constructed (relative) reality is the articulation of those phenomena of conditional processes, utilizing mental processes inherent in the nature of mere construction; (it is) the names, concepts, designations, and conventions from “form,” “sensation,” “conception,” “creation,” and “consciousness” up to “Buddha-qualities.” (It includes all things) from “discriminated form” up to “discriminated Buddha-qualities.”³⁸

Here, “those phenomena” refers to the subjects of expressions, and the mode of expressing them by utilizing discriminative construction (is described by the passage from) “forms,” etc. By explaining the thus expressed “names, etc.” as the “discriminatively constructed (relative) reality,” (we can) understand that the previously indicated subjects and mental constructions are also the discriminated (relative reality), and thus (we understand that it includes) both (the function of) discriminative construction and the ground of discriminative construction.

The scripture then defines the ultimate reality (as follows):

(The ultimate reality is) the truth-limit, Thatness, the objective selflessness and the sole realitylessness, permanent and eternal, of constructed form with respect to imagined form, (including all things) from ultimate form to ultimate Buddha-qualities.³⁹

Here, “ultimate form” is the realitylessness of constructed form, objective selflessness, etc. And since that principle is selflessness and realitylessness of constructed form with respect to imagined form, the negated “self” or reality is the imagined reality. “Permanent,” etc., indicates emptiness, which is ascertained at all times.

This method (is the same as) the Centrist presentation of the three natures, given by (Chandra) in the *Introduction Commentary*, where

(Chandra explains) that, just as a snake is a (mere) imaginative construct in a rope, not (really) existing there, yet is not (a mere) construct but is established in an actual snake, so intrinsic reality is a (mere) imaginative construct in the created relativity of the relative nature, since (Nagarjuna has defined) intrinsic reality as non-artificial and non-relational, yet such (intrinsic reality) is actual in the sphere of Buddhas, not being merely imaginatively constructed; as one is called a “Buddha” who realizes the solitary intrinsic reality, free of all contact with created things. Thus, this way of presenting the three realities elucidates the inner gist of the scriptures. And thus the meaning of the *Mother Scripture* should be understood as (Chandra explains) in the *Introduction Commentary*.⁴⁰

Here, the “constructed” (reality) is taken as the relative reality of all relative things from form to omniscience; and it is emphasized as the chief (reality). And that reality explained as the imagined, (consisting of) reality-imaginings from form to omniscience, is (itself) taken as the ground, or intrinsic reality, whose existence in the relative is (merely) imagined. Nevertheless, it is perfectly established as the object of a Buddha’s ultimate gnosis. Furthermore, the ultimate reality of the relative is its emptiness with respect to the imagined, which is the relative existing ultimately, and that very reality exists as the object of the Buddha’s ultimate knowledge. Thus, a single reality is presented as both imagined and also perfectly established when related to different grounds. Therefore, although there is no ultimate or superficial thing which is established as an intrinsic reality endowed with intrinsic identifiability, still the ultimate reality without the superficial reality is established as that which is represented as intrinsic reality of the absolute. Thus the question of existence and non-existence of intrinsic reality must be subtly understood.⁴¹

As for the statement (that a Buddha) understands clearly “the solitary intrinsic reality free of contact with created things,” it negates the (dualism of) “identified” and “identity” (inherent in) the object of the direct realization of the ultimate reality; and I have already explained the noncontradictoriness of this point.⁴²

The (subsequent) exhortation of the *Introduction Commentary* to think over whether the duality of subject and object is (merely) imaginatively constructed in the relative, since apart from the relative there are no subjects and objects, means that it is incorrect (to maintain) that the subject-object-duality alone is the imagined, since, there being no distinction between

existence and non-existence of subjective and objective, they both constitute the relative and thus serve as the designative base of the imagined.⁴³

Therefore, the “substantiality” mentioned in the *Questions of Maitreya* statement of “substantial existence and non-existence” is not the “substantial” of the pair “designative-substantial” employed in other treatises (of the Idealists), nor is it the “substantial” equated by the Centrists with intrinsically identifiable status; but signifies mere existence. Thus, “substantial non-existence of the imagined” intends the impossibility of (the imagined) existing as the reality of the relative, and does not (impugn) the existence of the imagined as object of names and signs, etc. And, as for the “substantial existence of the constructed (reality),” the scripture itself states it to be substantially established through the “substantial” existence of discriminative constructs (themselves), and not through some independently arisen phenomenon. Since “independent status” is just that which is explained in the treatises of the Father and Son Masters as intrinsically identifiable status, this (statement of “substantiality”) is not the same as the statements of other (interpretable) scriptures that the relative is endowed with intrinsic identifiability.

“Substantial” existence established by the substantiality of discriminative constructs is the kind of existence sustained by the existence of discriminative construction, which means that it is not an intrinsically identifiable existence. Since among things established by discriminative construction there are both those that do exist conventionally and those that do not, this (kind of mentally established existence) may not be likened to the discriminative construction of a snake in a rope. (Finally), as to the statement that the absolute reality is neither substantially existent nor non-existent, it intends the above non-existence according to the imagined and the existence as the intrinsic reality of the negation of that (imagined).

Interpreted in this way, this chapter determines with question and answer the points liable to misinterpretation from the statements in the scripture’s other chapters about the mere nominal designativeness of all things. It thoroughly differentiates the distinctions of existence and nonexistence of the three realities, and thus should be recognized as establishing the authority of the previous expositions.

This *Questions of Maitreya* chapter seems to be a major source of error for those scholars who are liable to suspect that within the *Transcendent*

Wisdom Scripture, the path which is the sole avenue of all the Victors of the three times, within that very scripture is (a chapter) which is determined to be interpretable in meaning like the *Elucidation of Intention*. And since the great Centrists do not seem to have elucidated the meaning of this very (chapter) in great detail, I have submitted the question to a detailed examination.⁴⁴

¹ MA, VI, k. 95cd, Poussin ed., p. 195; MABh, VI, Poussin ed., pp. 195-56. The SN quote, “The grasping consciousness ...” is the concluding verse of SN, V. Lamotte (*Explication*, p. 58) restores this verse as: *adanavijnana gambhhrasuksmo, ogho yathā vartati sarvabijo I balana eso mayi na prakasi, ma haiva dtma parikalpayeyuh //*. The scriptural quote, “Just as a doctor...” is from the LAS, Vaidya ed., p. 54 (Skt. *aturi aturi bhaisajyam yadvad bhisak prayacchati I cittamatram tatha buddhah sattvanam desayanti vai //*, also quoted *Subhdsitasamgraha*, f. 25, LVP, p. 250).

bLo-bzang Phun-tshogs (*Zin Bris* II, f. 49b4 ff.) mentions a fifth Idealist doctrine also shown to be interpretable by this reference, namely, the doctrine of the permanent phenomenal existence of the Buddha-essence (Tib. *snying po rtag dngos yod par*), discussed by mKhas-grub at length in *sTong Thun*.

² Tsong Khapa follows the tradition that accepts Nagarjuna’s authorship of the *Sutrasamuccaya*. Therein, the *ekayāna* proof runs from TG, C, ki, f. 190 ff.

³ *phyi rol snang ba yod min te I...* common phrase in Idealist scriptures.

⁴ MABh, VI, Poussin ed., p. 196, l. 12 to p. 198, l. 15, here expounded in paraphrase.

⁵ Jayananda’s MAT a subcommentary on MA often criticized by Tsong Khapa.

⁶ Refers to MABh passage given in n. 4 above.

⁷ LAS, Vaidya ed., p. 33 (passage preceding that quoted MABh, Poussin ed., pp. 196-97 (LVP pp. 251-52)): ... *sūtrāntah sarvasattvāsayadesanarthavyabhicārini, na sa tattvavyavasthānakathā I tadyathā mahāmate mrgatrsnikā mrgollāpint udakabhāvābhinivesenābhinivesyate, tasyām codakam nasti, evameva mahāmate sarvasūtrāntadesanā dharmā bālānām svavikalpasamtosanam, na tu sa tattvāryajñānavyavas-thānakathā / tasmātarhi mahāmate arthānusārinā bhavitavyam na desanābhilāpābhinivestena //*.

⁸ (LAS Vaidya ed., following the above, quoted MABh, etc.): ... *tathāgatagarbhah punarbhagavatā sūtrāntapathe ’nuvarnitah / sa ca kila tvayā prakrtiprabhasvaravisuddhyadivisuddha eva varnyate dvatrimisallaksanadharah sarvasattvadehantargatah maharghamulyaratnam malinavastraparivestitam iva skandhadhatvayatanavastraparivestito (ragadvesamohaparibhuta parikalpamalamalino) nityo dhruvah sasvatascanuvarnitah I tat katham ayarn bhagavdn tirthakaratomavadatulyas tathagatagarbhavado na bhavath tirthakarapi bhagavdn nityo ’karta nirguno vibhur avyaya ityatmavadopadesam kurvanti //*.

⁹ (LAS Vaidya ed., following above): *bhagavdn aha I na hi mahamate tirthakaratomavadatulyo mama tathagatagarbhavadopadesah I kim tu ... sunyata bhutakotinirvānānutpādnimittapranihitadyanam padarthanam tathagatagarbhopadesam krtva ... baldnam nairdmyasamtrasapadavivarjanartham ... desayanti I na ... bodhisattvair atmabhinivesah kartavyah /*, etc.

¹⁰ *Sutrasamuccaya*, TG, C, ki, f. 207a2-3.

¹¹ Ordinary, or gross, personal selflessness is defined by all Buddhist schools other than Dialecticist as the non-existence of a permanent, unique, and independent person. The subtle selflessness of person is defined by these schools as the non-existence of a self-sufficient person. The Dialecticists define the two as non-existence of a self-sufficient person, and non-existence of an intrinsically identifiable person, respectively. As to gross selflessness of things, the Idealists define it as the non-existence of independent objects as such, and the Experientalist-Dogmaticists as the non-existence of subject-object difference. Since the Dialecticists themselves do not consider any objective selflessness other than the subtle lack of intrinsic identifiability of things to be genuine, Tsong Khapa may here be using “gross” (*rags pa*) in a less technical sense, referring to the kind of intimation of objective selflessness contained in the similes for the aggregates used even in the Individual Vehicle to indicate their general insubstantiality. See Introduction, VIII, 3, Table D.

¹² *Ghanavyuhasutra* (Tib. *Rgyan-stug-po-bkod pa*).

¹³ LAS, Vaidya ed.; *tathdgatagarbhah dlayavijndnakirtitah saptavijndninah I*.

¹⁴ This distinction Tsong Khapa makes between the synonymy of the two expressions (*ming gi rnam grangs yin pa*), considering they both intend the same referent, and their literal-conceptual (*sgras zin gyi don*) difference (*gnyis mi gcig pa*) is somewhat obscure. He apparently means, as inferred from Chandra’s view, which he subsequently expounds, that both are used by the Buddha intending emptiness, but their conceptual difference, being respectively permanent and impermanent, is part of the interpretable, conventional, pedagogical device.

¹⁵ MABh, VI, ad. k. 41, Poussin ed., p. 131 (LVP, p. 321).

¹⁶ MA, VI, k. 43, Poussin ed., p. 132 (LVP, p. 322): Poussin cites a Skt. version from *Subhasitasamgraha*: *evam hi gambhirataran padarthan na vetti yastam prati desaneyam I astyalayah pudgala eva casti, skandha ime va khalu dhdtavasca //*. The Tibetan version was translated from a Skt. version that read *kevalam* for *dhatavas*.

¹⁷ MABh VI, ad. k. 95, Poussin ed., p. 198 (LVP, p. 252). LAS quote found Vaidya ed., p. 33: *etaddhi Mahamate sünyatdnutpadádvayanihsvabhvalaksanam sarvabuddhanám sarvasütrantagatam I*.

¹⁸ *Prajñaparamitdhrdaya*; *phung po Inga po de dag kyang rang bzhin gyis stong par rnam par yang dag par rjes su bltao*.

¹⁹ This last paragraph was resorted in translation into roughly the same order of presentation as the first two paragraphs: that is, 1) such and such a main theme is interpretable; 2) why; 3) intending what; 4) for what reason; 5) refutable by what reasonings—for clarity of comparison. Tsong Khapa, apparently tired of repeating himself in the same fashion, wove all the items together in his final paragraph into two rather convoluted sentences, quite intelligible in the abbreviated Tibetan. They are perfectly accurate, but, presented all at once as it were, might confuse the English reader not so accustomed to handling these doctrines.

²⁰ *Dhdranisvarardjapariprechasutra* is unavailable in Skt., and is not quoted in surviving compendia, though quoted in *Sutrasamuccaya* itself only extant in Tibetan.

²¹ Quote from *Sutrasamuccaya* occurs in *ekayāna* section, TG, C, ki, f. 190 ff.

²² This CS quote is not a direct quote from the text, although the gist of the statement is contained in CS, I.

²³ The gist seems to be that: 1) there is no internal contradiction in a passage that is intentionally to be interpreted differently by different disciples; 2) this is not just a case of literalness or non-

literalness, there being different types of expressions and different intentions in different cases; 3) and of the two cases, the former are normally definitive and the latter interpretable.

²⁴ This *Questions of Maitreya* chapter of the *Transcendent Wisdom Scriptures* is found only in the 18,000 and 25,000 line versions, as chapters 83 and 72 of the respective texts. E. Conze and S. lida have edited a Sanskrit version of the chapter, which closely corresponds to the version found in the 18,000 line version, and loosely corresponds to that of the 25,000/version (it is included in *Melanges d'Indianisme à la Memoire de Louis Renou*, Paris: Editions E. de Boccard, 1968, pp. 229-242). E. Conze has translated this edited Sanskrit text and included it as Chapter 83 of his *Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 644-652), itself based on the 25,000 line version. Tsong Khapa's own analysis of the main issues of the chapter follows the Tibetan version in the 18,000 line version, KG, P, ga, ff. 317b-334b, and the direct quotes he gives here and below can be traced easily to Conze and lida's Sanskrit version. His analytical paraphrases are very elaborate and involve references to a number of other texts, and are hard to attach to the rather more terse text of the Scripture, though they clearly adhere to its sense. The Sanskrit of this quote is as follows (Conze & lida, p. 238): *yan Maitreya parikalpitam rupam idam adravyam drastavyam*। *yad vikalpitam rupam idam vikalpitam rupam sadravyatam upadaya sadravyam drastavyam, na tu svatantravrttitah. yad dharmatā-rupan tan naivādravyam na sadravyam paramārthaprabhāvitam draṣṭavyam*. Conze's own English version of this is found in his *Large Sutra*, pp. 648-649. bLo-bzang Phun-tshogs (Zin Bris II, f. 56b) elucidates the scripture's definitions as follows: "Here the imagined is the negatee, the imagined; the constructed is the relative, said to be substantial as existent by force of designative discrimination, not as independent; the perfect is not non-substantial, existing as the reality of the negation of the negatee, and not substantial, not existing as an imagined reality."

²⁵ See Ch. II, "Actual Negation" (of reification).

²⁶ Skt. in Conze & lida, "Maitreya's Questions," p. 234; English in Conze, *Large Sutra*, p. 644.

²⁷ Tsong Khapa paraphrases here. English, Conze, *Large Sutra*, p. 645; Sanskrit, Conze & lida, "Maitreya's Questions," p. 234.

²⁸ Tsong Khapa continues the paraphrase; Conze, *Large Sutra*, p. 645; Conze & lida, "Maitreya's Questions," p. 234. The key phrase of the Buddha's here is: *āgantukam etan nāmadheyam prakṣiptam samskāranimitte vastuni, yad idam rūpam iti*.

²⁹ Conze, *Large Sutra*, p. 646; Conze & lida, "Maitreya's Questions," p. 236: *Maitreya āha: kiṃ punar Bhagavān sarvaśah svalakṣaṇena rūpam nāsti eva rūpam ... na santi eva yāvad buddhadharmāh? Bhagavān āha: na-aham . . . vadāmi. Maitreya āha- katham Bhagavān rūpam asti . . . yāvad buddhadharmāh santi? Bhagavān āha: loka-samketavyavaḥārato Maitreya rūpam asti na tu paramārthato ...* (abbreviations in edition).

³⁰ From this point, Tsong Khapa's paraphrase returns again to the beginning of the chapter (position in English and Sanskrit texts given above, n. 26), interpolating in his analysis the type of issue raised in the treatment of the process of verbal designation customary for the Idealists, as in Ch. II of the *Essence*.

³¹ These two reasons are always used together with the reason called "no cognition prior to name" given in Ch. II of the *Essence* under "Actual Negation."

³² *Vaidalyaprakarana*, P, C, tsa, f. 106al (paraphrased by Tsong Khapa here).

³³ Conze, *Large Sutra*, p. 646; Conze & lida, "Maitreya's Questions," p. 236.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Here Tsong Khapa's paraphrase again reaches the passage given above, n. 29.

³⁶ Since Tsong Khapa uses the expression “thought” (Tib. *snyam du dgongs so*), we may safely assume that there is no particular passage in the brothers’ writings elucidating this point. Tsong Khapa rather infers from the fact that the brothers did *not* use the *Maitreya Chapter* to support their Idealist philosophy that they made no claim that this chapter expounds the three natures in the same way as does the SN.

³⁷ Conze, *Large Sutra*, p. 648; Conze & Iida, “Maitreya’s Questions,” p. 238: *yā Maitreya tasmin saṃskāranimittē vastuni rūpam iti nāma-samjñā-samketa-prajñaptivyavahāran niśritya rūpa-svabhāvatayā parikalpanā, idam parikalpitam rūpam . . . yāvāt ime parikalpitā buddhadharmāḥ*. (Tib. omits *samketa*.)

³⁸ Ibid, *yā punas tasya saṃskāranimittasya vastuno vikalpamātra-dharmatāyām avasthānatā vikalpa-pratītya-abhilapanatā tatra-idaṃ nāmasamjñāsamketaprajñaptivyavaharo rūpam iti ... yāvād buddhadharmā iti. idaṃ vikalpitam rūpam ... ime vikalpitā buddhadharmāḥ*. (editors’ abbreviations).

³⁹ Ibid, (*dharmadhātur*) *yat tena parikalpitarūpeṇa tasya vikalpitarūpasya nityam nityakalam dhruvaṃ dhruvakālam nihsvabhāvatā dharmanairatmyan tathatā bhūtakotir idam dharmatā-rūpam ... ime yāvād buddhadharmā*.

⁴⁰ MABh, VI, ad. k. 97, p. 201 (paraphrased) (LVP, p. 255). Poussin badly garbles this passage, taking the “being of the snake” as “the rope,” and later reading *ma rig par* for *ma reg par*; etc.

⁴¹ That is, the Centrists *conventionally* reaffirm even the imagined reality, *ultimately* refuting both relative and imagined, this being a way of reducing the three realities to two realities, conventional and ultimate.

⁴² See explanation of “identified”-“identity” relationship on p. 261, in terms of “nature” and “nature-possessor” (*dhannadharmin*).

⁴³ See above, n. 40.

⁴⁴ See Ch. II nn. 96, 97, showing how Ratnakarashanti makes this mistake about the *Questions of Maitreya* chapter.